Chia-Hung Huang

This article explores two issues: (1) Can there be a national political philosophy (NPP) as a discipline, and if so, what methods, if any, might be used to develop such a discipline? (2) How valuable might a national political philosophy be? I first examine Ruey-Lin Chen’s group-construction theory, which suggests that the subjectivity of a NPP amounts to the subjectivity of the group dedicated to its development. However, this account is unappealing as it either assumes that a discipline has no genuine subjectivity or implies a categorical mistake in equating the subjectivity of NPP with the subjectivity of the group seeking its establishment. I then argue for a methodological account of NPP developed in terms of Sangiovanni’s theory of practice-dependence from a national perspective, hereafter the national practice-dependence approach (NPD). NPD makes NPP realistic because the principles theorized concern political feasibility and are thus action-guiding. It also helps identify and preserve the moral dimensions of a national community. However, NPP faces challenges in main- taining a critical distance from existing practices tied to national interests and its outcomes must be weighed against other valuable perspectives. Thus, I conclude that the value of NPP is upheld only if complemented by a political philosophy that incorporates global justice and/or the viewpoints of minority groups.

In Social Goodness, Witt argues that social role normativity is both distinct from morality or prudence, and exists independently of role-players’ attitudes. She also argues that the relationship between techniques and expertise, which constitutes the artisanal model, best explains the development of social role norms. I consider how internal conditions impact social role normativity and then raise two challenges to Witt’s ideas. First, I argue that agent-relative (i.e. internal) conditions can shape the contents and source of role obligations through state regulation. Internal conditions are necessary to legitimate institutional mediation regarding the development of social role norms, thereby creating a form of normative dualism that can counter Witt’s criticism of internalism. Second, I argue that some social roles generate alienation because they make the role-occupiers fail to reflect on the value of, and their connection to, the roles. This issue is beyond the grip of Witt’s theory, implying that internal conditions are necessary to understand the problem of alienating social roles.

This article grounds the morality of secession on two forms of collective self-determination: one manifests the communal goods of secessionists and the other the value of shared political institutions. Secession is morally valuable when the two are incompatible such that the claimant confronts persistent alienation. For remedial rights theories, only ‘strict violations’ permit secession. For primary rights theories, ‘broad violations’ grant secession as a last resort, and so this thesis, ‘collective self-determination as nonalienation’, should be accepted regardless. First, as the two collective forms of self-determination develop two forms of territorial rights, it supplements cogent accounts of territorial justification for, and claims to, secession. Second, as persistent alienation can have both strict and broad interpretations, it also provides moral grounds shared by remedial and primary rights theories if they concede the value of collective self-determination. The strict sense refers to persistent coercion that violates personal autonomy and nullifies state legitimacy. The broad interpretation denotes long-term political frustration caused by unreasonable prevention of greater collective autonomy that even legitimate states may achieve. Third, to verify whether this amounts to long-term political frustration and to address persistent alienation, secession should be regarded as a last resort, despite its support from the primary rights account.