Chrisoula Andreou

We often encounter situations in which an undesirable outcome is brought about through a series or collection of seemingly inconsequen-tial actions. This phenomenon, referred to as the inefficacy paradox, oc-curs both intrapersonally and collectively. Paradoxically, while we have good reason to avoid such patterns of action, there appears to be no com-pelling reason to abstain from any of the individual actions constituting such a pattern given its trivial impact. This paper scrutinizes Chrisoula Andreou's prominent endeavor to resolve the inefficacy paradox in both the intrapersonal and the collective context by utilizing their structural similarity. While her approach may prove successful in intrapersonal cases, the applicability of the proposed solution to collective cases is, I argue, ultimately limited. This is due to a fundamental dissimilarity be-tween these two kinds of cases, which I lay out in the paper. This insight may also shed light on the transferability of other proposed solutions to the inefficacy paradox from the intrapersonal to the collective context.

This chapter considers an interesting possibility related to human psychology and explores its relevance with respect to understanding and impacting behavior in the face of climate change understood as a “creeping environmental problem.” The possibility is that one’s best bet in terms of predicting and understanding someone’s take on her individually trivial contributions to positive or negative outcomes is not to look for clues about whether she is individualistic or group-oriented, but instead to figure out whether an individualistic take or a group-oriented take will facilitate her seeing herself as praiseworthy, or at least not blameworthy: insofar as one take is better suited to facilitating self-praise, or avoiding self-blame, with respect to the behavior at hand, it will, other things equal, be adopted. If this is right, it has important implications with respect to attempts at promoting environmentally friendly behavior by activating motivations associated with the prospect of self-praise or self-blame.

This chapter illustrates and analyzes an important coping strategy that has been neglected in the literature on procrastination: the leveraging strategy. Although one must know oneself quite well to use it, it has some significant advantages and so is worth considering, particularly when other strategies are not working or are out of place. Its main advantages are that it can be used even when no external incentives or constraints are conveniently available, and it avoids the dangers associated with magnifying the significance of lapses by casting every relevant choice as a crucial test of one’s self-control. Theoretically, the strategy is initially somewhat puzzling, since it seems to rely on having a significant amount of self-control; but such self-control is, it seems, precisely what is lacking. The puzzle dissolves once one recognizes the possibility that self-control can figure as a local trait rather than a robust character trait.

In Timothy Luke Williamson’s commentary on my article “Micromanagement and Poor Self-Control,” Williamson casts my focus on managerial failures in certain cases of poor self-control “as an especially fruitful tool for addressing problems of poor self-control”; but he suggests that the cases of poor self-control that I view as cases of managerial failure also involve control by a foreign force, in accordance with the “foreign force paradigm,” which I claim is off base in the cases on which I focus. Although I cannot get into Williamson’s entire interesting and elaborate argument, I here question The Weak Planning Perspective, which plays a key role in Williamson’s critical response, with the aim of addressing the issues he raises and shedding some light on why and how our views diverge.

According to a familiar and entrenched philosophical paradigm, poor self-control amounts to diminished control by the self. While some cases of poor self-control may fit this paradigm, many paradigmatic cases of poor self-control, including cases involving individually trivial effects, do not; they are better understood as cases in which the self controls behavior, but does so poorly. As such, philosophical research on poor self-control needs to go beyond research aimed at locating and empowering the self, and into research on what it takes for selves that are already in control to qualify as managerial successes rather than managerial failures. This article focuses on certain pitfalls associated with micromanagement and on the paradoxical connection between micromanagement and poor self-control in cases involving individually trivial effects. The article ends by advancing an approach to managerial success that provides a promising route to avoiding micromanagerial pitfalls while also promoting responsible resilient agency.

The money-pump argument figures as the staple argument in support of the view that cyclic preferences are irrational. According to a prominent way of understanding the argument, it is grounded in the assumption (or intuition) that (tangential qualifications aside) it is irrational to make choices that lead one to a dispreferred alternative. My aim in this paper is to motivate diffidence with respect to understanding the money-pump argument in this way by suggesting that (1) if it is so understood, the argument emerges as question-begging and as a complicated distraction in the debate concerning cyclic preferences, and that (2) there is a way of understanding the argument that casts it as grounded in a less controversial starting point.

