The traditional version of the Acquaintance Principle (AP) requires aesthetic judgements to be grounded in direct perceptual encounters with the artwork. Nanay’s recent revision, AP**, relaxes this, permitting testimony-based mental imagery to count as genuine acquaintance. I argue that AP** confuses psycholo- gical richness with epistemic warrant. Because aesthetic properties are holistically constituted and categorially situated, grasping them requires sensitivity to what I call a configuratio…
Read moreThe traditional version of the Acquaintance Principle (AP) requires aesthetic judgements to be grounded in direct perceptual encounters with the artwork. Nanay’s recent revision, AP**, relaxes this, permitting testimony-based mental imagery to count as genuine acquaintance. I argue that AP** confuses psycholo- gical richness with epistemic warrant. Because aesthetic properties are holistically constituted and categorially situated, grasping them requires sensitivity to what I call a configuration-response link between a work’s perceptual organisation and the response it elicits. This link is particular rather than law-like, and cannot be reconstructed from propositional information. From this I derive a corrective feedback criterion (CFC): the artwork must be in a position to constrain and revise the perceiver’s representations for the resulting judgement to be robustly justified. Testimony-based imagery fails this criterion, though it may serve a preparatory role. The criterion also supplies a rationale the AP has long been noted to lack: it shows why first-hand encounter is necessary, not merely preferable.