Chi Kwok

The recent political turn in theorizing the corporation has drawn attention to the extensive power that corporations possess, but has not yet provided a systematic normative account of corporate political power. This article proposes a “political capability approach” to address this. It identifies four forms of corporate political power: law-making, governance, discursive, and democratic will-shaping. The approach differentiates politically significant corporations from ordinary ones along two dimensions: vertically, by how many of these capabilities a corporation possesses in combination; and horizontally, by the scale and reach of each. Conventional metrics such as firm size or wealth are imperfect proxies for political power. The political capability approach instead connects normative evaluation directly to the concrete powers corporations exercise. It offers a more nuanced and empirically grounded basis for assessing which corporations warrant democratic justification, and for matching regulatory remedies to the specific capabilities that threaten democratic values.

Drawing on Joseph Carens’s social membership theory, originally developed in immigration ethics, I transpose this temporal logic to organizational spheres. I argue that as employees accrue tenure, they “sink roots”, integrating into the firm’s cooperative structure and subjecting themselves to its governance. This sustained integration generates increasingly strong moral entitlements to participate in decision-making, analogous to how long-term residents acquire claims to citizenship. I use this temporal framework to address the boundary problem in workplace democracy, defend a graduated workplace franchise that prioritizes long-term employees over transient stakeholders, and criticize fissured employment structures that block such membership over time.

This article asks how contemporary labor domination is sustained through the organization of knowledge, evidence, and procedure. Building on work in epistemic injustice, it introduces the concept of “processual epistemic burdens,” meaning the cumulative mental exhaustion and iterative cognitive labor imposed on disadvantaged actors who must repeatedly interpret events, assemble evidence, translate their experience in ways that are legible to relevant institutions and authorities, and defend their claims over time. Much of the epistemic injustice literature is oriented to discrete and episodic harms, yet insufficiently accounts for the protracted process by which the oppressed must struggle for recognition. Centering the platform gig economy as an archetypal case, this article shows how algorithmic opacity, fragmented accountability, and adversarial litigation compel workers to become perpetual investigators, translators, and litigants. Reconceptualizing domination as epistemically mediated, the article shows that reducing epistemic injustice in the digital economy requires a more equitable distribution of epistemic labor.

What constitutes a good corporate agent? The article answers this question by critically applying List and Pettit's theory of group agency, which emphasizes three crucial dimensions of organizational design: epistemic quality, incentive compatibility, and control. Integrating empirical insights from sociology and organizational studies, we argue that List and Pettit's framework implies a non‐contingent relationship between good corporate agents and egalitarian structures. This article makes two contributions: (1) it enriches debates in the political theory of the firm by clarifying how group agency concepts impact the normative understanding of corporate structures; (2) it strengthens the normative foundations of List and Pettit's framework by situating their theoretical criteria within empirical evidence of organizational effectiveness.

This article develops the concept of epistemic dispossession as a distinctive structural form of epistemic injustice arising under platform capitalism. Epistemic dispossession occurs when socio-technical infrastructures systematically extract, suppress, or appropriate epistemic resources, such as knowledge, data, and communicative contributions, from marginalised groups, depriving them of both epistemic agency and the benefits derived from their knowledge production. Building upon Iris Marion Young’s theory of structural injustice and oppression, the article illustrates how epistemic dispossession manifests along Young’s five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. Through an examination of contemporary digital platforms, the article demonstrates how algorithmic practices, profit-driven incentives, and content moderation systems structurally reproduce these injustices. The article contrasts epistemic dispossession with existing theories of epistemic injustice, arguing that this concept highlights the political-economic dimensions of epistemic harm that are less salient in the literature. Finally, drawing upon Young’s communicative democracy and social connection model of responsibility, the article sheds light on a range of institutional remedies to counter epistemic dispossession and uphold epistemic justice in digital public spheres.

Political theorists frequently utilize the ‘firm–state analogy’ (FSA) to support the arguments for democratic governance in firms. This article presents the FSA as an analogy with both justificatory and epistemic functions. Its justificatory function provides valid justificatory strategies for workplace democracy, while its epistemic function offers models that shape the understanding of corporate power. In this article, four limitations of the justificatory function of the FSA are identified: (i) the problem of ambiguity, (ii) the boundary problem, (iii) the issue of normative redundancy, and (iv) the universality problem. Furthermore, the article argues that the epistemic function of the FSA fails to adequately address some of the most concerning forms of corporate power wielded by large, particularly multinational, corporations in the realm of international trade. As a result, the FSA misses crucial reasons for the normative desirability of democracy in corporate governance.

Purpose This study aims to develop an interdisciplinary political theory of data justice by connecting three major political theories of the public good with empirical studies about the functions of big data and offering normative principles for restricting and guiding the state’s data practices from a public good perspective. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on three major political theories of the public good – the market failure approach, the basic rights approach and the democratic approach – and critical data studies, this study synthesizes existing studies on the promises and perils of big data for public good purposes. The outcome is a conceptual paper that maps philosophical discussions about the conditions under which the state has a legitimate right to collect and use big data for public goods purposes. Findings This study argues that market failure, basic rights protection and deepening democracy can be normative grounds for justifying the state’s right to data collection and utilization, from the perspective of political theories of the public good. The state’s data practices, however, should be guided by three political principles, namely, the principle of transparency and accountability; the principle of fairness; and the principle of democratic legitimacy. The paper draws on empirical studies and practical examples to explicate these principles. Originality/value Bringing together normative political theory and critical data studies, this study contributes to a more philosophically rigorous understanding of how and why big data should be used for public good purposes while discussing the normative boundaries of such data practices.