The guiding aim of this piece is to illuminate the topic of morality and diachronic choice by revealing its connections to two closely related topics that have received significantly more attention in philosophy, namely that of morality and collective action problems and that of rationality and diachronic choice. A further, related aim is to chime in on a key point of contention relevant to debates on morality and diachronic choice that centers around the marginalized but, in my view, compelling idea that appropriate diachronic choice can involve passing up a preferable option. Ultimately, I will suggest that, although the idea is initially counterintuitive, it is philosophically powerful and very much worthy of continued investigation. Relatedly, I will consider the possibility of preferability cycles—which can, if they exist, make sense of passing up a preferable option—and suggest that there remain reasons for pause in relation to the widespread rejection of such cycles.

This book symposium contribution provides responses to four commentaries on my book Choosing Well: The Good, the Bad, and the Trivial. The authors of the commentaries are Michael Bratman, Mark Budolfson, Sergio Tenenbaum, and Johanna Thoma. Although doing justice to all of the interesting points raised by the commentators is out of the question, I respond to some of the main issues raised (proceeding in alphabetical order by the commentators’ last names), launching my responses with a discussion of Bratman’s question “Why stop with adding categorial appraisals?” and wrapping them up with my response to Thoma’s contrasting question “Do we need categorial appraisal responses?” Notably, some responses require me to get more “in the weeds” than others. Hopefully, this is for the better rather than for the worse, and will give the reader a taste of both some big picture issues and some more intricate complications involved in developing and defending my approach.

We consider two versions of the view that the person of good sense has good sensibility and argue that at least one version of the view is correct. The version we defend is weaker than the version defended by contemporary Aristotelians; it can be consistently accepted even by those who find the contemporary Aristotelian version completely implausible. According to the version we defend, the person of good sense can be relied on to act soundly in part because, with the guidance of a fine-tuned and wide-ranging ability to directly sense what is called for, she is regularly drawn, even pre-reflectively, to actions that are supported by reason. As we explain, this position does not imply that one's reasons exist independently of one's ends and that one must therefore detect reasons with the help of some value-detecting perceptual capacity that reveals some ends as valuable and others as not worth pursuing.

We seek to illuminate the prevalence of cooperation among biologically unrelated individuals via an analysis of agency that recognizes the possibility of bonding and challenges the common view that agency is invariably an individual-level affair. Via bonding, a single individual’s behavior patterns or programs are altered so as to facilitate the formation, on at least some occasions, of a larger entity to whom is attributable the coordination of the component entities. Some of these larger entities will qualify as agents in their own right, even when the comprising entities also qualify as agents. In light of the many possibilities that humans actually enjoy for entering into numerous bonding schemes, and the extent to which they avail themselves of these possibilities, there is no basis for the assumption that cooperative behavior must ultimately emerge as either altruistic or self-interested; it can instead be the product of collective agency.

There is growing support for the view that there can be cases of incommensurability, understood as cases in which two alternatives, X and Y, are such that X is not better than Y, Y is not better than X, and X and Y are not equally good. This paper assumes that alternatives can be incommensurable and explores the prominent idea that, insofar as choice situations that agents face qua rational agents involve options that are not rankable as one better than the other or as equally good, the choice situations are, due to this _structural_ feature, _distinctively_ hard. It might seem like choosing between incommensurable alternatives is obviously distinctively hard because, _unlike in other cases_, in cases of incommensurability, one cannot proceed in a way that does justice to the value of each of the goods at stake by factoring their value into one’s decision. The reasoning in this paper suggests that this position is mistaken, not because there is no real challenge here, but because, insofar as a challenge has been identified, it is one that can make cases involving commensurable alternatives hard too. The paper’s reasoning also suggests that the challenge at issue can sometimes, even if not always, be overcome via effective choice over time. Although many of the illustrations focused on in the paper involve low-stakes intrapersonal cases of decisionmaking, the paper’s reasoning is, as is apparent by the end of the paper, relevant for high-stakes and population-level decision-making as well.

