Catarina Neves

Despite widespread media coverage, cancel culture (or cancelling), has rarely been the subject of academic analysis. This article aims to contribute to the scholarly debate by discussing two arguments for why cancelling might be considered legitimate: (1) that cancelling regulates social conduct and behaviour and, (2) that it is a form of expression used by minority groups in the public sphere. Looking at John Stuart Mill’s theory, the article rejects the first argument, arguing that the possibility of vilification and the vagueness of the principle of harm make it difficult to justify cancelling for the sake of regulating social behaviour. Nonetheless, the article suggests that cancelling might be more easily justified according to the second argument, although this approach risks promoting conformism and the empowerment of the “social police”. The article closes with a call for more work on the subject, reflecting that despite calls for an end to cancelling based on the values of freedom of expression, the complexity of the phenomenon implies that even Mill could be used to legitimise cancel culture. Apesar da grande cobertura mediática, a cultura de cancelar tende a ser pouco analisada em publicações científicas. O presente artigo discute a legitimadade do cancelling, argumentando que pode (1) regular condutas sociais e, (2) que é um ato de expressão utilizada por grupos minoritários no espaço público. Olhando para a teoria de John Stuart Mill, (1) é rejeitado, devido aos riscos de difamação, mas também à dificuldade de aplicação do princípio do dano, largamente indefinido. Por outro lado, é reconhecida a possibilidade de legitimar o cancelamento graças a (2), embora existam riscos relacionados com conformismo e empoderamento da polícia social. O artigo termina com um apelo para mais trabalho sobre o tema, mas refletindo que apesar dos apelos ao fim do cancelamento, tendo por base os valores da liberdade de expressão, a complexidade do fenômeno faz com que mesmo Mill possa ser utilizado para legitimar o cancelling.

Gillian Brock’s book Corruption and Global Justice (2023) is a timely discussion on corruption. As Brock points out, this has been a neglected issue in political philosophy, even though its existence is a constraint on realizing many justice-related goals. The book tackles the important questions of what ought to be done about corruption, who ought to do it, and how responsibility should be shared. However, the book neglects to expand the issue of motivation, namely why citizens will join in the fight against corruption. Given that many of the solutions Brock proposes in the book require the participation of a range of stakeholders, lack of take-up by a significant number of citizens can compromise the feasibility of these proposals. In my comment, I argue we should enquire into the wrongfulness of political corruption, to account for the motivational question. Moreover, by framing political corruption as a breach of cooperation as fair reciprocity, I believe we can both discuss corruption as a relational harm, but also better account for what undermines or encourages citizens’ participation in corruption-curbing initiatives.

Inheritance is a major source of inequality, and evidence suggests that the more unequal a society is, the less supportive it will be to taxing it. This seems to be partly explained by ideas of how inheritance is important for family values. But for most egalitarians, family values are not compelling enough to justify unrestricted inheritance flows, due to the need to preserve equality of opportunities. In this article I will discuss how reciprocity can help explain common objections to taxing inheritance. To do so, I will discuss how reciprocal obligations within families help nurture family values of continuity and belonging, and that the ritual act of inheritance constitutes an important mechanism to do so. However, I will argue that the argument for inheritance resting on reciprocal obligations within families is restricted by similar reciprocal obligations with fellow citizens, namely the obligations to share burdens and benefits, but also to distribute evenly a right to bequeath. Finally, I will argue that in contexts of high concentration of wealth and income, the reciprocal obligations towards fellow citizens should justify a more demanding inheritance tax rate.

This article aims to contribute to the existing literature on the virtues and challenges of political liberalism. It argues that the principle of reciprocity can only sustain political agreement under pluralism, if citizens share a relationship of civic friends, based on mutual recognition as equals (Lister in Anal Kritik 2011, pp. 91–112), a non-prudential concern for the interest of others (Leland and van Wietmarschen in J Moral Philos 14, 2017, pp. 142–167) and shared experiences that can foster interpersonal trust. Inasmuch as this thicker definition of civic friendship is sound, and breeds a successful ground for civic reciprocity, it is argued that this renders the concept of civic reciprocity culturally sensitive in at least four ways: how citizens commit to reciprocity, what political values and institutional arrangements they deem reasonable and how they choose to cooperate are all influenced by culture. While this makes the project of multiculturalism more challenging, it does not make it impossible. Rather, it reminds us that while the formal requirement of reciprocity is important, it is a relational value anchored in how citizens relate to one another. Therefore, for multiculturalism to be successful, policies that strengthen ties of civic friendship need to be implemented.

The paper highlights the need to discuss the norm of reciprocity in the context of basic income experiments. Considering how the norm of reciprocity is an important objection to basic income, both at a normative level, but also in empirical discussions, a case is made for considering it in basic income experiments. The paper proposes several hypotheses on basic income and reciprocity and concludes with two distinct points: the first is focused on what in fact experiments could be telling us about behaviours that seem relevant to reciprocity, and how this could enhance our understanding of both basic income and the norm of reciprocity. The second point is a reflection on how our theoretical debate is shaped on ideal settings, whereas experiments take place in real-world conditions, hence non-ideal ones. This reflection might contribute to the need to reframe our theoretical account of the norm of reciprocity.

The paper highlights the need to discuss the norm of reciprocity in the context of basic income experiments. Considering how the norm of reciprocity is an important objection to basic income, both at a normative level, but also in empirical discussions, a case is made for considering it in basic income experiments. The paper proposes several hypotheses on basic income and reciprocity and concludes with two distinct points: the first is focused on what in fact experiments could be telling us about behaviours that seem relevant to reciprocity, and how this could enhance our understanding of both basic income and the norm of reciprocity. The second point is a reflection on how our theoretical debate is shaped on ideal settings, whereas experiments take place in real-world conditions, hence non-ideal ones. This reflection might contribute to the need to reframe our theoretical account of the norm of reciprocity.

In order to discuss Unconditional Basic Income from a philosophical standpoint, it is important to mention John Rawls and its concept of justice as fairness and property-owning democracy. At the same time, one is required to argue whether Rawls’ ideas are compatible with the UBI concept. On one hand, the idea of social minimum and ensuring everyone its fair share might lead to a strong and simple justification of UBI through John Rawls’ lens. On the other hand, I believe it may be too simplistic, since reciprocity is embedded in John Rawls’ principles of justice and one of his models of a fair society: property-owning democracy. I will argue in favor of the latter position: that it is not possible to justify an UBI through John Rawl’s theory. The discussion will then move into looking at our own societies, considering empirical issues in the analysis, since UBI can be an innovative measure to tackle some of these challenges.

In a larger context of an egalitarian project which aims to reformulate capitalism a job guarantee program in the form of a State as an Employer of Last Resort is considered superior to Unconditional Basic Income by many, namely Alan Thomas. This article claims that most of the arguments used to assert the superiority of SELR fail their objective, for the following reasons: first, SELR falls short in its reformulation of capitalism because neither SELR nor UBI alone can euthanize the rentier class. Second, most accounts are based on a flawed assumption that UBI leads to rampage inflation. Third, if macroeconomic considerations are not enough to justify implementing SELR over UBI, then insisting on the superiority of SELR can only stem from two types of moral reasons: on one hand from a perfectionist view of empowering the worst-off through labor and on the other from demands and obligations of reciprocity. We argue that these two moral-based reasons fall short of providing a justification for the superiority of SELR over UBI. We conclude our paper defending the possibility of conciliating the two policies.