Chelsea Haramia

Pedigreed breeding often leads to severe health problems for, say, those dogs who exist as a result of the practice. It is also the case that virtually all of those unhealthy animals would not exist at all if it were not for the practice of pedigreed breeding. If those animals have lives worth living, then it follows that they are not harmed by the practice—assuming that a life worth living is better than no life at all. It would seem, then, that the standard account of harm cannot account for the wrongness of our intentionally creating pets with lower welfare. I argue that there is an overlooked aspect of harm that, when coupled with our responsibilities as animal caretakers, entails that we ought to cease the practice of pedigreed breeding for the sake of future pets, even if many actual pets are not made worse off by the practice

My focus is on the contemporary astrobiological activity of Messaging ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence (METI). This intentional astrobiological signaling typically involves embedding digital communications in powerful radio signals and transmitting those signals out into the cosmos in an explicit effort to make contact with extraterrestrial others. Some who criticize METI express concern that contact with technologically advanced extraterrestrial life could be seriously harmful to Earth or humanity. One popular response to this critique of messaging is an appeal to causal impotence sometimes referred to as the ‘Barn Door’ Argument—we are already engaged in many other detectable activities not intended for cosmic communication. If the Barn Door Argument is correct, then those who engage in messaging arguably have a moral excuse. They are permitted to continue messaging because there is no point in abstaining. I develop three ways in which the claim of causal impotence in the Barn Door Argument could be understood. I evaluate each of these in turn and demonstrate that only one is appropriate to contemporary messaging. However, this interpretation does not generate the moral excuse on which the proponents of the Barn Door Argument rely; thus, the argument fails. Finally, I entertain and respond to candidate objections.

Those who do not exist cannot be harmed. If someone is not worse off than she otherwise would have been, she is not harmed. Together, these claims entail that the individuals in non-identity cases are not harmed, because no one who exists is made worse off. While these claims might be true at the individual level, their truth does not preclude our having harm-based concerns about future persons in general. These concerns are justified when we recognize the responsibility we have over certain offices that persons come to fill. By positing an account of de dicto harm and arguing for its moral relevance, I provide a solution to the non- identity problem that coheres nicely with our intuitions regarding harm, responsibility, and obligations to future persons