Charlotte Gauvry

The widespread use of English in the field of philosophy facilitates international collaboration but may also pose significant challenges in understanding, analyzing, or producing information for both native (NES) and non-native English speakers (NNES). These challenges have not yet been systematically investigated. We conducted an international survey of philosophers (_N_ = 1,615), comparing NES and NNES, while controlling for their academic position (e.g., student, staff, etc.) and other relevant variables. Responses indicated that NNES needed up to twice as long as NES to read English articles and nearly twice as long to prepare English presentations. Additionally, even NNES with the highest English proficiency reported significantly more English manuscript rejections, greater avoidance of attending or asking questions at philosophy events in English, and more frequent feelings of ridicule for their English use. No statistically significant difference was observed in the reported time required to complete an English draft, but NNES tended to report shorter times, possibly reflecting greater reliance on external assistance to detect linguistic errors. Finally, while extensive use of English may help NNES overcome difficulties with English, 88% of NNES respondents reported that it also reduced their ability to discuss philosophy in their native language. This study provides the first systematic, quantitative evidence of English-related epistemic challenges that many NNES may face in philosophy, highlighting significant linguistic inequities.

According to a venerable phenomenological claim which is still quite authoritative nowadays, our phenomenal field is necessarily unified at a time t. This means that everything we simultaneously experience in the first person is subjectively, representationally or at least phenomenally unified. Against this background, Tim Bayne (2010) provides an insightful overview of the various descriptive or empirical challenges to subjective and representational unity while also demonstrating that the claim of phenomenal unity singularly resists these objections. The primary objective of my article, however, is to critically examine the robustness of the phenomenal unity claim, highlighting a specific neuro-divergent condition: “Depersonalization and Derealization Disorder.” In doing so, I aim to introduce a new argument against the phenomenal unity of consciousness. My second objective is to draw on recent empirical evidence linking DPDR symptoms to the use of virtual reality (VR) to explore whether VR could be regarded as an indirect threat to phenomenal unity.

Since 2020, Thomas Metzinger has been developing a minimalist model of “pure consciousness”, known as the MPE model. This model offers significant descriptive and explanatory advantages, as it identifies minimal conditions for consciousness that are intended to be theoretically neutral and universally applicable to all cases of “consciousness as such”. However, this article argues that recent candidates for minimal consciousness – particularly so-called borderline cases emerging from recent advances in neurosurgery and medical biology – pose unique challenges to this promising model. By examining one such borderline case, namely the isolated hemisphere following hemispherotomy, this article demonstrates that these challenges are primarily epistemological. The case of hemispherotomy calls indeed into question the minimalist and universal assumptions of the MPE model. Moreover, these challenges are also ethical in nature, especially if one considers that candidates for phenomenal consciousness may hold a privileged moral status.

The widespread use of English in the field of philosophy facilitates international collaboration but may also pose significant challenges in understanding, analyzing, or producing information for both native (NES) and non-native English speakers (NNES). These challenges have not yet been systematically investigated. We conducted an international survey of philosophers (N = 1,615), comparing NES and NNES, while controlling for their academic position (e.g., student, staff, etc.) and other relevant variables. Responses indicated that NNES needed up to twice as long as NES to read English articles and nearly twice as long to prepare English presentations. Additionally, even NNES with the highest English proficiency reported significantly more English manuscript rejections, greater avoidance of attending or asking questions at philosophy events in English, and more frequent feelings of ridicule for their English use. No statistically significant difference was observed in the reported time required to complete an English draft, but NNES tended to report shorter times, possibly reflecting greater reliance on external assistance to detect linguistic errors. Finally, while extensive use of English may help NNES overcome difficulties with English, 88% of NNES respondents reported that it also reduced their ability to discuss philosophy in their native language. This study provides the first systematic, quantitative evidence of English-related epistemic challenges that many NNES may face in philosophy, highlighting significant linguistic inequities.

