Chiara Palazzolo

This article addresses the inherently relational nature of musical agency, drawing upon interdisciplinary research. It argues that music does not exist in isolation but within social and emotional contexts shaped by a network of relationships among musicians. These interactions create a collaborative space that transcends mere technical execution, fostering a collective experience enriched by shared sensitivity and emotional engagement. Consequently, musical practice, whether compositional or performative, entails a moral responsibility, particularly challenging the perspectives of Levinas; Bauman; and Wilde, who traditionally separated art from ethics. As outlined in Nielsen and Cobussen’s work “music contributes to a better understanding of one’s place within the world, and thus, to an ethical sensibility”, emphasizing how musical practice cultivates ethical awareness through its relational nature. Music is thus conceived as a moral endeavor, where care extends not only to the music itself but also to the individuals involved in its creation and performance. Moreover, this moral responsibility extends to future generations, as musical tradition is conceived as a temporal bridge linking the past, the present, and the future. The tradition is composed of individuals actively engaged in the practices that shape the tradition or traditions. Musicians bear an intergenerational responsibility toward those who will inherit and reinterpret current practices—a responsibility not grounded in direct reciprocity, but in what Randall describes as “conceptual ties”. The continuity of musical tradition and its aesthetic value depend on the care and responsibility each generation shows toward both the participants and the evolving cultural products of this process. Thus, the discussion elucidates the ethical dimensions of musical agency and practice, particularly in Western classical music, and highlights how our obligations to future generations are intrinsic to the practice itself, thereby contributing to broader debates on intergenerational care ethics.

The article examines the relationship between evil, freedom, and divine necessity in Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, and how Schelling’s ideas seem to echo in Harry Frankfurt’s contemporary theory of moral responsibility. Schelling’s concept of evil arises from the ground of existence, revealing an intrinsic duality in which God requires an opposing principle (evil) for His self-revelation. Schelling denies that God can be the author of evil, instead locating its origin in human free will. This analysis draws a parallel between Schelling’s claim that evil is necessary for God’s revelation and Frankfurt’s rejection of the principle of alternative possibilities, arguing that moral responsibility does not require the ability to act otherwise. The article critically examines Schelling’s stance on the compatibility between necessity and freedom, focusing on the theological and metaphysical implications of felix culpa, which transforms human sin into a necessary condition for divine grace. By linking Schelling’s notion of freedom within necessity to Frankfurt’s compatibilist theory of moral responsibility, this article not only sheds light on Schelling’s position but also connects classical metaphysical concerns surrounding theodicy and free will with more contemporary issues, showing how these themes remain relevant in modern ethical debates, albeit through different conceptual frameworks.