Chenyang Li

I argue that the nature of the international human rights discourse ("IHRD") is to promote certain moral values across various cultural traditions; as such, this should be done through persuasion; it should not merely be forcing people to change their behavior; it should seek to have people accept certain moral values that they have not embraced or accept certain moral values as more important than they have held them to be. With persuasion as a goal, we need to make strategies suitable for this purpose. The paper has the following sections.

There is an inner thoroughness spirit in traditional Chinese learning of classics—the so-called "Guoxue" in Chinese. Only on this foundation of "thoroughness" spirit can academics show its vigorous culture life and spiritual life, which makes traditional Chinese learning of classics pursue the transcendence of heaven and man and can’t be divided into a religion. Our traditional Chinese values and its original significance exist in our traditional academic system and the enlightenment of propriety and music. As for the self—identification, because of the lost of the "thoroughness" spirit and original significance foundation, the traditional Chinese learning of classics concealed their academic specialties that make the reconstruction of modern Chinese culture lack a solid foundation. Currently, various colleges, institutes and centers of traditional Chinese learning have been set up in many universities, but “Guoxue” should not be taken as one special subject far from the other disciplines, and we should make efforts to reconstruct the traditional Chinese learning of classics ("Guoxue") as a primitive significance-adding foundation or “academic home”.

It is a great honor to receive thoughtful and insightful commentaries from three esteemed critics of my Reshaping Confucianism: A Progressive Inquiry (Oxford University Press, 2023). I very much appreciate their generous praises and will respond to their comments in the order of the chapters with which they engage, by Loy Hui Chieh, Winnie Sung, and Daniel Bell.Loy Hui Chieh’s commentary raises profound methodological questions. The significance of addressing these questions concerns not only the book in question but also how to study Confucianism in general and how to do cultural philosophy broadly. Loy’s first question is about the role of open-endedness in studying Confucianism progressively. In the Introduction... Read More.

Familism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism form three concentric circles in a person's life. Each of these respective human communities constitutes an independent good for the good life. The value of family life does not depend on the value of country, and the world. Nor does the value of patriotic life or cosmopolitan life depend on that of family life. Shifting allegiances between these circles entails reallocating loyalty and dedication, and thus both enriches one's life and incurs a cost to it. In the view that I construct here, a philosophy of the good life articulates its own vision of the ideal allocation of loyalty and dedication among these three or more spheres. While cosmopolitanism has its own value and good, it also comes with a cost; proponents of cosmopolitanism-including Confucian cosmopolitansoften overlook such a cost. I argue for a "dynamic harmony" approach to cosmopolitanism that takes into account the cost it incurs on people's local commitments.

Michael Sandel has been one of the most powerful critics of liberalism in the past decades. His work, especially in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, exposes some of the fundamental flaws of Rawlsian liberalism and shows the need for a community-based framework in order for us to adequately understand and appreciate the concept of the individual and just society. Confucians can endorse many of Sandel’s critiques of liberalism. From a Confucian perspective, however, Sandel’s version of communitarianism is nevertheless too thin for a robust communitarian society. Confucians maintain a thick notion of community and take it to be vital to human flourishing. In this essay, I first discuss a key point where Confucians converge with Sandel as an example of the common ground between the two philosophies before turn to one important difference between them. The key point of convergence is about the circumstances of justice; the difference is on harmony. Harmony lies in the very center of the Confucian notion of community, whereas it has been given no place in Sandel’s conception of community. This essay offers a Confucian critique as well as an endorsement of Sandel’s communitarian philosophy. It also extends a friendly invitation to Sandel for him to take harmony into his conception of community.