Charlie Seymour

Most contemporary philosophers who defend the compatibility of hell with the divine goodness do so by arguing that the damned freely choose hell. Thomas Talbott denies that such a choice is possible, on the grounds that God in his goodness would remove any 'ignorance, deception, or bondage to desire' which would motivate a person to choose eternal misery. My strategy is to turn the tables on Talbott and ask why God would not remove the motives we have for any sin whatsoever. I argue that two plausible answers to this question also show why God would not remove our motives for choosing hell

Problem: if God has middle knowledge, he should actualize a world containing only persons whom he knows would freely choose heaven. Thus there should be no hell. Craig offers an answer to this problem in his article “ ‘No Other Name’: a Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ.” Craig is mainly concerned to give a logically possible defense of hell, though he thinks his suggestion does not lack the sort of plausibility needed for a theodicy. I consider various objections to the latter assessment. My conclusion is that, although Craig’s argument is implausible as a theodicy of conservative exclusivist soteriology, it is useful for less traditional ideas of hell.