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5Nominalism, realism and objectivitySynthese 196 (2): 519-534. 2016.I argue that constructive nominalism is preferable to scientific realism. Rather than reflecting without distortion the way the mind-independent world is, theories refract. They provide an understanding of the world as modulated by a particular theory. Truth is defined within a theoretical framework rather than outside of it. This does not undermine objectivity, for an assertion contains a (perhaps tacit) reference to the framework in terms of which its truth is claimed.
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35An original critique of mainstream epistemology, one that emphasizes the roles of active agents operating in an epistemic ecology, rather than a static image of results after the fact.
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Selective disregardIn Chiara Ambrosio & Julia Sánchez-Dorado (eds.), Abstraction in science and art: philosophical perspectives. 2024.
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1Impartiality and legal reasoningIn Amalia Amaya & Maksymilian Del Mar (eds.), Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning. 2020.
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38Understanding’s TethersIn Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 131-146. 2007.
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74Word Giving, Word TakingIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. 2005.This chapter contains section titled: Suggested Reading.
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96Worldmaker: Nelson Goodman 1906–1998Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1): 1-18. 2000.
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Epistemic gatekeepers : the role of aesthetic factors in scienceIn Milena Ivanova & Steven French (eds.), The Aesthetics of Science: Beauty, Imagination and Understanding. 2020.
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2Understanding as an educational objectiveIn Randall R. Curren (ed.), Handbook of philosophy of education, Routledge. 2023.
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67Beyond the Information Given: Teaching, Testimony, and the Advancement of UnderstandingPhilosophical Topics 49 (2): 17-34. 2021.Teaching is not testimony. Although both convey information, they have different uptake requirements. Testimony aims to impart information and typically succeeds if the recipient believes that informationon account of having been told by a reliable informant. Teaching aims to equip learners to go beyond the information given—to leverage that information to broaden, deepen, and critique their current understanding of a topic. Teaching fails if the recipients believe the information only because i…Read more
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106Models as Felicitous FalsehoodsPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (1): 7-23. 2022.I argue that models enable us to understand reality in ways that we would be unable to do if we restricted ourselves to the unvarnished truth. The point is not just that the features that a model skirts can permissibly be neglected. They ought to be neglected. Too much information occludes patterns that figure in an understanding of the phenomena. The regularities a model reveals are real and informative. But many of them show up only under idealizing assumptions.
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239Disagreement in philosophySynthese 200 (1): 1-16. 2022.Recent philosophical discussions construe disagreement as epistemically unsettling. On learning that a peer disagrees, it is said, you should suspend judgment, lower your credence, or dismiss your peer’s conviction as somehow flawed, even if you can neither identify the flaw nor explain why you think she is the party in error. Philosophers do none of these things. A distinctive feature of philosophy as currently practiced is that, although we marshal the strongest arguments we can devise, we do …Read more
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173The Function of KnowledgeAnalysis 81 (1): 100-107. 2021.Human beings are epistemically interdependent. Much of what we know and much of what we need to know we glean from others. Being a gregarious bunch, we are prone to venturing opinions whether they are warranted or not. This makes information transfer a tricky business. What we want from others is not just information, but reliable information. When we seek information, we are in the position of enquirers not examiners. We ask someone whether p because we do not ourselves already know whether p. …Read more
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52Considered JudgmentPrinceton University Press. 1999.Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbi…Read more
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115The Mark of a Good InformantActa Analytica 35 (3): 319-331. 2020.Edward Craig and Michael Hannon agree that the function of knowledge is to enable us to identify informants whose word we can safely take. This requires that knowers display a publicly recognizable mark. Although this might suffice for information transfer, I argue that the position that emerges promotes testimonial injustice, since the mark of a good informant need not be shared by all who are privy to the facts we seek. I suggest a way the problem might be alleviated.
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108D. M. Armstrong. A combinatorial theory of possibility. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge etc. 1989, xiii + 156 pp. - Brian Skyrms. Tractarian nominalism. Therein, pp. 145–152. , pp. 199–206.) (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1): 352-355. 1991.
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8Epistemically Useful FalsehoodsIn Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.), Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes from Klein. pp. 25-38. 2019.In “Useful False Beliefs,” Peter Klein argues that the justification required for knowledge can contain a false belief essentially. When this happens, the agent arrives at her conclusion via a chain of inference that includes a false belief. He illustrates his argument with cases that depend on apparent memory, testimony, recorded empirical evidence, and observation-based calculation. If the agent’s inferential path is close enough to a route that contains only truths, Klein maintains, her concl…Read more
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Reference and Meaning: A Tractarian Analysis of Incommensurable Representational SystemsDissertation, Brandeis University. 1975.
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55Philosophie de la danse (edited book)Aesthetica, Presses Universitaires de Rennes. 2010.En posant avec clarté des questions de philosophie de l’esprit, d’ontologie et d’épistémologie, ce livre témoigne à la fois de l’intérêt réel de la danse comme objet philosophique et du rôle unique que peut jouer la philosophie dans une meilleure compréhension de cet art. Qu’est-ce que danser ? Que nous apprend le mouvement dansé sur la nature humaine et la relation entre le corps et l’esprit ? À quelles conditions une œuvre est-elle correctement interprétée par les danseurs et bien identifiée p…Read more
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117Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone?In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. pp. 244-273. 2013.
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22[Book review] considered judgment (review)In Stephen Everson (ed.), Ethics: Companions to Ancient Thought, Vol. 4. pp. 108--4. 1998.
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2Reasonable DisagreementIn Casey Rebecca Johnson (ed.), Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, Routledge. pp. 10-21. 2018.
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173Lawlikeness and the end of sciencePhilosophy of Science 47 (1): 56-68. 1980.Although our theories are not precisely true, scientific realists contend that we should admit their objects into our ontology. One justification--offered by Sellars and Putnam--is that current theories belong to series that converge to ideally adequate theories. I consider the way the commitment to convergence reflects on the interpretation of lawlike claims. I argue that the distinction between lawlike and accidental generalizations depends on our cognitive interests and reflects our commitmen…Read more
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73Science relies on models and idealizations that are known not to be true. Even so, science is epistemically reputable. To accommodate science, epistemology should focus on understanding rather than knowledge and should recognize that the understanding of a topic need not be factive. This requires reconfiguring the norms of epistemic acceptability. If epistemology has the resources to accommodate science, it will also have the resources to show that art too advances understanding
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1772Emotion and UnderstandingIn Georg Brun, Ulvi Doğuoğlu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions, Ashgate Publishing Company. 2008.
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118Indeterminacy, underdetermination, and the anomalism of the mentalSynthese 45 (2). 1980.Davidson's token-Token identity theory is based on the indeterminacy of translation. I argue that psychological theories, Like other theories, Are underdetermined by the evidence, And that their reduction, Like other reductions, Is subject to the indeterminacy of translation. This does not invalidate reduction, But it does raise epistemic difficulties. Accepting a claim as law-Like involves uncertainty and risk. There are ideological reasons for thinking that psychophysical reduction involves ri…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Aesthetics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |