Chi-keung Chan

This article offers a new interpretation of moral knowledge in Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 philosophy, emphasizing its embodied foundations and practical significance. I advance two central claims. First, although moral knowledge (liangzhi 良知) is often construed as an internal mental sense to know right from wrong, Wang’s writings reveal its deeper grounding in bodily perception, particularly in the perception of pain. Second, while the extension of moral knowledge (zhi liangzhi 致良知) is typically understood as an inward process of correcting one’s mental states, Wang understands it more fundamentally as the practice of recognizing the affective interconnectedness and mutual resonance between oneself and other beings. Drawing on close readings of Wang’s key texts, informed by comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives, I argue that this embodied and relational account both deepens our understanding of the unity of knowledge and action in Wang’s thought and enriches contemporary discussions of moral motivation.

This paper presents an enactive approach to Neo-Confucian ethics, with a particular focus on Wang Yangming’s (王陽明 1472-1529) concepts of the heart-mind (xin 心) and moral knowledge (liangzhi 良知). While traditional ethical models in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism emphasize grounding ethical life in universal rational principles or in the cultivation of a moral mind, this paper seeks to clarify these assumptions by drawing on the enactive insight of groundlessness. It argues that, rather than resting on a fixed and isolated metaphysical ground, any moral mind, if it exists, must manifest through embodied interaction and engagement with the world. This perspective reconceptualizes the moral mind and liangzhi as more than cognitive processes confined to the head; instead, they are understood as part of an integrated mind-body-world system, characterized by embodied, contextually grounded, and beyond-self-aware coping mechanisms. By redefining these elements, this paper aims to deepen our understanding of Neo-Confucian ethics and contribute meaningfully to broader philosophical discussions on moral agency, autonomy, and moral responsibility.

The Taizhou school of philosophy, followers of Wang Yangming, places significant emphasis on the body, which has led to theoretical challenges concerning the potential dissipation of natural desires. Critics contend that while Taizhou philosophy acknowledges the natural state of human existence, it fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the existence of evil and tends to overlook the crucial role of deliberate moral practice by idealizing the natural as morally perfect. Drawing on insights from embodied cognition, this article aims to shed light on the nuanced perspectives of Taizhou moral philosophy and address common criticisms regarding its approach to evil and moral practice. I will explore Taizhou’s holistic understanding, which integrates mind and body, self and others, offering fresh insights into the interplay between deliberation and spontaneity within moral practices. As a comparative and interdisciplinary endeavor, this work seeks to bridge the divide between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions and between moral philosophy and empirical science. This article not only aims to enhance our understanding of Taizhou philosophy but also strives to illuminate broader implications for ethical behavior and moral reasoning in a diverse, global context.

How does evil arise? While accounts of moral development commonly emphasize cognition-related factors—such as rationality, knowledge, reasoning, consciousness, and deliberation—the Neo-Confucian philosopher LIU Zongzhou 劉宗周 (Jishan 蕺山, 1578–1645) offers a strikingly different perspective by drawing attention to their potential dangers. As the Chinese idiom cautions, one can be "fooled by cleverness": human knowing, in certain modes, can go astray. Drawing on Liu's affect-centered moral theory, this essay aims to: (1) elucidate how cognitive processes contribute to the emergence of wrongdoing, and examine the mechanisms by which wrongdoing gives rise to moral evil; and (2) question the common assumption that moral practice consists solely in conscious and deliberate effort, and propose instead that it also involves an effortless, self-sustaining dimension that operates beyond reflective self-awareness. By incorporating insights from moral psychology, this essay ultimately seeks to enrich and deepen our understanding of wrongdoing and moral evil within a cross-cultural philosophical context.