This paper investigates one of the central concepts of the contemporary intentionalist philosophy of mind: “intentional content”. It asks whether intentional content eo ipso means propositional content. After having shown that it makes sense to characterize the representational theories of consciousness as “content theories” (or “content views”), it seeks to prove that those contemporary theories lay on a semantic conception of the mental acts analysis that denies them access to the fine-grained sensible. As a consequence this paper examines Tim Crane’s alternative view which postulates that it is possible to keep the intentionalist paradigm without falling into some traps of semantics. This solution requires carefully distinguishing between two meanings of the “content” concept: the phenomenal content of experience and the propositional content that is supposed to describe it. As a conclusion, it questions the possibility of such a distinction.

The first aim of this chapter is to examine the historical hypothesis that Emil Lask might be regarded as the “materialist” of the Baden school. This singular Neo-Kantian indeed defends the view that the domain of meaning, far from being purely formal, involves an interpenetration of form and matter (Materie, Material), and that this matter is, moreover, “impenetrable” (undurchdringlich). The second, more conceptual aim is to show that there is room within Lask’s system for what more contemporary theorists have referred to as “the given” (the given, die Gegebenheit). My demonstration proceeds through a lexical and conceptual analysis of the author’s distinctions used to thematize the material: das Alogische, das logische Nackt, and die Undurchdringlichkeit.

In line with a rich and long tradition revived by Suárez, Brentano maintains that all non- determined entities have to be considered as non-beings. In this respect, he makes use of the concept of entia rationis. Interestingly, he suggests, at least since his 1901 letter to Marty, that these entities have to be considered not things or beings at all but “fictions,” more precisely, as linguistic fictions. The purpose of my text is twofold. First, I intend to clarify the status of linguistic fictions in Brentano. In particular, I will consider the extent to which they are connected or not with medieval theories of entia irrealia and entia rationis (Suárez). Secondly, I will emphasize the linguistic nature of those fictions and sketch some remarks on Brentano’s view on language and concepts.

The question of the “passage of time,” particularly that of the subjective experience of time’s passage, raises difficult problems from both phenomenal and metaphysical perspectives. This is because it seems that we experience the passage of time in the first person, even though this experience does not correspond to any physical reality. The aim of this chapter is to clarify the phenomenology of the experience of time’s passage and to offer a non-eliminativist explanation of it in terms of second-order representation.

This article primarily focuses on the intriguing case of hemispherotomy, a neurosurgical procedure presenting a serious challenge by producing an isolated hemisphere exhibiting cortical activity suggestive of an “island of awareness.” The article proceeds as follows. First, it underscores that none of the traditional demarcation criteria for consciousness can be considered necessary or sufficient for deciding the status of the isolated hemisphere. Second, it introduces a new strategy to extrapolate consciousness to neuro-atypical creatures, called the “Conceptual Level” strategy. In the third section, it applies the strategy to the hemispherotomy case in order to elucidate which conceptual level of consciousness can be attributed to the isolated hemisphere, as well as the theoretical and practical implications stemming from such an attribution.

My paper investigates the hypothesis that Brentano paved the way to Frege and Wittgenstein and already introduced a “context principle” in his manuscripts on language. I will mostly focus on his distinction between “syncategorematic” and “categorematic” expressions. In Sect. 1, I will first assess the evidences found in the literature to hold that Brentano is indeed a philosopher of language. In Sect. 2, I will focus on “syncategorematic expressions,” whose meaning functions are sensitive to some syntactical considerations. In Sect. 3, I will examine further the notion of “categorematic expressions,” which manifests that the naming function of some expressions is a-contextual. Sect. 4 challenges this last conclusion. The main purpose of the whole chapter is to ask whether Brentano’s focus on practical considerations is sufficient to make him a “contextualist.”

L’enjeu du présent article est d’examiner la critique du naturalisme menée par Charles Taylor de 1970 à 1990 et d’en interroger la portée. L’article commence par définir les thèses ontologiques et épistémologiques constitutives de ce que Taylor appelle « le naturalisme » et qu’il considère, non sans le déplorer, comme le courant philosophique hégémonique de la deuxième moitié du xx e siècle. Il analyse ensuite les différents arguments mobilisés par Taylor pour en contester la légitimité et il en identifie un comme central : la cécité du naturalisme au caractère déterminant de « l’arrière-plan ». Cet argument se décline en deux versions : la cécité au statut herméneutique de l’arrière-plan, la cécité à son statut normatif. Pour finir, l’article formule plusieurs objections à l’endroit de la proposition normativiste élaborée par Taylor en réponse au naturalisme.

Nous analysons le traitement que Heidegger consacre au concept de logos dans les paragraphes 31, 32 et 33 de Sein und Zeit et la manière dont il articule les concepts de «significativité» [Bedeutsamkeit], de «sens» [Sinn], d’«explicitation» [Auslegung] et d’«énoncé» discursif [Aussage]. Nous montrons, par une lecture rétrospective des cours de Marbourg et de Fribourg, que ces analyses présentent certaines intuitions pragmatiques qui anticipent en un sens celles du réalisme linguistique. Mais nous soulignerons avant tout le caractère éminemment herméneutique de l’analyse.

Traditionnellement, la scène contemporaine opère un partage entre deux acceptions de l? « intentionnalité » : entre les lectures dites « interna­liste » et « externaliste » de la notion. À l?aune des débats contemporains, il est en effet tentant de distinguer une approche « internaliste » de l?intention­nalité ? conçue comme l?expression d?un vécu psychique ? d?une ap­proche « externaliste » qui substitue au concept d?« intentionnalité » celui d? « intention » pour en récuser toute anticipation ou détermination « subjec­tive ». Selon la première acception, l?intentionnalité est un acte psychique qui se détermine lui-même. Ce vécu est l?expression d?une inten­tion de signifier. Selon la deuxième acception, l?intention n?est pas un vécu. Elle n?accom­pagne pas l?action (elle ne l?anticipe ni ne la guide) : l?intention, c?est l?action elle-même dont la détermination requiert des facteurs « ex­ternes » au vécu. Il est cependant clair que ce partage est schématique. La première catégorie de partage, dite « internaliste », est évidemment hétéro­gène. Mais on entend ici se concentrer sur la deuxième, « externaliste », pour montrer sa complexité.

L’article examine le rôle de l’interprétation dans la compréhension du sens d’un énoncé, selon une perspective contextualiste. Dans l’héritage des travaux inauguraux de Frege, de Wittgenstein et d’Austin, les principaux représentants du contextualisme – Charles Travis par excellence – soutiennent que la compréhension des critères qui fixent le sens des énoncés requiert un ancrage en contexte. Ces critères tiennent lieu de standard de correction de l’application des propriétés sémantiques. Mais dire que l’application des propriétés sémantiques d’un énoncé requiert la compréhension des critères qui sont discriminants dans un contexte, est-ce pour autant affirmer que le locuteur interprète librement quel critère est pertinent et donc qu’il peut interpréter différemment le sens d’un même énoncé qu’un autre locuteur qui est dans la même situation ? Le premier enjeu de l’article est de montrer, à l’encontre de toute conception relativiste de la compréhension, que les critères du sens sont normés de manière conventionnelle et donc, qu’en contexte, il n’y a jamais qu’une interprétation possible des critères. L’interprétation est imposée par le contexte qui la norme. Dans ces conditions, cela a-t-il un sens de parler d’interprétation du sens de l’énoncé ? Le deuxième objectif du texte est d’examiner si, localement, la compréhension des énoncés du langage ordinaire peut cependant tolérer une, et donc plusieurs interprétations. L’article distingue alors deux processus : l’interprétation des signes du langage qui se justifie dès lors que les signes en question sont ambigus et l’interprétation du sens de l’énoncé qui s’impose dans un cas bien circonscrit, en cas d’absence ou du moins de méconnaissance du contexte. Il distingue alors plusieurs concepts d’ « interprétation » : l’interprétation qui consiste à substituer un symbole par un autre pour traduire un énoncé ambigu en langage ordinaire et l’interprétation qui ne se surajoute pas à la compréhension mais qui n’est autre que le processus de donation de sens lui-même et dont l’enjeu est exclusivement clarificateur

