• Suffolk University
    Department of Philosophy
    Politics, Philosophy, and Economics
    Assistant Professor
University of Pennsylvania
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2014
CV
  •  16
    The Reasons to Follow Conventional Practices
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    This article challenges a reductive analysis of social practices by distinguishing five kinds of reason for following the rules of conventional practices. Depending on one’s preferred intellectual tradition, conventional practices enable coordination, facilitate cooperation, constitute activities, fulfil reciprocity, or specify abstract rights. Instead of being rival theories of social practices, these different models complement one another in a normative analysis of social practices. By distin…Read more
  •  5
    Social Cooperation as Institutional Rule-Following
    Public Affairs Quarterly 34 (1): 26-49. 2020.
    The idea that society is a cooperative venture has been used by contractualists, contractarians, and deliberative democrats to justify the burdens of society to each member. In such a cooperative venture, those who benefit from society owe a contribution and those who contribute are owed benefits. Even though this idea is quite intuitive, there are deep disagreements about what makes society cooperative. Some focus on acts of production, others on fair interaction, and still others on the intent…Read more
  •  345
    This handbook advances the interdisciplinary field of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics by identifying thirty-five topics of ongoing research. Instead of focusing on historically significant texts, it features experts talking about current debates. Individually, each chapter provides a resource for new research. Together, the chapters provide a thorough introduction to contemporary work in PPE, which makes it an ideal reader for a senior-year course. The handbook is organized into seven parts,…Read more
  •  10
    Interests from and in conventions
    Synthese 200 (1): 1-21. 2022.
    In Strategic Justice, Peter Vanderschraaf introduces a “Baseline Consistency” criterion for Justice as Mutual Advantage. This criterion requires assessing how well individuals fare under existing conventions with how well they would fare under hypothetical social conditions. However, this comparison requires the impossible. Under different social conditions, individuals would have different preferences and different interests. As such, we cannot make any direct comparison between how well an ind…Read more
  •  6
    The Status Quo in Buchanan’s Constitutional Contractarianism
    Homo Oeconomicus 1 (36): 87-109. 2019.
    When Buchanan discusses the constitutional changes that members of society would agree to, he uses the status quo as the default. If no agreement occurs, we continue with the constitutional rules that are currently in place. This article argues that this choice results in an unjustified status quo bias. To make this point, I examine and challenge three possible arguments in favor of using the status quo as the default. Then, I give two arguments in favor of a form of contractarianism that does n…Read more
  •  26
    Social Cooperation as Institutional Rule-Following
    Public Affairs Quarterly 1 (34): 26-49. 2020.
    The idea that society is a cooperative venture has been used by contractualists, contractarians, and deliberative democrats to justify the burdens of society to each member. In such a coop- erative venture, those who benefit from society owe a contribution and those that contribute are owed benefits. Even though this idea is quite intuitive, there are deep disagreements about what makes society cooperative. Some focus on acts of production, others on fair interaction, and still others on the int…Read more
  •  26
    Conventionalism and Legitimate Expectations
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (2): 1-23. 2020.
    To be a conventionalist about a specific obligation or right is to believe that the obligation or right is dependent on the existence of a social practice. A conventionalist about property, for example, believes that a moral right to property is generated by conventional norms rather than by any natural right. One problem with dominant conventionalist theories is that they do not adequately justify conventional moral claims. They can justify why it is wrong to steal, for example, but they do not…Read more
  •  21
    The Value of a Non-Ideal
    Social Theory and Practice 45 (3): 427-450. 2019.
    In The Tyranny of the Ideal, Gerald Gaus gives an extended argument on behalf of the “Open Society.” Instead of claiming that it is uniquely best from some privileged moral perspective, he argues for the Open Society by showing why it is acceptable to many perspectives. In this way, Gaus argues for a liberal market-based society in a way that treats deep diversity as a fundamental feature of social life. However, the argument falters at four important points. When taken together, these four prob…Read more
  •  36
    Rawlsian Objectivity
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4): 545-564. 2018.
