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13Review of Gail Weiss, Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon (ed), 50 concepts for a critical phenomenology, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press (review)Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1-10. forthcoming.
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45The Skeptical Origins of Husserl’s Transcendental PhenomenologyHusserl Studies 37 (2): 169-191. 2021.This paper demonstrates that two signature methodological concepts in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, the epoché and the phenomenological reduction, derive from his reflections on the history and significance of epistemological skepticism in the Western tradition. Drawing on his Lectures on Logic and Epistemology (Hua XXIV) from the Winter semester of 1906–07, it is argued that Husserl derives his conception of the fundamental task of transcendental philosophy from his reading of a novel…Read more
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765What has Transparency to do with Husserlian Phenomenology?ProtoSociology 36 221-242. 2019.This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs w…Read more
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864Re-examining Husserl’s Non-Conceptualism in the Logical InvestigationsArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 101 (3): 407-444. 2019.A recent trend in Husserl scholarship takes the Logische Untersuchungen (LU) as advancing an inconsistent and confused view of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. Against this, I argue that there is no inconsistency about non-conceptualism in LU. Rather, LU presents a hybrid view of the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, which can easily be misread as inconsistent, since it combines a conceptualist view of perceptual content (or matter) with a non-conceptualist view of …Read more
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655Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representationPhilosophical Studies 152 (3): 361-383. 2011.In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousn…Read more
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510Thiemo Breyer and Christopher Gutland (Eds.): Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations into the Character of Cognitive Experiences (review)Husserl Studies 33 (1): 91-98. 2017.
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413The idols of inner-sensePhilosophical Studies 172 (7): 1759-1782. 2015.Many philosophers hold one of two extreme views about our capacity to have phenomenally conscious experience : either that inner-sense enables us to know our experience and its properties infallibly or the contrary conviction that inner-sense is utterly fallible and the evidence it provides completely defeasible. Both of these are in error. This paper presents an alternative conception of inner-sense, modeled on disjunctive conceptions of perceptual awareness, that avoids both erroneous extremes…Read more
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2988Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of IntuitionIn Linda Osbeck & Barbara Held (eds.), Rational Intuition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-150. 2014.
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Areas of Interest
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PhilPapers Editorships
Edmund Husserl |
Husserl: Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Husserl: Metaphysics |
Husserl: Epistemology |