Charles Ess

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to give an introduction to the special issue by providing background on the ETHICOMP conference series and a discussion of its role in the academic debate on ethics and computing. It provides the context that influenced the launch of the conference series and highlights its unique features. Finally, it provides an overview of the papers in the special issues. Design/methodology/approach – The paper combines an historical account of ETHICOMP and a review of the existing papers. Findings – ETHICOMP is one of the well-established conference series (alongside IACAP and CEPE) focused on ethical issues of information and computing. Its special features include: multidisciplinary and diversity of contributors and contributions; explicit outreach to professionals whose work is to design, build, deploy and maintain specific computing applications in the world at large; creation of knowledge that is accessible and relevant across fields and disciplines; intention of making a practical difference to development, use and policy of computing principles and artefacts; and creation of an inclusive, supportive and nurturing community across traditional knowledge silos. Originality/value – The paper is the first one to explicitly define the nature of ETHICOMP which is an important building block in the future development of the conference series and will contribute to the further self-definition of the ETHICOMP community.

My dissertation attempts to establish two interrelated theses. First, the shift from medieval to modern thought is partly a shift from a central use of analogical proportion and equivocation--as structures of non-identical connection alongside irreducible differences--to the rejection of analogy. Analogy is examined in the Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas: the shift in modernity to a demand for connection qua identity, as exclusive of radical difference, is then shown by way of example in Descartes and Fichte. ;The second thesis is that Kant's critical philosophy, while clearly modern, explicitly makes consistent use of analogical proportion and equivocation in a manifold of central ways. ;A review of previous efforts to establish this thesis shows that these efforts, while suggestive, remain limited in crucial ways. A more comprehensive overview of Kant's actual use and understanding of analogy emerges through a relatively complete analysis of pertinent texts in the critical works, including the Prolegomena. This overview shows analogy to function for Kant in two crucial ways. First, analogical proportion and equivocation are taken up by Kant to predicate the categories in the transcendental ideas. Hereby, it appears that the classical charge of contradiction in Kant's doctrine of the thing in itself is circumvented. Second, analogy fulfills not only the critical intention of determining in the transcendental ideas the bounds of reason: more radically, analogy accomplishes and articulates the tensional unity of reason which Kant seeks from the outset of the critical philosophy. Most briefly, analogy articulates a coherency of non-identical connection and difference between freedom and nature, reason and understanding, practical reason and theoretical reason, and between the practical and theoretical parts of philosophy. ;This analogical Kant then emerges as a unique synthesis of the analogical tradition and modern idealism

In Stig Hjarvard’s characterization, mediatization studies move beyond the positivist origins of the social sciences, as they must in order to avoid the fundamental contradiction between original commitments to classical determinism vis-à-vis human agency as acknowledged within mediatization studies. In order to sustain and enhance Hjarvard’s vision of the coherence between human agency and mediatization studies as a species of social science, I first sharpen these theoretical tensions by developing a robust account of human freedom as informed by Kant and virtue ethics. I then adopt precise understandings of complementarity and epistemological pluralism as initially developed in Quantum Mechanics and subsequently by Karen Barad and Judith Simon as frameworks that can coherently conjoin contemporary social science with strong accounts of human freedom. The resulting coherency—or entanglement—between ethics and science implies new ethical responsibilities for social scientists as ‘virtuous agents’.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new collaboration between the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) and the Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society (JICES). Design/methodology/approach The paper uses historical, comparative and ethics-based approaches. Findings The collaboration is catalyzed by central interests shared between AoIR and JICES, namely, in the ethical and social impacts of the internet. The collaboration accordingly aims to bring research and reflection developed for the AoIR conferences to the JICES’ readership. Originality/value The value of this collaboration is considerable, as it promises extensive new cross-fertilization between the two communities. The viewpoint begins with a brief overview of the collaboration’s initiation by Prof Simon Rogerson and its logistics over the next two years. Following a general review of Information and Computing Ethics and Intercultural Information Ethics, an overview of ethical considerations fostered by AoIR is offered, focusing on the development of internet research ethics (IRE), especially its most recent expression in an IRE 3.0.

