Chris Fraser

The word hé 和—often interpreted as “harmony”—has a pivotal normative role in several prominent pericopes of the Zhuāngzǐ dealing with how best to follow dào, especially in interaction with others.1 Just what is this role, and why is it expressed by the term hé 和? I’ll try to answer these questions by first surveying the content of hé 和 as used across the classical Chinese literature, then giving an interpretation of its use in Zhuāngzǐ writings, and finally offering a hypothesis about why the term was adopted to express a Zhuangist normative ideal.

I am deeply grateful to each of the commentators—Henry Allen, Karyn Lai, Huanyou Li, Winnie Sung, and Ellie Wang—for their very kind and rich contributions, especially their extensive critical feedback, which I hope will prompt much fruitful discussion. Limits on space preclude offering a thorough response to every point they raise, so from each set of remarks, I will pick a few salient issues to address.Karyn Lai’s remarks are insightful, piquant, and wide-ranging. I’ll try to address four prominent topics she mentions.First, let me respond to the methodological questions Lai raises. As explained in the book’s Introduction (pp. 13–15), the interpretive approach pursued in Late Classical Chinese Thought... Read More.

In two previous essays, I have proposed that certain threads of discourse in the Zhuangzi present an ethical outlook revolving around the paired concepts of dao 道, or ways or paths, and de 德, the agentive powers by which we pursue ways or paths. Lam Hong Ki 林康琪 presents a forceful, invigorating challenge to several aspects of my interpretation of a Zhuangist ethical outlook. Her discussion reveals several respects in which my previous treatments were insufficiently clear or precise. I am grateful for her meticulous critical appraisal, which highlights several dimensions along which I need to elaborate my proposed interpretation.

The major treatments of language in pre-Han texts—those of the Mohists and Xúnzǐ—directly address the representational functions of language. Both account for the use of words to represent objects and situations by appeal to social practices for distinguishing the same from different kinds of things and for associating names with things of the same kind. For these theorists, pragmatics explains semantics: shared norms governing the use of names fix reference and thus explain how names can represent objects and express thoughts. The relation between language and the world is not explained by appeal to mental representations or to meanings that words stand for. Instead, by virtue of social practices, participants in a discussion or members of a speech community understand that general terms represent things of a certain kind and thus understand what the objects referred to by some general term are like.

This chapter explores how Guo Xiang’s views emerge from his approach to the metaphysics of dao 道 (way) and the place of human activity and agency in dao. Once we understand his views on these points, we can see that he holds a distinctive conception of the self and agency—and, accordingly, normatively appropriate action—on which self-fulfillment and easy, aimless freedom are consistent with his doctrine of non-mindedness, which in fact presents a precondition for attaining them. As I will show, GUO Xiang uses key terms such as zi 自 (self), xin (heart-mind), zhi 知 (know), and xing (inherent character) in distinctive, specialized ways that diverge both from common uses of these words in Chinese and from familiar categories in contemporary philosophical psychology yet are coherent, intelligible, and defensible. The normative conception of agency and the well-lived life that emerges from his Zhuangzi commentary can at first sight seem puzzling and counterintuitive. But I will contend that it is plausible and presents a fascinating, profound, and potentially correct view of the nature of human agency and the sources of normativity.

In a recent article in this journal, Daniel Stephens argues against Chad Hansen’s and Chris Fraser’s interpretations of the later Mohists as realists about the ontology of kinds, contending that the Mohist stance is better explained as conventionalist. This essay defends a realist interpretation of later Mohism that I call “similarity realism,” the view that human-independent reality fixes the similarities that constitute kinds and thus determines what kinds exist and what their members are. I support this interpretation with a new, detailed account of the Mohist conception of a kind on which kind relations lie in inherent similarities between the intrinsic features of objects. This account distinguishes kind relations from “uniting together” and part-whole relations, both of which, unlike kind relations, may be determined by convention. I argue that Stephens’s critique of realist interpretations fails because it confuses the ontological issue of what determines the existence of kinds with the semantic issue of what fixes the names for kinds.

