Cayla Clinkenbeard

Are social media companies epistemically responsible for the spread of disinformation? Against the view that they are not responsible, on the grounds that they are passive conduits of information like telephones, I argue that they are responsible, on the grounds that they have discretionary control over the information shared on them and their audiences are vulnerable to that control. I identify two epistemic harms that social media companies are responsible for as the result of that control. I conclude that they are responsible for promoting a harmful form of epistemic distrust, which makes the nature of their responsibility importantly different from sources that generate disinformation.

Paradigmatic echo chambers are widely thought to be epistemically unhealthy communities, but there is little agreement about what, exactly, makes them epistemically unhealthy. C. Thi Nguyen argues that echo chambers manipulate members into distrusting outsiders by preparing them for criticism in advance, a form of preemptive distrust. I argue that this kind of trust manipulation is neither necessary nor sufficient to identify the problem with echo chambers. Instead, I argue that the problem is that they exhibit a different kind of trust manipulation: nihilistic distrust. The problem stems from two related issues. First, echo chambers exhibit asymmetrical trust relationships within the group, in which authority figures are highly trusted and critics are distrusted. This distrust is reactive rather than preemptive and is not directed at outsiders as such, so it is not best understood in the terms provided by Nguyen’s account. Second, by distrusting criticism, authorities in an echo chamber abandon the norm of being open to learning from one’s mistakes. By prioritizing the internal power dynamics of the group over their own epistemic standards, echo chambers exhibit a kind of epistemic nihilism.

Epistemic trust involves a catch-22. We have to trust others in order to acquire knowledge, but we need knowledge in order to know who to trust. Part of our vulnerability is that we may not realize the extent of our dependence on others to make sense of things. I argue for a holistic conception of epistemic responsibility by examining the roles that different sources of information have on our understanding of the world. Instead of grounding epistemic responsibility in individual virtue or testimonial promises, I argue that what makes a source epistemically accountable is discretionary control over information to which audiences are vulnerable. To explain the apparent credibility of implausible views, we must include a network of sources who corroborate a claim. I distinguish responsible and irresponsible networks by their openness to criticism and self-examination about the plausibility of their views. I conclude that given the holistic account of epistemic responsibility that I develop, even conduits like social media companies can be held epistemically responsible for the distrust and confusion that they promote.

What kind of collective is responsible for the deception that follows disinformation campaigns? Jennifer Lackey argues in The Epistemology of Groups that a group agent is responsible for such deception. She analyzes this deception as a group lie, which involves a group misrepresenting its own beliefs through a jointly accepted assertion or a spokesperson. Against this view, I argue that the group responsible for disinformation campaigns is a diffuse network. This deception involves misrepresenting scientific knowledge, not a group belief. Taking tobacco industry disinformation campaigns as an example, I argue that these corporate groups needed a network of epistemically authoritative sources—including scientists, doctors, and reputable publishers—to create and spread disinformation in order to make a skeptical view of scientific knowledge appear credible. As such, I argue that a network is epistemically responsible for this deception. First, I challenge the assumption within group epistemology that assertion is the basis of epistemic responsibility and argue that credibility enhancement is the basis instead. This explains how non-testimonial forms of support and corroboration from multiple sources can bolster the apparent credibility of an implausible view. Next, I describe the roles of different corroborators to show why it is necessary to include them. Finally, I defend a network model of epistemic responsibility for deception. Understanding how enhancing the credibility of disinformation is a matter of responsibility can help us to build more trustworthy communities.