Dans l’héritage des travaux inauguraux de Gottlob Frege et du fameux « principe de contexte » de la préface aux Fondements de l’arithmétique, la notion de « contexte » a gagné un surcroît d’intérêt dans la philosophie du langage de la seconde moitié du XXesiècle, au prix de grandes confusions. Notre article tente de contribuer à la clarification de ces confusions en proposant une distinction entre le « contextualisme », tel qu’il se définit dans un héritage wittgensteinien et austinien, et la « sémantique pragmatique ». Nous espérons ainsi montrer que la sémantique pragmatique dont l’échelle d’analyse est la proposition, tout en considérant certains éléments de contexte extra-sémantique, en reste à l’idée que l’énoncé a un contenu propositionnel susceptible d’être évalué en termes de vérité et de fausseté et que le sens de l’énoncé est déterminé par des « conditions de vérité » : elle en reste donc à une analyse sémantique de la phrase. A contrario, nous tenterons de montrer que le « contextualisme radical » bien compris refuse précisément de s’en tenir à cette approche sémantique de l’énoncé et définit le contexte non pas comme un élément de « contenu » de la phrase mais comme la norme qui détermine un acte de langage en tant qu’acte.

This paper focuses on the determinations of the notion of "use" in the early Heidegger – from the 1920’s – and in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. It aims to distinguish the notion of « use » from the one of « life’s practice », and more precisely, from the two notions of "life’s achievement" and "form of life". The objective is to point out that, although they are indeed very different, Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s notions of "use" both are specific and determined by their resistance to a context. This paper will therefore dwell more specifically on the analysis of the Heideggerian notion of « formal indication » and of a therapeutic and non hermeneutic notion of context in the Investigations

Cet article examine la doctrine des catégories développée par Emil Lask (1875-1915) au début du xx e siècle (1911). Son objectif est double. 1) Nous entendons proposer une étude historique précise de cette doctrine relativement méconnue qui présente une synthèse inédite entre l’objectivisme sémantique de Bolzano, la théorie des valeurs de l’école de Bade et le formalisme husserlien, dans le contexte de l’héritage de la révolution copernicienne kantienne. Nous montrons que cette doctrine présente un caractère radical en ceci qu’elle considère que la philosophie est eo ipso une doctrine des catégories. 2) Le deuxième objectif de cette étude, plus critique, est d’évaluer la pertinence de la lecture herméneutique, d’inspiration heideggérienne, qui en est souvent proposée. S’il est indéniable que la doctrine de Lask exerça une réelle influence sur la phénoménologie herméneutique du jeune Heidegger, nous entendons également montrer que les intuitions originales de Lask sur la résistance du matériau sont irréconciliables avec toute forme d’herméneutique.

This collection of fourteen original essays addresses the seminal contribution of Franz Brentano and his heirs, to philosophy of language. Despite the great interest provoked by the Brentanian tradition and its multiple connections with early analytic philosophy, precious little is known about the Brentanian contribution to philosophy of language. The aim of this new collection is to fill this gap by providing the reader with a more thorough understanding of the legacy of Brentano and his school, in their pursuit of a unique research programme according to which the analysis of meaning is inseparable from philosophical inquiries into what goes on in the mind and what there is in the world. In three parts, the volume first reconstructs Brentano’s pathbreaking thoughts on meaning and grammatical illusions, exploring their strong connections with the Austro-German tradition and analytic philosophy. It then addresses the multifaceted debates on the objectivity of meaning in the Brentano School and its aftermath. Finally, part three explores Brentano’s wider legacy, namely: Husserl’s theory of modification and typicality, Bühler’s theory of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions, and Wittgenstein’s thoughts on guidance and rule-following. The result is a unique collection of essays which shows the significance, originality and timely character of the Brentanian philosophy of language.