•  77
    In this paper, I propose a principle of doxastic rationality based on Bernard Williams's argument against doxastic voluntarism. This principle, I go on to show, undermines a number of notions of epistemic duty which have been put forth within the framework of virtue theory. I then suggest an alternative formulation which remains within the bounds of rationality allowed for by my principle. In the end, I suggest that the failure of the earlier formulations and the adoption of the latter tend to v…Read more
  •  58
    Religious luck and religious virtue
    Religious Studies 40 (1): 97-111. 2000.
    Following Linda Zagzebski's discussion of the paradoxical implications of moral luck for Christian morality, I explore the role of religious luck in two accounts of divine election – that of Paul the Apostle and that of the sixteenth-century Jewish thinker, Rabbi Judah Loeb of Prague. On both accounts, special religious status is conferred unrelated to the deserts of the beneficiary. What sense does it make to ascribe religious worth to someone if it simply came his way? Both accounts appeal to …Read more
  •  41
    Knowing how
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1): 61-69. 1984.
  •  39
    Salomon Maimon's Critique of Kant's Theory of Consciousness
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 35 (2). 1981.
  •  37
    When Is Knowledge a Matter of Luck?
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1): 105-120. 1996.
    It is quite common that a claim to knowledge is dismissed as a matter of luck. It is demonstrated that when one cites as the reason for rejecting a true belief that it is merely lucky, this is typically because the belief has not satisfied the requirements of one's theory. So disputes on luck in fact turn out to be disputes on deep epistemological issues. Criterea for epistemological luck suggested by Thomas Nagel, Nicolas Rescher, Alvin Goldman, Mylan Engel and Richard Foley are analyzed and re…Read more
  •  34
    Oakeshott and the Practice of Politics
    Journal of Philosophical Research 17 265-277. 1992.
    Oakeshott’s thesis is that political knowledge is essentially praetical: it is not given to propositional formulation and cannot be deliberately exercised, but rather is expressed in conduct and transmitted by example and practice. I argue that this is true primarily of physical skills which depend upon unconscious, automatic physiological processes. Political practice, by contrast, is largely a matter of rule-governed activity. It is an empirical fact that we do have introspcetive access to man…Read more
  •  33
    Avoidability and Libertarianism: A Response to Fischer
    Faith and Philosophy 13 (3): 415-421. 1996.
    Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer’s fir…Read more
  •  30
    Epistemic obligation and rationality constraints
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 455-470. 1996.
  •  27
    Book reviews (review)
    Philosophia 6 (2): 379-386. 1976.
  •  20
    Intentional Action—Sometimes a Matter of Luck
    Philosophical Investigations 12 (3): 234-242. 1989.
  •  17
    Justification without good reasons
    Philosophical Papers 21 (2): 121-131. 1992.
  •  12
    Counter-evidence and the Duty to Critically Reflect
    Analysis 60 (1): 89-96. 2000.
  •  11
    Knowing How
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1): 61-69. 1984.
  •  10
    Epistemic Obligation and Rationality Constraints
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 455-470. 1996.
  •  8
    When Is Knowledge a Matter of Luck?
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1): 105-120. 1996.
    It is quite common that a claim to knowledge is dismissed as a matter of luck. It is demonstrated that when one cites as the reason for rejecting a true belief that it is merely lucky, this is typically because the belief has not satisfied the requirements of one's theory. So disputes on luck in fact turn out to be disputes on deep epistemological issues. Criterea for epistemological luck suggested by Thomas Nagel, Nicolas Rescher, Alvin Goldman, Mylan Engel and Richard Foley are analyzed and re…Read more
  •  8
    Oakeshott and the Practice of Politics
    Journal of Philosophical Research 17 265-277. 1992.
    Oakeshott’s thesis is that political knowledge is essentially praetical: it is not given to propositional formulation and cannot be deliberately exercised, but rather is expressed in conduct and transmitted by example and practice. I argue that this is true primarily of physical skills which depend upon unconscious, automatic physiological processes. Political practice, by contrast, is largely a matter of rule-governed activity. It is an empirical fact that we do have introspcetive access to man…Read more
  •  8
    Epistemic Virtue and Epistemic Responsibility
    Dialectica 55 (2): 105-118. 2001.
    Virtue epistemology construes intellectual virtue as a reliable ability to form true beliefs. Responsibilist versions seek to substitute for the passive, reliabilist model of the knower, that of an active subject who deliberately and purposefully exercises traits of character which tend to result in true beliefs. On these views, the disposition to exercise these epistemic virtues gives rise to notions of epistemic duty.In this paper, I propose a principle of doxastic rationality based on Bernard…Read more
  • Jacob and Isaac: a tale of deception and self-deception
    In Charles Harry Manekin & Robert Eisen (eds.), Philosophers and the Jewish Bible, University Press of Maryland. 2008.