Susanna Rinard argues that philosophical skeptics can be rationally persuaded to abandon their position. She claims the classic brain-in-a-vat (biv) argument is so complex that it requires trust in memory—a faculty that skepticism itself undermines. The argument, she concludes, is therefore self-defeating. This paper counters that Rinard’s critique only applies to unnecessarily elaborate formulations of the skeptical argument. The essential biv argument is actually a simple inference that can be…
Read moreSusanna Rinard argues that philosophical skeptics can be rationally persuaded to abandon their position. She claims the classic brain-in-a-vat (biv) argument is so complex that it requires trust in memory—a faculty that skepticism itself undermines. The argument, she concludes, is therefore self-defeating. This paper counters that Rinard’s critique only applies to unnecessarily elaborate formulations of the skeptical argument. The essential biv argument is actually a simple inference that can be grasped in a single moment of reflection, without relying on memory. Because this simpler argument is immune to her self-undermining charge, Rinard has not shown that rational persuasion is possible for skeptics who arrive at their position through this more direct route.
