Chenyu Bu

Contemporary musical ontology has become fixated on musical works, treating them as the primary—often exclusive—subject of metaphysical inquiry. This paper argues that such work-centrism is methodologically limiting. Musical work is a heterogeneous category that resists unified ontological treatment, while the very concept of a work proves historically contingent and practice-relative. Moreover, work-centrism leaves un(der)theorized vast ranges of musical phenomena that merit ontological consideration. These limitations are diagnosed from testing the work-centric methodology against four desiderata for an ontological theory of music, each motivated by reflecting on musical phenomena and practices. I then propose a compositional approach to musical ontology, focused on musical elements (pitches, rhythms, motifs) and their interrelations under compositional operations, as a promising alternative. This approach not only meets the desiderata but also systematically tracks musical content—what makes something musical—thereby offering a stable foundation for philosophical theorizing about music as such.

Contemporary musical ontology has become fixated on musical works, treating them as the primary—often exclusive—subject of metaphysical inquiry. This paper argues that such work-centrism is methodologically limiting. Musical work is a heterogeneous category that resists unified ontological treatment, while the very concept of a work proves historically contingent and practice-relative. Moreover, work-centrism leaves un(der)theorized vast ranges of musical phenomena that merit ontological consideration. These limitations are diagnosed from testing the work-centric methodology against four desiderata for an ontological theory of music, each motivated by reflecting on musical phenomena and practices. I then propose a compositional approach to musical ontology, focused on musical elements (pitches, rhythms, motifs) and their interrelations under compositional operations, as a promising alternative. This approach not only meets the desiderata but also systematically tracks musical content—what makes something musical—thereby offering a stable foundation for philosophical theorizing about music as such.

I develop Schopenhauerian musical formalism. First, I present a Schopenhauerian account of music with a background of his metaphysical framework. Then, I define meaningfulness as an analog to a Kantian notion of purposiveness and argue that, in light of Schopenhauer, music is meaningful as a direct manifestation of the universal will. Given the ineffable nature of what music points to, its form lacks any representation of meaning. Music is therefore the mere form of meaningfulness, and it is precisely this mere form that gives rise to the infinite possibilities to ascribe it with a variety of musical meaning.