In this paper, the authors examine Haslanger’s argumentation in “What is knowledge and what it ought to be”. This paper draws on critical findings to discuss the moral background of knowledge conceptualization and proposes a moral legitimization. The authors find open questions as to what extent this moral foundation proposes changes to the conceptualization of knowledge and what the argumentation entails further. To achieve a better understanding, the authors contextualize Haslanger’s project i…
Read moreIn this paper, the authors examine Haslanger’s argumentation in “What is knowledge and what it ought to be”. This paper draws on critical findings to discuss the moral background of knowledge conceptualization and proposes a moral legitimization. The authors find open questions as to what extent this moral foundation proposes changes to the conceptualization of knowledge and what the argumentation entails further. To achieve a better understanding, the authors contextualize Haslanger’s project in light of her newer work on ameliorative projects in “Going on, Not in the Same Way”. They conclude that her argumentation on knowledge is an ameliorative project itself. Haslanger’s standpoint is rather morally legitimating and expanding the concept of knowledge than changing its common definition. Moreover, Haslanger’s argumentation entails that ameliorative projects are generally complementary to our common epistemic practices. Finally, the authors propose potential objections based on the results of their examination and contextualization.
