Charles Scott

THE TOPIC OF THIS PAPER is the end of metaphysics and the question of foundations. This issue is not phrased as an expression of conviction or hope, but as a question, or as several questions. Can metaphysics come to an end? What could its ending mean? Is its ending found in the questionableness of its foundations? If metaphysics came to its end, would there be no more metaphysics? Could it not end again, having already come to an end? Does the end of metaphysics mean the end of the idea of transcendence? Does its possible end mean that within metaphysics there is lodged the possibility of metaphysics coming to an end? Is that possibility the question of metaphysical foundations?

"... stimulating and insightful... a thoroughly researched and timely contribution to the secondary literature of ethics... " —Library Journal "His important new work establishes Scott... as one of the foremost interpreters of the Continental philosophical tradition of the US.... Necessary for anyone working in ethics or the Continental tradition." —Choice "... a provocative discourse on the consequences of the ethical in the thought of Nietzsche, Foucault, and Heidegger." —The Journal of Religion Charles E. Scott's challenging book advances the broad claim that ethics as a way of judging and thinking has come into question as philosophers have confronted suffering and conflicts that arise from our traditional systems of value

The idea of presentation may also help as one attempts to conceive the nature of self-awareness. In considering self-awareness I want to simplify the discussion of presentation, for the sake of accessibility, by not investigating the nature of worldly presentations. I want to focus on the immediate presentation of those structures which present things to man pre-thematically. I am interested, for example, in the way that intentions present themselves in a conscious state and not in the way something else is presented intentionally. My suggestions are that there are some structures which are conditions of consciousness; that they are immediately presented; and that these conditions in their immediate givenness help to define the occurrence of self-awareness. I want to show in an initial way that the immediate self-presentation and consequent self-consciousness of what I am calling the general internal conditions of consciousness cannot be understood as intentional in nature. This suggestion is not meant to oppose the idea that objective awareness is intentional. It is meant to show that pre-thematic self-consciousness is a dimension of awareness that is non-objective and non-intentional.

Foucault's genealogies and archeologies provide occasions in which one may come to know the powers, accidents, and influences that have structured a particular knowledge or discipline. The Birth of the Clinic shows the development of modern medicine in a process by which rational inference and emphasis on the history of a disease are replaced by pathological anatomy. In modern anatomy, the corpse, not reason, became the “space” of modern medical knowledge. In this “space” developed a confederation of dead body, knowledge, trained and noninferential gaze, organic unity, and the increased importance of bodily space instead of physical time. The discussion shows how Foucault's genealogy of modern medicine is influenced by and overcomes the knowledge that it describes. In this context, his genealogy is also shown to be self-overcoming and to raise important questions for medical ethics when ethical thought is conceived within the structures of knowledge that have been exposed by the genealogy

Ethics and Danger examines Heidegger’s association with German National Socialism and attempts to understand both the question of politics in Heidegger’s thought and the thought that gives rise to that question. It explores the contribution of Heidegger’s work to issues of ethics, technology, and social theory, as well as his relationship to other thinkers such as Parmenides, Aristotle, Hegel, Husserl, Benjamin, Levinas, Rorty, Foucault, and Derrida. Finally, it addresses the more general question of the future of ethical thought within continental philosophy. In order to engage the ethical issues surrounding Heidegger’s life and thought, the authors speak of dangers such as facism and the facile, self-congratulatory moral stance that Heidegger exemplifies. The question of how to speak in the wake of Heidegger’s thought takes many forms, and the answers represent a diversity of viewpoints from both American and continental thinkers.

This book punctuates the moments of crisis in continental thought from the foundational crisis of reason in Husserl’s call for a rigorous science of phenomenology to the current crisis of postmodernism and its rejection of Husserl’s metanarrative of history and rationality. The mediating links between these moments is the centrality of the epochal history of Being, the power of cultural and disciplinary practices, and the dispersal of meaning in the post-Husserlian and post-subjective philosophies of Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and others. Included here are the thoughts of leading scholars who critically discuss Husserl’s analysis of the crisis of Western thought and the importance of the concepts of “world” in Husserl’s early writings. The authors analyze the deprivileging of philosophy as social critique through the text of Husserl, Habermas, Foucault, and recent feminist theory. They examine the end of the epistemological and morally autonomous subject in continental thought. Together, these thoughts articulate multiple points or moments of crisis without cure or end.

