Catherine Kemp

there are two lines of influence of David Hume on the history of classical American pragmatism: the familiar atomist-nominalist-associationist of empirical psychology reviled by Kantian and idealist critics, on the one side, and the conjectural historian and early developmentalist, or evolutionary, philosopher who was important to Darwin, on the other. The classical pragmatists received the first most directly through the work of Thomas Hill Green, in his edition of the Treatise of Human Nature—with its long critical introduction—that appeared in the 1870s. In this essay I argue that the atomist of the traditional reading is a false Hume, with the hope that identification of the error will make way for a better...

In The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (1910), Dewey characterizes Hume as an orthodox empiricist wedded to a static and unchanging view of mental life. The lead essay argues that Darwinism is a cure for the errors of traditional empiricism. This paper demonstrates that Hume is a precursor to Darwin, and thus to Dewey, by reviewing the historical case that Hume directly influenced Darwin’s theory of evolution. Using Dewey’s discussion of the design versus chance problem, the paper throws light on the origins of his misinterpretation of Hume, and suggests that the two thinkers are closer than Dewey’s criticism would allow.

John Arbuthnot's celebrated but flawed paper in the Philosophical Transactions of 1711-12 is a philosophically and historically plausible target of Hume's probability theory. Arbuthnot argues for providential design rather than chance as a cause of the annual birth ratio, and the paper was championed as a successful extension of the new calculations of the value of wagers in games of chance to wagers about natural and social phenomena. Arbuthnot replaces the earlier anti-Epicurean notion of chance with the equiprobability assumption of Huygens's mathematics of games of chance, and misrepresents the birth ratio data to rule out chance in favour of design. The probability sections of Hume's Treatise taken together correct the equiprobability assumption and its extension to other kinds of phenomena in the estimation of wagers or expectations about particular events. Hume's probability theory demonstrates the flaw in this version of the design argument.

The atomist Hume inherited by classical American pragmatism is a false Hume. I trace the origins and reception of the atomist Hume in the pragmatic tradition and the correction of this reading in modern Hume scholarship, and then argue (1) that in the Treatise Hume assumes that we first encounter wholes, not parts, in experience, (2) that the distinction of parts is possible only after the experience of wholes, and (3) that their distinction as well as their separation is not real, pace James, but hypothetical.