•  15
    What Does “Mind‐Wandering” Mean to the Folk? An Empirical Investigation
    with Zachary C. Irving, Aaron Glasser, Alison Gopnik, and Verity Pinter
    Cognitive Science 44 (10). 2020.
  •  61
    The atoms of self‐control
    Noûs. forthcoming.
  •  115
    Although mind-wandering research is rapidly progressing, stark disagreements are emerging about what the term “mind-wandering” means. Four prominent views define mind-wandering as 1) task-unrelated thought, 2) stimulus-independent thought, 3) unintentional thought, or 4) dynamically unguided thought. Although theorists claim to capture the ordinary understanding of mind-wandering, no systematic studies have assessed these claims. Two large factorial studies present participants (n=545) with vign…Read more
  •  10
    The fallibility paradox
    Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1): 234-248. 2019.
    :Reasons-responsiveness theories of moral responsibility are currently among the most popular. Here, I present the fallibility paradox, a novel challenge to these views. The paradox involves an agent who is performing a somewhat demanding psychological task across an extended sequence of trials and who is deeply committed to doing her very best at this task. Her action-issuing psychological processes are outstandingly reliable, so she meets the criterion of being reasons-responsive on every sing…Read more
  •  9
    Acting from the Gut: Responsibility without Awareness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8): 37-48. 2015.
  •  56
    Addiction and Fallibility
    Journal of Philosophy 115 (11): 569-587. 2018.
    There is an ongoing debate about loss of control in addiction: Some theorists say at least some addicts’ drug-directed desires are irresistible, while others insist that pursuing drugs is a choice. The debate is long-standing and has essentially reached a stalemate. This essay suggests a way forward. I propose an alternative model of loss of control in addiction, one based not on irresistibility, but rather fallibility. According to the model, on every occasion of use, self-control processes exh…Read more
  •  3684
    The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility
    with Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Shepard, Eddy Nahmias, and Lisa Thomson Ross
    Consciousness and Cognition 25 27-41. 2014.
    In this paper, we present the results of the construction and validation of a new psychometric tool for measuring beliefs about free will and related concepts: The Free Will Inventory (FWI). In its final form, FWI is a 29-item instrument with two parts. Part 1 consists of three 5-item subscales designed to measure strength of belief in free will, determinism, and dualism. Part 2 consists of a series of fourteen statements designed to further explore the complex network of people’s associated bel…Read more
  • Experimental Philosophy and Moral Theory
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 609-625. 2017.
  •  248
    According to Interest-Relative Invariantism, whether an agent knows that p, or possesses other sorts of epistemic properties or relations, is in part determined by the practical costs of being wrong about p. Recent studies in experimental philosophy have tested the claims of IRI. After critically discussing prior studies, we present the results of our own experiments that provide strong support for IRI. We discuss our results in light of complementary findings by other theorists, and address the…Read more
  •  1240
    Empirically Investigating Imaginative Resistance
    British Journal of Aesthetics 54 (3): 339-355. 2014.
    Imaginative resistance refers to a phenomenon in which people resist engaging in particular prompted imaginative activities. Philosophers have primarily theorized about this phenomenon from the armchair. In this paper, we demonstrate the utility of empirical methods for investigating imaginative resistance. We present two studies that help to establish the psychological reality of imaginative resistance, and to uncover one factor that is significant for explaining this phenomenon but low in psyc…Read more
  •  1192
    What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3): 563-593. 2012.
    Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such as indoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to the manipulated agent’s lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipulation on t…Read more
  •  733
    Mental State Attributions and the Side-Effect Effect
    Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1): 232-238. 2012.
    The side-effect effect, in which an agent who does not speci␣cally intend an outcome is seen as having brought it about intentionally, is thought to show that moral factors inappropriately bias judgments of intentionality, and to challenge standard mental state models of intentionality judgments. This study used matched vignettes to dissociate a number of moral factors and mental states. Results support the view that mental states, and not moral factors, explain the side-effect effect. However, …Read more
  •  71
    Adaptationism, Culture, and the Malleability of Human Nature
    In Peter Caruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind, Volume 3, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    It is often thought that if an adaptationist explanation of some behavioural phenomenon is true, then this fact shows that a culturist explanation of the very same phenomenon is false, or else the adaptationist explanation preempts or crowds out the culturist explanation in some way. This chapter shows why this so-called competition thesis is misguided. Two evolutionary models are identified — the Information Learning Model and the Strategic Learning Model — which show that adaptationist reasoni…Read more
  •  270
    Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction betw…Read more
  •  108
    Frankfurt’s Unwilling and Willing Addicts
    Mind 126 (503): 781-815. 2017.
    Harry Frankfurt’s Unwilling Addict and Willing Addict cases accomplish something fairly unique: they pull apart the predictions of control-based views of moral responsibility and competing self-expression views. The addicts both lack control over their actions but differ in terms of expression of their respective selves. Frankfurt’s own view is that—in line with the predictions of self-expression views—the unwilling addict is not morally responsible for his drug-directed actions while the willin…Read more
  •  154
    The Philosophy of psychology
    with Kelby Mason and Stephen Stich
    In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy, Routledge. 2008.