This article discusses the key existential stakes of implementing biometrics in human lifeworlds. In this pursuit, we offer a problematization and reinvention of central values often taken for granted within the “ethical turn” of AI development and discourse, such as autonomy, agency, privacy and integrity, as we revisit basic questions about what it means to be human and embodied. Within a framework of existential media studies, we introduce an existential ethics of care—through a conversation between existentialism, virtue ethics, a feminist ethics of care and post-humanist ethics—aiming to deepen and nuance our understanding of the human behind “human-centered” AI directives. The key argument is that biometrics implicates humans through unprecedented forms of objectification, through which the existential body—the relational, intimate and frail human being—is at risk. We interrogate these risks as they become visible at three sites where embodied humans are challenged by biometrics, and thus where the existential body is challenged by the biometric body. This occurs through reductionism (biometric passports nailing bodies to identities, removing human judgment and compromising agency at the AI border), enforced transparency (smart home assistants surveying human intimacies and invading intimate spaces in the bedroom) and the breaching of bodily integrity (chipping bodies to capture sensory data, challenging the very concept of bodily integrity through self-invasive biohacking). Our existential ethics of care is importantly not a solutionist list of principles or suggestions, but a manifesto for a way of thinking about the ethical challenges of living with biometrics in today’s world, by raising the right questions. We argue that a revitalized discussion of the basic existential stakes within human lived experience is needed and should serve as the foundation on which comprehensive frameworks can be built to address the complexities and prospects for ethical machines, responsible biometrics and AI.

Intercultural Digital Ethics faces the central challenge of how to develop a global IDE that can endorse and defend some set of universal ethical norms, principles, frameworks, etc. alongside sustaining local, culturally variable identities, traditions, practices, norms, and so on. I explicate interpretive pros hen ethical pluralism ) emerging in the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century in response to this general problem and its correlates, including conflicts generated by “computer-mediated colonization” that imposed homogenous values, communication styles, and so on upon “target” peoples and cultures via ICTs as embedding these values in their very design. I contrast different kinds of ethical pluralisms as structural apparatus for understanding what differences may mean and allow for, as these emerged in the 1990s forwards with EP. As interwoven with phronēsis, a form of reflective judgment and virtue, EP more radically preserves irreducible differences and so fosters positive engagements across deep cultural differences. I show how EP emerged in the context of empirical research on “Cultural Attitudes towards Technology and Communication” beginning in 1998, and then in specific applications within Internet Research Ethics beginning in 2000. I summarize its main characteristics and trace how it has further been taken up in ICE, IRE, Intercultural Information Ethics, and virtue ethics more broadly. I respond to important criticisms and objections, arguing that EP thus stands as an important component for a contemporary IDE that seeks an ethical cosmopolitanism in place of computer-mediated colonization.

Trust is essential to human society and the good life. At the same time, citizens of developed countries spend more and more time in virtual environments. This collection asks how far virtual environments, especially those affiliated with -Web 2.0-, challenge and foster trust? &ltBR> The book's early chapters establish historical, linguistic, and philosophical foundations for key concepts of trust, embodiment, virtuality, and virtual worlds. Four philosophers then analyze how trust - historically interwoven with embodied co-presence - may be enhanced through online environments. Final contributions tackle the specific challenges of virtual child pornography and democratic deliberation online. &ltBR> This is the first collection devoted exclusively to the philosophical dimensions of trust and virtual worlds. It helps bring the reader up to date on the relevant concepts and issues, and on ways in which widely ranging insights and approaches may nonetheless cohere into a reasonably comprehensive account of trust."

Read as an inclusio, a ‘growing up’ story, the Phaedrus illustrates the risks and benefits of writing. Accepting writing’s mere semblance of wisdom and knowledge threatens de-skilling, our failing to cultivate the wisdom and ethical judgment—phronēsis—required for self-knowledge and contentment (eudaimonia): writing can also remind. Young Phaedrus grows up by learning the strengths and limits of both literacy and orality in order to use these tools properly. These lessons are vitally central to our own efforts to grow up in our AI-saturated age. Reviewing the origins and machineries of both classic and generative AI illustrates their strengths and limits, teaching us their proper use as complements to human judgment as computationally intractable. A concrete example of using LLMs in research and writing exploits their strengths while sustaining the cultivation of judgment and contentment. Socrates’s indirect pedagogy is exemplary for contemporary teachers guiding students learning to grow up with AI.