A striking passage from the Daoist classic Zhuangzi likens devoting oneself to benevolence and propriety and seeking to distinguish right from wrong to suffering the ancient Chinese corporal punishments of tattooing the convict’s face and amputating the nose. Commonsense morality is not merely a mistake, the passage implies. It mutilates us, leaving us blind to the features by which to navigate the Way. This astonishing rejection not just of a particular understanding of morality but of the very idea of morality as a guide to action is representative of an intriguing thread of discourse that winds through several of the classical Chinese philosophical anthologies. According to this discourse, benevolence and propriety obscure the Way and impair our ability to follow it. They are a sign of pathology, they interfere with people’s spontaneous capacities, they are redundant, and they are an obstacle to adroit action. This talk aims to elucidate these themes, explain their significance in the context of early Chinese ethics, and relate them to ethical discourse today. I explain how, given early Daoists’ understanding of the structure of action and of the factors that guide it, their critique may be surprisingly plausible. I attempt briefly to situate the Daoist critique in relation to well-known ‘morality critics’ in the West, including contemporary writers such as Nagel, Wolf, and Williams and nineteenth-century figures such as Nietzsche and James. I then consider potential objections to the Daoist position and tentatively suggest how Daoists might respond.

The Zhuangzi — an anthology of anonymous writings produced in China between the fourth and second centuries BC — is one of the world's great literary treasures and the single most important source for early Daoist philosophy. It has exerted a profound influence on Chinese thought, literature, and culture, inspiring philosophy, poetry, idioms, proverbs, and even visual art. This volume provides a complete, annotated English translation of the Zhuangzi with a philosophical focus that guides readers in understanding and appreciating the text's world of thought. Informed by traditional and recent scholarship, the translation presents the ideas, reasoning, and worldview of the Zhuangzi in smooth, idiomatic English carefully formulated to reflect the phrasing and philosophical nuances of the original Chinese. Providing a lucid, lively translation, this edition is a guidebook into the philosophy of the Zhuangzi.

Zhuangzi: Ways of Wandering the Way presents a richly detailed, philosophically informed interpretation of the personal and interpersonal ethics found in the Daoist classic Zhuangzi, introducing a unique Daoist approach to ethics focusing on the concept of a way and our capacity for following ways. Zhuangist thought reframes our relation to our social and natural setting while offering a distinctive, intriguing view of dao, agency, and the structure and grounds for action. At the same time, it embodies an ethical and epistemic modesty that rejects the idea of there being any uniquely privileged form of the good life or any authoritatively correct way to interact with others. The Zhuangist dao is inherently plural, provisional, and protean, and we are likely to find a variety of justifiable ways of wandering along it. Any number of these might contribute to a well-lived, fulfilling life, marked by appropriate social interaction, provided it is pursued with adept responsiveness to our circumstances and awareness of our place in the larger scheme of things. The book examines what prominent threads of discourse in the Zhuǎngzǐ have to say about the nature and content of dào, how we might guide our path along dào, the personal training and cultivation involved, and the criteria by which to evaluate our performance. The discussion illustrates how a Zhuangist outlook in metaethics, ethics, moral psychology, and moral epistemology remains relevant to readers today.

The role of truth in pre-Han thought has been a focus of interest and controversy since Munro first suggested that early Chinese thinkers were concerned primarily with the consequences of a belief or proposition for action, not its truth (Munro 1969: 55). Scholars have defended a range of interpretations of the place of truth in early Chinese thought, from the view that pre-Han philosophy has no concept of semantic truth, for example, to the view that it has several concepts with roles overlapping those of truth, to the view that early Chinese thinkers actually offer theories of truth.1 One reason for intense interest in the topic is signaled by Graham’s well-known remark that for pre-Han philosophers “the crucial question...is not the Western philosopher’s ‘What is the truth?’ but ‘Where is the way?, the way to order the state and conduct personal life” (Graham 1989: 3). How issues related to truth are framed may reflect central features of the theoretical orientation of early Chinese philosophical discourse. For example, if pre-Han inquiries into logic, language, knowledge, and metaphysics focused on accurate description of the structure of reality, they might accordingly devote much attention to explaining the nature of truth and evaluating which descriptions are indeed true. On the other hand, if such inquiries centered on questions concerning the proper dao 道 (way) of conduct and how it relates to the course of the natural world, they might instead be concerned primarily with questions regarding the appropriate use of language and the basis for norms of correct use— whether they are purely products of human convention, for example, or are grounded in natural patterns. A clearer grasp of how pre-Han philosophers thought about truth may help us better understand the overall framework and orientation of early Chinese philosophy. This article first reviews the long-standing debate in the scholarly literature concerning the role of truth in pre-Han philosophy. Next, it considers how we might effectively and informatively frame inquiry into the topic of truth in Chinese thought. It then offers concise interpretations of several concepts in pre-Han texts with conceptual roles overlapping that of truth.