I wish to show that living is composed of events that are defined by memories, that memories are inclusive of what we might call animality, that memories are definitive of the occurrence of time, and that experiences of light and of animality are inseparably associated. Our ability to communicate With animals, our projections onto them, and our own experiences of animality show memories of something that is intrinsic to our lives and to events of appearance as well as something that Heidegger leaves out of his thought. Time belongs to memory in the sense that time happens with and in memories. Without memory time does not occur. Without time memory does not occur. The phrase, the memory of time, when one maximizes the ambiguity of the ''of'', means that each belongs to the other and although we might find time passing through memory, we will also find memory marking time. The account suggests that the ''light'' of appearing happens in a fleshly way that requires considerable modification of Heidegger''s descriptive accounts of dasein and being.

This discussion of John Sallis’s thought on “the elemental” begins with an engagement of Terrance Malick’s film The Tree of Life. In this engagement the emphasis falls on mere cosmic force, the formation of life on earth, and the development of human bodies with the elemental inevitability of cruelty and violence that is simultaneous with nurturing care, tenderness, and love. Does Sallis give adequate consideration to cosmic force and human kinship with mere force? The next section expands Sallis’s understanding of “elemental” to include such integral aspects of human lives as institutions, languages, cultural identities: To include all the defining aspects intrinsic in human lives. This section calls for a re-thinking of “elemental” and its restricted use in connection with “nature.” The third section engages parts of the chapter, “Elemental Cosmology,” in Logic of Imagination. Although Sallis often appears to give priority to vision, in this chapter he turns to the invisible in his encounter with “the” elemental. In this process he develops within the context of a broadly conceived phenomenological tradition a new conception of objectivity and a new conception of logic. A final section summarizes Sallis’s and my encounter and leads to an incident the telling of which shows a deep compatibility in Sallis’s and my thought in spite of significant differences

This article gives an account of the paradox that happens when liberatory reforms bring with them, simultaneously and in addition to the reforming values and practices, oppressive customs, beliefs, and authoritative knowledges. How can activists become aware of the paradox? How can they transform oppressive practices and systems of power and not bring with them other oppressive practices and systems of power? In responding to these questions, the article emphasizes: the importance of animating the paradoxes instead of attempting to eliminate them; making transverse and transforming movements instead of direct attacks on oppressive formations; finding all “solutions” questionable; and in the absence of stable foundations advancing an approach Tuana and Scott call “hyper-activism.”

We begin at the site of borders, the demarcations between us, between: my body and your body, humans and nonhuman animals, habits of thought and institutional structures, nature and culture, subject and object. We find ourselves between the devil and the deep blue sea. Differences, distinctions, and borders are key to knowing and acting responsibly. Yet we are “held captive” by particular habits of understanding that police such borders with unbecoming fervor. We desire to trouble these borders with the aim of transforming habits of thought and embodied dispositions, to give rise to new appreciations of difference through the deep, ongoing play of the in-between. Ours is an ontology of the in-between...

We are concerned with borders and their crucial importance in people's lives. Throughout we place emphasis on liberatory critique and knowledge and on the importance of the forces lineages exercise in the ways we live. How might we speak of whatever is bordered and allow that of which we speak its manifest differences? How are we able to engage differences and maintain our own differences? How might we, as philosophers, speak philosophically about what is beyond philosophy? Such speaking would constitute an art, a philosophical art, that is guided by unspeakable differences. After developing the concepts of border, in-between, sensibility, and mutations of lineages, we turn to Gloria Anzaldúa's accounts of border awareness and her experiences of it. Through an engagement with her account of nepantla, we offer reflections on the force that “beyond” can have in the happenings of liberatory philosophies. In doing so, we emphasize her conceptions of border arte and her manner of bringing it to expression. In that process we find parts of Alejandro Vallega's work helpful in elaborating radical exteriority, fluid margins, and “ana-chronic” sensibilities. We are engaging a philosophical understanding that gives us bridges that provide thresholds beyond philosophy.

The primary goal of this article is to find an interplay of concepts that will help us to write about the broad transformative potential of Gloria Anzaldúa's experiences of what she calls nepantla in her posthumously published Light in the Dark/Luz en lo Oscuro: Rewriting Identity, Spirituality, Reality (2015). We want to integrate these concepts into our reading of her account of nepantla and to allow her language to further animate the force and meaning of the concepts' interactive connections. The concepts are assemblage, occasion, lineages, sensibility, and temporality. The article concludes with her own culminating understanding of nepantla. The leading topics are Anzaldúa's world, the Coyolxauhqui process, rebirth, and cuerpoespíritu.