Celia Edell

This chapter examines online public shaming through the lens of feminist ethics, asking how feminists should respond to moral wrongdoing in the digital age. Drawing on real-world cases, I explore four key dilemmas feminists face when engaging in online shaming: disproportionality, efficacy, misrepresentation, and backlash. I consider how these challenges reveal the potential for online shaming to both advance feminist aims and unintentionally undermine them. Ultimately, I call for a more careful, context-sensitive approach to digital accountability, one that foregrounds ethical communication, self-reflection, and collective responsibility.

This chapter explores the parallels between early modern European witch hunts and contemporary online shaming campaigns, arguing that the comparison is politically valuable in uncovering how power, fear, and social control operate in tandem. The chapter outlines three key parallels: (1) both forms of mass blame misrepresent structural causes of unrest through the targeting of individual “bad actors”; (2) both are often incited or leveraged by charismatic elite figures as a means of sowing division among and aggression toward vulnerable groups; and (3) both function as mechanisms of social bonding, using public condemnation to forge group identity. At the same time, the chapter attends to key divergences, including the vastly different scale, structure, and rhetorical possibilities of digital space, and the recent co-optation and commodification of “witch” identity. Taken together, these comparisons shed light on the moral complexity of digital shaming and the need for more ethically reflective approaches to justice online.

This paper examines the wave of anti-transgender legislation in Western countries as a contemporary form of scapegoating. Drawing on René Girard’s theory of mimetic violence and Talia Mae Bettcher’s analysis of transphobic violence and essentialization, it argues that trans people are culturally constructed as deceptive or dangerous, and that such narratives become institutionalized through law. By examining legislation concerning education, sports, identification, and healthcare, the paper shows how moral panic and political rhetoric redirect social anxieties onto a vulnerable group, fostering unity among those who view themselves as “protected.” A feminist extension of Girard’s model reveals scapegoating as both gendered and structural: it reinforces patriarchal and cisnormative norms while obscuring the deeper social and political causes of instability.

In this dissertation I develop a philosophical theory of scapegoating that explains the role of blame-shifting and guilt avoidance in the endurance of oppression. I argue that scapegoating masks and justifies oppression by shifting unwarranted blame onto marginalized groups and away from systems of oppression and those who benefit from them, such that people in dominant positions are less inclined to notice or challenge its workings. I first identify a gap in our understanding of oppression, namely how oppression endures despite widespread formal commitments to principles of equality and justice. I argue that prominent theories of oppression do not place enough weight on the question of how oppression is justified and concealed from us through blame-shifting, in ways that enable its persistence without our explicit approval of its systems. Scapegoating, a concept as old as the Bible, offers potential insight into the means through which we shift blame and avoid responsibility. However, my survey of the genealogy of scapegoating shows that existing conceptualizations of scapegoating are limited in their scope and cannot be applied to explain the endurance of oppression. I propose an ameliorative theory of scapegoating that accounts for deficiencies in prevailing theories of both oppression and scapegoating. Distinct from interpersonal theories and psychologistic analyses of scapegoating, my theory characterizes scapegoating according to its social function in oppression, thereby explaining structural dimensions that are not already captured by other accounts.With the motivation and ingredients in place, I develop my theory of scapegoating as made up of three sub-mechanisms: essentialization of marginalized groups as blameworthy, collective interest in protection against a threat, and social exclusion of the blamed. These sub-mechanisms work together to construct certain groups as scapegoats and encourage us to treat them accordingly through various structural and interpersonal means. I argue that scapegoating has important implications for the formation of social identities; namely, scapegoating constructs social identities in an oppressive arrangement that is largely hidden from us but informs our social and affective relations. By constructing some identities as essentially blameworthy and threatening, dominantly situated identity groups are encouraged to internalize a protected status, act together in defense of their status, and maintain systems of oppressive exclusion. Finally, I elaborate the epistemic dimensions of my theory of scapegoating to argue that scapegoating functions within our social imaginaries and structural epistemic practices. In particular, I focus on the ways that ignorance functions to maintain the scapegoat mechanism, and how scapegoating helps insulate structural forms of ignorance. I end by considering the potential for resistance to scapegoating.

Using the concepts of epistemic virtue and vice as defined by José Medina, and reciprocal recognition as outlined by Glen Coulthard, I argue that the Canadian state is currently in a non-reciprocal relationship with Indigenous peoples as a result of epistemic failure on the part of the state. This failure involves a surfacelevel recognition of Indigenous peoples at the same time as the manifestation of the epistemic vices of arrogance, laziness and closed-mindedness. The epistemic injustice framework alongside a critique of the politics of recognition can help shed light on what is going wrong betweenthe settler state and Indigenous peoples. Moreover, by appealing to grounded normativity, an Indigenous ethical framework, I argue that a land-based ethics of reciprocity can help us move toward reciprocal recognition and equality, if we are epistemically humble, curious and open-minded to it.