Background and ProcessIn February 2012, the European Commission launched “The ONLIFE Initiative—a Concept Reengineering Exercise” within the context of the Digital Agenda for Europe. Initiated by Nicole Dewandre of the EC and chaired by Luciano Floridi , scholars from various academic backgrounds were invited to discuss the impact of information and communication technologies on individual, social and public lives. Of particular concern were the policy-relevant consequences of ICT-related developments. Taking Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition To begin with, we took the following from the prologue to The Human Condition as the opening motto of the Background Document. Arendt calls for “… a reconsideration of the human condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and most recent fears”—vis-à-vis what she observed to be a prevailing thoughtlessness, “the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of ..

We begin with our reasons for seeking to bring Kant to bear on contemporary information and computing ethics (ICE). We highlight what each contributor to this special issue draws from Kant and then applies to contemporary matters in ICE. We conclude with a summary of what these chapters individually and collectively tell us about Kant’s continuing relevance to these contemporary matters – specifically, with regard to the issues of building trust online and regulating the Internet; how far discourse contributing to deliberative democracy online may include storytelling and appeals to the emotions; and whether or not search engine algorithms should be made public. We further highlight how certain chapters – especially as they incorporate more recent philosophical traditions such as phenomenology and cognitive psychology – develop a Kantian approach (or at least one that is both inspired by while simultaneously transforming Kant) to ethical issues in ICE, including the ethical implications of the on-going blurring of the border between the real and the virtual; designing software in light of distributed ethical responsibility; and trust-building in e-Science collaborations.

I expand the metaphor of computing as philosophical laboratory by exploring philosophical insights gleaned from examining computer‐mediated communication (CMC) technologies in terms of the cultural values and communicative preferences they embed, as well as their interactions with the values and preferences that define diverse cultures in which the technologies are deployed. These empirically grounded data provide new insights for debates in philosophy of technology, notions of the self, and epistemology. This approach to utilizing data drawn from the cultural encounters facilitated by CMC technologies further suggests more ambitious ways of making philosophical use of CMC venues as a laboratory for testing and refining basic claims and hypotheses. The approach also uncovers other grounds that should encourage philosophers to become interdisciplinarians – not only for the sake of perhaps developing new sorts of insights and even forms of knowledge but also in order to shape and contribute to a global ethic and a Socratic education needed to sustain cultural diversity as CMC envelops the globe.

The goals of a global liberal arts education, as conjoining both western and eastern sources, focus on ‘virtue first’, i.e. on pursuing human excellence . To determine whether such excellence can be taught online, I turn to contemporary research on Computer-Mediated Communication and online education. Among other factors, important cultural issues as well as the real costs of online education have moderated 1990s enthusiasm for online learning as ‘revolutionary’. I then take up Hubert Dreyfus’ pedagogical taxonomy as it emphasizes the role of embodiment in learning. Expanding on his analysis, I argue that the most important goals of a global liberal arts education–precisely the goals of becoming excellent human beings capable of Aristotelian phroneØsis, a key form of judgment crucial to not only professional success but also ethical and political life–require human teachers who incarnate the skills and judgment students need to acquire. These analyses, finally, support what is in fact a recent turn in online education towards blended classrooms that seek to exploit the distinctive advantages of both embodied and disembodied teaching

A global information ethics that seeks to avoid imperialistic homogenization must conjoin shared norms while simultaneously preserving the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples. I argue that a global information ethics may fulfill these requirements by taking up an ethical pluralism – specifically Aristotle’s pros hen [“towards one”] or “focal” equivocals. These ethical pluralisms figure centrally in both classical and contemporary Western ethics: they further offer important connections with the major Eastern ethical tradition of Confucian thought. Both traditions understand ethical judgment to lead to and thus require ethical pluralism – i.e., an acceptance of more than one judgment regarding the interpretation and application of a shared ethical norm. Both traditions invoke notions of resonance and harmony to articulate pluralistic structures of connection alongside irreducible differences. Specific examples within Western computer and information ethics demonstrate these pluralisms in fact working in praxis. After reviewing further resonances and radical differences between Western and Eastern views, I then argue that emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection laws in China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Thailand in fact constitute a robust, pros hen pluralism with Western conceptions. In both theory and in praxis, then, this pluralism thus fulfills the requirement for a global information ethics that holds shared norms alongside the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples.