Caterina Maurer

This essay examines the notion of shame in Hegel’s writings as a case study to show that an emotion that is generally considered ‘negative’ may nonetheless fulfil important functions in the life of the subject. In none of Hegel’s works the concept of shame is analysed systematically and thoroughly. Therefore, I will start by analysing the encyclopaedic Anthropology to show how feelings always presume, for Hegel, states of physiological arousal and include bodily manifestations. Subsequently, on the basis of the encyclopaedic Psychology, I will show not only that the philosopher attributes considerable importance to sensations and feelings in general but also considers the emotional dimension of the subject in continuity with rational thinking. Eventually, I will examine some relevant passages of the Encyclopaedia Logic and the Aesthetic and I will show how, for Hegel, shame plays a relevant role in the process of development of the human being. Indeed, shame is considered by the philosopher as the constitutive place of self-consciousness. Contextually, I will try to retrieve the relations, by way of comparison and contrast, between the Hegelian understanding of shame and the most recent psychological and neuroscientific findings.

Riassunto: Questo contributo si propone di instaurare un proficuo dialogo tra la Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes hegeliana e i principali studi neuroscientifici e psicologici sulle emozioni. Ciò alla luce del fatto che caratteristica dell’attuale dibattito sulle emozioni è proprio l’interazione tra neuroscienze, psicologia e filosofia. Dopo aver mostrato come Hegel abbia elaborato una Theorie des Gefühls, mediante un’analisi del ruolo di Empfindungen e Gefühle nella Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, emergerà come il dialogo tra il pensiero hegeliano e le prospettive contemporanee sulle emozioni possa contribuire a chiarire questioni quali la distinzione tra diversi tipi di emozioni o la differenza che sussiste tra il loro aspetto cognitivo e quello affettivo. È l’aspetto cognitivo insito nelle emozioni, come sottolineato sia da Hegel sia dai più recenti studi sulle emozioni, che consente al soggetto di orientarsi nel mondo. Parole chiave : G.W.F. Hegel; Spirito soggettivo; Emozione; Sentimento; Cognizione Hegel’s Theorie des Gefühls in Dialogue with Contemporary Theories of Emotions: Considering the relevance of the interaction between neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy in the contemporary debate on emotions, this paper aims at establishing a fruitful dialogue between Hegel’s Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes and the most important neuroscientific and psychological research on emotions. By means of an analysis of the role of Empfindungen and Gefühle in the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, we will show that Hegel developed a Theorie des Gefühls. The proposed dialogue between Hegel’s thought and contemporary theories is useful for distinguishing the various types of emotions and their cognitive and affective aspects. In fact, it will emerge that both Hegel and recent studies on emotion consider emotions to be characterized by a cognitive valence which enables a person to orient herself/himself in the world. Keywords: G.W.F. Hegel; Subjective Spirit; Emotion; Feeling; Cognition