    The 20 sup > th /sup > century has been a tumultuous time in psychology -- a century in which the discipline struggled with basic questions about its intellectual identity, but nonetheless managed to achieve spectacular growth and maturation. It’s not surprising, then, that psychology has attracted sustained philosophical attention and stimulated rich philosophical debate. Some of this debate was aimed at understanding, and sometimes criticizing, the assumptions, concepts and explanatory strateg…Read more
  •  166
    A Framework for the Psychology of Norms
    In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind, Volume 2: Culture and Cognition, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    Humans are unique in the animal world in the extent to which their day-to-day behavior is governed by a complex set of rules and principles commonly called norms. Norms delimit the bounds of proper behavior in a host of domains, providing an invisible web of normative structure embracing virtually all aspects of social life. People also find many norms to be deeply meaningful. Norms give rise to powerful subjective feelings that, in the view of many, are an important part of what it is to be a h…Read more
  •  110
    Punishment and the strategic structure of moral systems
    Biology and Philosophy 20 (4). 2005.
    The problem of moral compliance is the problem of explaining how moral norms are sustained over extented stretches of time despite the existence of selfish evolutionary incentives that favor their violation. There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of solutions that have been offered to the problem of moral compliance, the reciprocity-based account and the punishment-based account. In this paper, I argue that though the reciprocity-based account has been widely endorsed by evolutionary theorists, …Read more
  •  94
    Review of Morton's The importance of being understood: Folk psychology as ethics (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2). 2004.
    Book Information The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics. The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics Adam Morton , London; New York: Routledge , 2002 , 240 , US$95 ( cloth ), US$29.95 ( paper ) By Adam Morton. London; New York: Routledge. Pp. 240. US$95 (cloth:), US$29.95 (paper:).
  •  61
    Free will and the construction of options
    Philosophical Studies 173 (11): 2913-2933. 2016.
    What are the distinctive psychological features that explain why humans are free, but many other creatures, such as simple animals, are not? It is natural to think that the answer has something to do with unique human capacities for decision-making. Philosophical discussions of how decision-making works, however, are tellingly incomplete. In particular, these discussions invariably presuppose an agent who has a mentally represented set of options already fully in hand. The emphasis is largely on…Read more
  •  31
    Volition, Self-Control, and Public Policy: Symposium on the Tanner Lecture on Human Values
    with Walter Mischel, David Laibson, John Jonides, and Ethan Kross
    The 2014 Tanner Symposium features a panel of speakers discussing current research in the areas of volition and self-control and the effects of that research for issues of public policy
  •  254
    Evolution, culture, and the irrationality of the emotions
    In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality, Oxford University Press. 2004.
    For about 2500 years, from Plato’s time until the closing decades of the 20th century, the dominant view was that the emotions are quite distinct from the processes of rational thinking and decision making, and are often a major impediment to those processes. But in recent years this orthodoxy has been challenged in a number of ways. Damasio (1994) has made a forceful case that the traditional view, which he has dubbed _Descartes’ Error_, is quite wrong, because emotions play a fundamental role …Read more
  •  179
    Philosophical Questions about the Nature of Willpower
    Philosophy Compass 5 (9). 2010.
    In this article, I survey four key questions about willpower: How is willpower possible? Why does willpower fail? How does willpower relate to other self-regulatory processes? and What are the connections between willpower and weakness of will? Empirical research into willpower is growing rapidly and yielding some fascinating new findings. This survey emphasizes areas in which empirical progress in understanding willpower helps to advance traditional philosophical debates.
  •  114
    A reply to Rose, Livengood, Sytsma, and Machery
    with Richard Gonzalez, Daniel Kessler, Eric Laber, Sara Konrath, and Vijay Nair
  •  127
    Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action
    with Sara Konrath
    Mind and Language 26 (3): 353-380. 2011.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have advanced a surprising conclusion: people's judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally are pervasively influenced by normative considerations. In this paper, we investigate the ‘Chairman case’, an influential case from this literature and disagree with this conclusion. Using a statistical method called structural path modeling, we show that people's attributions of intentional action to an agent are driven not by normative asses…Read more
  •  1
    Homo Prospectus
    with Martin E. P. Seligman, Peter Railton, and Roy F. Baumeister
    Oxford University Press USA. 2016.
    Our species is misnamed. Though sapiens defines human beings as "wise" what humans do especially well is to prospect the future. We are homo prospectus. In this book, Martin E. P. Seligman, Peter Railton, Roy F. Baumeister, and Chandra Sripada argue it is anticipating and evaluating future possibilities for the guidance of thought and action that is the cornerstone of human success. Much of the history of psychology has been dominated by a framework in which people's behavior is driven by past h…Read more
  •  16
    Using big data to map the network organization of the brain
    with James E. Swain and John D. Swain
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1): 101-102. 2014.