Ching Keng

This paper first shows the ambiguous nature of the dependent nature ( paratantra-svabhāva ) as being both negative and positive, and then examines the two conflicting readings of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra regarding whether the dependent nature is cognitive objects directed toward purification (* viśuddhy-ālambana ). I argue that the original intent of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra is indeed that the dependent nature is cognitive objects directed toward purification and that, for this reason, it is a part of the lack of self-nature with respect to the ultimate reality ( paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā ). However, this interpretation creates tension with the text’s comparison of the dependent nature to an illusion ( māyā ). Drawing on the pivotal model proposed by Sponberg, I suggest that the dependent nature is regarded as illusory because it arises from prior permeation ( vāsanā ) by the imagined nature ( parikalpita-svabhāva ). However, when the dependent nature is perceived as devoid of the imagined nature, it becomes cognitive objects directed toward purification.

Understanding the meaning of a sentence is crucial for Buddhists because they put so much emphasis on understanding the verbal expressions of the Buddha. But this can be problematic under their metaphysical framework of momentariness, and their epistemological framework of multiple consciousnesses. This paper starts by reviewing the theory of five states of mind in the Yogācārabhūmi, and then investigates debates among medieval East Asian Yogācāra thinkers about how various consciousnesses work together to understand the meaning of a sentence. The major differences between the various explanations proffered lie in the minimum number of types of consciousnesses involved, and the minimum linguistic marks cognized, in order for one to understand a sentence consisting of four Chinese characters. I show that in these disputes, two points are key: First, the role played by the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with a sensory consciousness: that is to say, whether a sensory consciousness should still be regarded as essential for understanding, if the simultaneous mental consciousness also cognizes the same mark. Second, whether the syntactic structure of a sentence is taken into consideration: that is to say, whether there is a separate determination of understanding regarding each character, or there is no determination until one has heard two or more characters and takes them as a syntactically meaningful unit.