Chang Liu

Phenomenal Intentionality Theory is a burgeoning theory of intentionality, asserting that the ultimate basis of intentionality lies in the phenomenal character of conscious mental events. The specific phenomenal character exhibited by a mental event determines its specific intentional content. Consequently, Phenomenal Intentionality Theory necessitates the delineation of this determinative relationship, termed as “Phenomenal Determination.” This paper endeavors to employ Husserl’s phenomenological model of intentionality to delineate Phenomenal Determination while drawing on the contemporary metaphysical concept of “grounding” for supplementary clarification.

Constructionists claim that emotions result from the categorization of a kind of phenomenal character, or what is known as core affect. This categorization takes shape in terms of prior situated experience. Husserl, in turn, suggests that perceptions emerge from the apprehension of a kind of phenomenal character. Similarly, this also takes shape in terms of prior situated experience. Thus, the constructionism of emotion and Husserl’s Apprehension Model can be seen as two independent formulations of one and the same framework. They both provide the Construction Framework of the Mental (CFM). This framework takes most folk psychological categories to be “constructs” built from more basic mental processes. Given the consistency of the constructionist framework of mental states with recent findings in neuroscience and competitive metaphysical positions, along with its application in psychology and phenomenology, this framework for the formation of mental states should be considered a feasible research framework.

Network theory is a novel approach to mental disorders, conceptualising them as causal relationships between symptoms. Despite its extensive prevalence and the significant research that has been inspired by its core ideas, limited critical inquiry has been conducted to assess its explanatory power and theoretical coherence. This paper aims to address this gap by critically examining three theoretical assumptions endorsed by proponents of network theory: (1) mental disorders can be seen as mereological sums; (2) intentionality unlocks the causal role of symptoms; and (3) symptoms are linked in the same way causally. Our examination indicates that all three assumptions should be reframed or adjusted. Firstly, although the part-whole relationship can be construed as constitutive of mental disorders, it is not fully able to capture the nature of symptom relationships. Secondly, although the intentional contents of psychiatric symptoms provide explanatory value, theory advocates cannot affirm the unique causal role of intentional contents. Finally, the practice of a uniform causal relationship conceals an important distinction between how one symptom causally impacts another symptom. Symptoms can directly activate another symptom or indirectly lower its threshold value. We recommend that the network theory differentiates between structural causation and triggering causation in its network model.

Husserl's Absolute-Flow-Model (AFM) represents an approach to a coherent phenomenological description of time-consciousness. Within the AFM framework the streaming of every real moment in the flow of time-consciousness is necessarily concomitant with some retentional or protentional modifications of time-consciousness modes. These modifications of consciousness, i.e. all retentions and protentions, are characterized here as "temporal apprehension." By means of this distinctive function of time-consciousness, all constituents of one and the same consciousness phase are assigned an intentional sense as their temporal index, so that all these constituents can be temporally represented and distinguished by time-consciousness. In this way, the AFM can overcome some of the difficulties in describing the flow of consciousness.

“Apprehension” is a key term in Husserl’s phenomenology of perceptual consciousness. However, its modes of operation have not yet been closely analyzed. Apprehension has its own principles and foundations. According to Husserl, the principles of apprehension are 1) contiguity, 2) equality and 3) similarity, and each of them expresses a specific kind of qualitative connection between the apprehension-content and the apprehension-sense. When a content presents a sense through equality or similarity, this sense can be regarded as a “projection” from the apprehension-content. Besides the principles, the working of perceptual apprehension as knowing is based on two foundations. The first foundation is a space of sense, in which a perceptual sense finds its place and is combined holistically with other senses. The second foundation is a concrete cultural and historical lifeworld, upon which the space of sense constructed. Similar ideas can also be found at work in Sellars and Searle.

Representationalism is a philosophical position which reduces all phenomenal conscious states to intentional states. However, starting from the phenomenal consciousness, the phenomenal intentionality theory provides an explanation of all sorts of intentionality. Against Michael Shim's interpretation, I argue that, although Hussserl's phenomenology is certainly considered as an antipode of strong representationalism, Husserl does not stand in opposition the weak representationalists, because Husserl maintains an essential connection between the senses of noemata and the hyletic data. In addition, Husserl's phenomenology is also consistent with the phenomenal theory of intentionality. According to him, statically and genetically, all non-phenomenal intentional states take a recourse to phenomenal intentional states and eventually to sensual perceptions.

In neo-Aristotelian accounts, the task of metaphysics is to explore the space of metaphysical possibilities, and our knowledge of metaphysical possibilities is ultimately grounded on our knowledge concerning the essence of entities. Eidetic variation, as established by Husserlian phenomenology, is a method of identifying a specific pattern of phenomenological givenness that is constitutive of the identity and condition of existence of a kind of entities. Thus, Husserlian phenomenology provides us with a method to acquire knowledge concerning the general essence of entities.

Drawing on material from Husserlian phenomenology, we can reconstruct a realist version of anomalous monism (rAM). According to such a view, mental events are identical to some physical events because they simultaneously exemplify mental and physical properties. rAM would have to confront the charge of epiphenomenalism because Husserl rejects psychophysical causal interaction. And as a form of nonreductive physicalism, rAM also faces the challenge of Kim’s supervenience argument and explanatory exclusion. Utilizing Husserl’s conception of mental motivation and contemporary elaborations of substance causation, rAM can refute the accusation of epiphenomenalism and overcome the problem of exclusion.

As two defining properties of mental phenomena, consciousness and intentionality have some deep connections. These connections may be either grounded by a more fundamental mental property, or governed by some bridge laws, or accepted as a brute unexplainable fact. This paper argues, on the one hand, that we do not have justifications for believing in the existence of a new fundamental mental property, although we have motivations for making an inference to such a new mental property. On the other hand, this paper demonstrates that Husserl took these connections to be governed by some bridge laws and to be realized by the mapping function of what he called apprehension.