Scientists strive to understand the world. Traditionally, philosophers of science have thought that this is a matter of constructing explanations, based on theories and laws, thereby gaining understanding of phenomena by explaining them. This thesis takes a radically different approach, instead relating the notion of understanding to the activities that scientists perform. Scientific understanding is not just a matter of representing or explaining the world, but a matter of practical and intelli…
Read moreScientists strive to understand the world. Traditionally, philosophers of science have thought that this is a matter of constructing explanations, based on theories and laws, thereby gaining understanding of phenomena by explaining them. This thesis takes a radically different approach, instead relating the notion of understanding to the activities that scientists perform. Scientific understanding is not just a matter of representing or explaining the world, but a matter of practical and intelligent doing. Philosophers of science have continued to sell short the project of making sense of scientific understanding, limiting their views to the articulated and well-formed products of inquiry, like theory and explanation. In taking a pragmatist approach to the epistemology of understanding, I reorientate our theorising about understanding from products to processes, and from explanations to methods and concepts. I thereby provide an ecumenical account of scientific understanding that can accommodate the dynamics and heterogeneity of scientific practice. In Chapter 1, I argue against the dominant focus on explanatory understanding in philosophy of science, thereby making room for my own account of operational understanding. Chapter 2 provides an account of how concepts are essential constituents of understanding. Concepts frame entities so that scientists can think and talk about and interact with them intelligently. Chapter 3 gives an account of understanding-how, through my notion of operational understanding, which relates to the methods that structure and guide successful performances of activities. In Chapter 4, I take up the task of describing the psychology of understanding, the kind of state that understanding is, which I argue is accounted for in terms of skill. In Chapter 5, I develop an account of how cognitive devices — tools for thinking, like models and thought-experiments — facilitate and produce understanding.