Chris Byron

Fifteen Million Merits depicts a reality remarkably similar to our own, in which technology has developed to the point where we could, in principle, work less, and reproduce the basic goods and services needed to survive into the future without arduous effort. Nevertheless, we cycle endlessly, towards nothing, and the only motivation keeping our feet rigidly attached to our peddles is vacuous entertainment in the form of pornography, video games, cruel comedy, and the improbable prospect of becoming a celebrity. Each of these lurid topics is explored in this chapter, with a special focus on the philosophers Marx, Marcuse, Adorno, and Lukacs. Finally, the issue as to whether or not resisting entertainment‐capitalist is possible is raised and addressed, albeit with pessimism.

The philosophical position against procreation is known as anti‐natalism, and Rust is an anti‐natalist. Rust's insights, coupled with the philosophy of David Benatar, not only require the characters of True Detective to cease procreation but also morally compel all people to stop procreating. This chapter explores whether or not anti‐natalism is a philosophically cogent position by presenting Rust's perspective on human existence and connecting it with Benatar's argument that coming into existence is necessarily harmful. According to Benatar's philosophy, one can see that Rust's anti‐natalism is actually quite reasonable. Benatar's points are that pleasure is good and pain is bad. However, it also is true that "the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone", whereas "the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation".

We argue in this article that Marx’s scientific method coupled with his analysis of the phenomenological consciousness of agents trapped within the capitalist mode of production provides a sufficient solution to the transformation problem. That is, Marx needs no amending – mathematical, philosophical, or otherwise – and the tools he uses to demonstrate and resolve the problem – science and phenomenology – were already clearly spelled out in his texts. Critics of Marx either fail to understand his scientific method, or are themselves trapped within a non-scientific capitalist phenomenology. Similarly, Marxists that mathematically resolve the transformation problem fail to realise that Marx’s scientific analysis alone demonstrates that a mathematical solution to the transformation problem is a misapprehension of the relation between Marx’s abstract theory and concrete phenomena. Consequently, we also criticise the monetary theorists who try to dismiss the problem as pointless by claiming that Marx was not a pre-monetary theorist.

In current debates concerning atheism, two positions are considered possible: naturalistic atheism or anti-naturalistic theism. Anti-naturalistic theism is motivated by the failure of naturalism to explain the fundamental nature of reality. We, however, endorse anti-naturalistic atheism by reviving the ‘anthropomorphic critique’, arguing that theism misattributes human traits to the deity. Anti-naturalistic atheism is better suited to refute theists, since it undercuts their appeal to science's inadequacies. We trace the anthropomorphic critique from Hume's Dialogues, through Kant's epistemology, and conclude with its reception in Feuerbach. The anthropomorphic critique is an epistemological – not metaphysical – thesis, hence, it is agnostic about the fundamental nature of reality. Yet it convincingly shows that theism is not a tenable position. In essence, we aim to decouple atheism from naturalism, on the basis of a salient critique in the history of modern philosophy, in order to ameliorate current debates between atheists and theists.Export citation.

The evil God challenge argues that for every theodicy that justifies the existence of an omnibenevolent God in the face of evil, there is a mirror theodicy that can defend the existence of an omnimalevolent God in the face of good. People who invoke the evil God challenge further argue that because we find evil God theodicies to be implausible, we should find good God theodicies to be equally implausible. This article argues that in fact evil God theodicies are more reasonable than good God theodicies by expanding upon arguments offered by David Benatar regarding the nature of existence, and David Hume regarding the asymmetry in our sensations of pain and pleasure.Export citation.