Ching Keng

This paper argues that a strong-sense Buddhist nominalism, which denies any resemblance between two things, even among natural kinds, fails to explain why names and concepts can successfully identify a group among other things. Drawing evidence from the theory of the three natures in two major Yogācāra texts—the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha—I propose that these two texts affirm the affinity between concepts and things because they hold that it is the utilization of concepts in previous lives that gives rise to our shared world. While rejecting the idea that there is an inherent property or universal shared by natural kinds, these two texts agree that natural kinds are regulated by concepts and therefore share some features from among the set of characteristics defined by those concepts. I therefore propose a weak-sense Buddhist nominalism that endorses the idea that natural kinds share resemblances.

This paper asks two questions about episodic memory and seeks the answers from the Buddhist tradition. The two questions are: (1) Are both non-conceptual and conceptual contents stored in episodic memory? (2) Does episodic memory change over time? Following the Buddhist notion that episodic memory is a type of cognition that has a past cognition as its cognitive object. I first lay out a Buddhist model of cognition, and then depict the basic structure of episodic memory and how it is stored in the mental continuum, before I investigate how the Buddhist tradition might respond to the two questions. My answers to them are: (1) The content of episodic memory contains both non-conceptual and conceptualized elements; the conceptualized elements may help reinforce the memory; (2) episodic memory undergoes constant changes, in two respects. First, for retrieved memory, since every retrieval comes with new co-arising mental concomitants, it also reshapes the memory. Second, for episodic memory that remains dormant, it still undergoes constant changes. Namely, when one associates relevant experience in general with thoughts about their desirable or undesirable aspects or results, that episodic memory becomes stronger or weaker accordingly. With the above conclusions, this paper echoes the idea of “constructive memory” proposed by Tulving and others.

This paper first shows the ambiguous nature of the dependent nature ( paratantra-svabhāva ) as being both negative and positive, and then examines the two conflicting readings of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra regarding whether the dependent nature is cognitive objects directed toward purification (* viśuddhy-ālambana ). I argue that the original intent of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra is indeed that the dependent nature is cognitive objects directed toward purification and that, for this reason, it is a part of the lack of self-nature with respect to the ultimate reality ( paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā ). However, this interpretation creates tension with the text’s comparison of the dependent nature to an illusion ( māyā ). Drawing on the pivotal model proposed by Sponberg, I suggest that the dependent nature is regarded as illusory because it arises from prior permeation ( vāsanā ) by the imagined nature ( parikalpita-svabhāva ). However, when the dependent nature is perceived as devoid of the imagined nature, it becomes cognitive objects directed toward purification.

Understanding the meaning of a sentence is crucial for Buddhists because they put so much emphasis on understanding the verbal expressions of the Buddha. But this can be problematic under their metaphysical framework of momentariness, and their epistemological framework of multiple consciousnesses. This paper starts by reviewing the theory of five states of mind in the Yogācārabhūmi, and then investigates debates among medieval East Asian Yogācāra thinkers about how various consciousnesses work together to understand the meaning of a sentence. The major differences between the various explanations proffered lie in the minimum number of types of consciousnesses involved, and the minimum linguistic marks cognized, in order for one to understand a sentence consisting of four Chinese characters. I show that in these disputes, two points are key: First, the role played by the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with a sensory consciousness: that is to say, whether a sensory consciousness should still be regarded as essential for understanding, if the simultaneous mental consciousness also cognizes the same mark. Second, whether the syntactic structure of a sentence is taken into consideration: that is to say, whether there is a separate determination of understanding regarding each character, or there is no determination until one has heard two or more characters and takes them as a syntactically meaningful unit.