    In a 1981 letter to H.L. A. Hart, John Rawls sketches a view of moral objectivity that substantially differs from that of contemporary constructivists. The view he describes does not rely on constitutive features of agency as Korsgaard's does, and it does not bottom out in a form of realism as Scanlon's moral theory does. Instead, Rawls's view grounds objectivity on the fundamental conceptions that could be shared in wide reflective equilibrium. Constructivism grounds objectivity in a kind of in…Read more
  •  26
    Not All Political Lies Are Morally Equal
    Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (2): 294-314. 2018.
    This paper examines the conflict between conventional and non-conventional moral obligations by focusing on the specific case of political lies. It argues that political candidates are under a conventional obligation to try and win their election, and sometimes the most moral way to discharge this obligation involves lying. In such cases, candidates face a conflict between the conventional obligation to try and win and the non-conventional obligation to not lie. Oftentimes, candidates that face …Read more
  •  213
    Recent interpretations of Kant’s international political philosophy have argued that the formation of a coercive world-state (Völkerstaat) is morally required. While these interpretations highlight the importance of a strong world government, they ignore Kant’s alternative to a Völkerstaat, a world-federation (Völkerbund). For both theoretical and practical reasons, the Völkerbund plays a crucial role in cosmopolitan right, and Kant can only justifiably reject the formation of the Völkerstaat be…Read more
  •  229
    A Mooring for Ethical Life
    Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania. 2014.
    Since G.A. Cohen’s influential criticism, John Rawls’s focus on the basic structure of society has fallen out of favor in moral and political philosophy. The most prominent defenses of this focus has argued from particular conceptions of justice or from a moral division of labor. In this dissertation, I instead argue for the Rawlsian focus from the ways in which social institutions establish new obligations, rights and powers. I argue that full evaluation of individual conduct requires that we e…Read more
  •  23
    Incentives, Conventionalism, and Constructivism
    Ethics 126 (3): 549-574. 2016.
    Rawlsians argue for principles of justice that apply exclusively to the basic structure of society, but it can seem strange that those who accept these principles should not also regulate their choices by them. Valid moral principles should seemingly identify ideals for both institutions and individuals. What justifies this nonintuitive distinction between institutional and individual principles is not a moral division of labor but Rawls’s dual commitments to conventionalism and constructivism. …Read more
  •  29
    Promises, Practices, and Reciprocity
    Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266): 106-126. 2017.
    The dominant conventionalist view explains the wrong of breaking a promise as failing to do our fair share in supporting the practice of promise-keeping. Yet, this account fails to explain any unique moral standing that a promisee has to demand that the promisor keep the promise. In this paper, I provide a conventionalist response to this problem. In any cooperative practice, participants stand as both beneficiary and contributor. As a beneficiary, they are morally required to follow the rules o…Read more
  •  34
    The Implicit Argument for the Basic Liberties
    Res Publica 24 (4): 433-454. 2018.
    Most criticism and exposition of John Rawls’s political theory has focused on his account of distributive justice rather than on his support for liberalism. Because of this, much of his argument for protecting the basic liberties remains under explained. Specifically, Rawls claims that representative citizens would agree to guarantee those social conditions necessary for the exercise and development of the two moral powers, but he does not adequately explain why protecting the basic liberties wo…Read more
  •  69
    Why Free Market Rights are not Basic Liberties
    Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2): 47-67. 2015.
    Most liberals agree that governments should protect certain basic liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of the person. Liberals disagree, however, about whether free market rights should also be protected. By “free market rights,” we mean those rights typically associated with laissez-faire economic systems such as freedom of contract, a right to market returns, and claims to privately own the means of production.We do not use the phrase “economic liberties,” as T…Read more
  •  50
    The Basic Structure as a System of Social Practices
    Social Theory and Practice 39 (4): 599-624. 2013.
    In his own writings, Rawls purposively used only a loose characterization of the basic structure, but two prominent misinterpretations highlight the current need for a more detailed account. First, G.A. Cohen argues that the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrary due to the Rawlsian appeal to profound effects. Second, some theorists conflate the justification of coercion with the assessment of a basic structure by defining the basic structure as the coercive structure. Both misinterp…Read more