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519Epistemic utility theory’s difficult futureSynthese 199 (3-4): 7401-7421. 2021.According to epistemic utility theory, epistemic rationality is teleological: epistemic norms are instrumental norms that have the aim of acquiring accuracy. What’s definitive of these norms is that they can be expected to lead to the acquisition of accuracy when followed. While there’s much to be said in favor of this approach, it turns out that it faces a couple of worrisome extensional problems involving the future. The first problem involves credences about the future, and the second problem…Read more
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437Closing the Case on Self-Fulfilling BeliefsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1): 1-14. 2023.Two principles in epistemology are apparent examples of the close connection between rationality and truth. First, adding a disjunct to what it is rational to believe yields a proposition that’s also rational to believe. Second, what’s likely if believed is rational to believe. While these principles are accepted by many, it turns out that they clash. In light of this clash, we must relinquish the second principle. Reflecting on its rationale, though, reveals that there are two distinct ways to …Read more
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649On the epistemic rationality and significance of self-fulfilling beliefsSynthese 199 (1-2): 4243-4260. 2021.Some propositions are not likely to be true overall, but are likely to be true if you believe them. Appealing to the platitude that belief aims at truth, it has become increasingly popular to defend the view that such propositions are epistemically rational to believe. However, I argue that this view runs into trouble when we consider the connection between what’s epistemically rational to believe and what’s practically rational to do. I conclude by discussing how rejecting the view bears on thr…Read more
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17Review of Richard Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (review)Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
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46Richard Pettigrew. Accuracy and the Laws of CredencePhilosophy of Science 85 (2): 316-320. 2018.
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28Fatalism and Truth at a TimeStance 6 29-35. 2013.In this paper, I will examine an argument for fatalism. I will offer a formalized version of the argument and analyze one of the argument’s most controversial assumptions. Then, I will argue that one ought to reject the assumption that propositions about the future are true facts of the past, even if no one makes reference to such propositions.
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582Yes, Safety is in DangerPhilosophia 42 (2): 321-334. 2014.In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications …Read more
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Formal Epistemology |