Peirce calls philosophy “cenoscopy”, that is, a view of the general. By that, he means that its aim is to provide a general view of the positive facts of human life and experience. Thus, cenoscopy begins its inquiries scrutinizing everything; experience shows us that is universal and pervasive, general and evident. The method of cenoscopic inquiry, as its very name says, rests upon the careful observation of all manifestations of usual and common experience, limiting itself to what can be inferr…
Read morePeirce calls philosophy “cenoscopy”, that is, a view of the general. By that, he means that its aim is to provide a general view of the positive facts of human life and experience. Thus, cenoscopy begins its inquiries scrutinizing everything; experience shows us that is universal and pervasive, general and evident. The method of cenoscopic inquiry, as its very name says, rests upon the careful observation of all manifestations of usual and common experience, limiting itself to what can be inferred from it: our common-sense experiences constitute the positum of philosophical inquiry. So, the biggest difficulty in philosophical inquiry is to cope with the certainties of common-sense, which are extremely vague and general, such certainties as expressed in propositions such as “fire burns”. Such experiences inform our world view, before any scientific world view, and as such it does not occur to us we can doubt them – they acquire the indubitable status of instinctive beliefs. In fact, common-sense beliefs are the very ground of our rational certainties, thus constituting the inevitable hic et nunc from where to start any philosophical and scientific inquiry. This paper aims at presenting Peirce’s main tenets of common-sense in relation to his conception of philosophy.