This paper uses the idea of a proxy, which figures in discussions of bounded rationality, to construct an argument for a revisionary conclusion about ideal instrumental rationality. I consider how subjective responses can figure as proxies in heuristics and develop the following argument: (1) Proxies, even if relatively easy to recognize, can sometimes be messy, prompting incomplete or cyclic preferences. (2) From the point of view of ideal instrumental rationality, it is permissible for an agent to be concerned with a proxy rather than with what it is a proxy for. And so, (3) although it is standardly assumed, as part of the prevailing conception of ideal instrumental rationality, that rational preferences are complete and acyclic, neither incomplete preferences nor cyclic preferences can be dismissed as invariably irrational from the point of view of ideal instrumental rationality.

Action theorists and formal epistemologists often pursue parallel inquiries regarding rationality, with the former focused on practical rationality, and the latter focused on theoretical rationality. In both fields, there is currently a strong interest in exploring rationality in relation to time. This exploration raises questions about the rationality of certain patterns over time. For example, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of intention; similarly, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of belief. While the action-theoretic and epistemic questions raised are closely related, advances in one field are not always processed by the other. This volume brings together contributions by scholars in action theory and formal epistemology working on questions regarding rationality and time so that researchers in these overlapping fields can profit from each other’s insights. This book was originally published as a special issue of the _Canadian Journal of Philosophy. _.

BACKGROUND: Reasoning biases have been suggested as risk factors for delusional ideation in both patients and non-clinical individuals. Still, it is unclear how these biases are longitudinally related to delusions in the general population. We hence aimed to investigate longitudinal associations between reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population. METHODS: We conducted an online cohort study with 1184 adults from the German and Swiss general population. Participants completed measures on reasoning biases (jumping-to-conclusion bias JTC, liberal acceptance bias LA, bias against disconfirmatory evidence BADE, possibility of being mistaken PM) and delusional ideation at baseline, and delusional ideation 7 to 8 months later. RESULTS: A greater JTC bias was associated with a greater increase in delusional ideation over the following months. This association was better described by a positive quadratic relationship. Neither BADE, LA nor PM were associated with subsequent changes in delusional ideation. CONCLUSIONS: This study suggests that jumping-to-conclusions predicts delusional ideation in the general population but that this association may follow a quadratic trajectory. While no other associations turned significant, future studies with shorter temporal distances may shed further light on the role of reasoning biases as risk factors for delusional ideation in non-clinical samples.

This book focuses on the challenges associated with effective choice over time. In particular, it considers the challenges raised by cyclic preferences and by incomplete preferences, both of which interfere with the agent's neatly ordering her options, and which make the agent susceptible to self-defeating patterns of choice in which the agent is drawn into taking each of a series of steps that collectively lead her to a result that she deems unacceptable. The book's guiding questions are the following: What is an agent to do if she finds herself with cyclic preferences or with incomplete preferences? Is an agent or group of agents with such preferences necessarily irrational? It is argued that the answer to the latter question is "no"; rationality does not invariably prohibit disorderly preferences, but it does (to get back to the first question) prompt us to proceed with caution and with a readiness to show restraint, based on an awareness of larger dynamics, when our preferences are disorderly. Theories of rational choice often dismiss or abstract away from the sorts of disorderly preferences at issue here. They assume that rational agents can and should have neat preferences over their options; but this assumption is problematic. Rationality can validate certain disorderly preference structures while also protecting us from self-defeating patterns of choice. Rationality can thus handle quite a lot of messiness, which is important, since rationality wouldn't be all that helpful if, whenever messiness threatened, we could not turn to it for guidance.

This paper defends a version of the view that, sometimes, rational choice between two options can be grounded on a good reason whose justifying force does not depend on how the two options compare. The route via which this view is arrived at does not presuppose the existence of incomparable options, and so allows for common ground with skeptics about incomparability. Still, it requires that challenging cases be acknowledged and addressed, rather than abstracted from or assumed away. Ultimately, the reasoning provided suggests that rationality can handle quite a lot of messiness, which is important, since rationality wouldn’t be all that helpful if, whenever messiness threatened, we had to rush to its rescue rather than look to it for guidance.

This paper explores the possibility of incomparability. It first focuses on a challenge to the small-improvement argument for incomparability and then turns to some seemingly more promising, “huge-improvement” variations on the argument. After considering an important complication, it is argued that, whether or not options can be strictly incomparable, there is room for cases beyond not just classic cases of trichotomous comparability but even beyond cases involving options that, though not trichotomously comparable, are still comparable as both positive, or both negative, or, even if indeterminate, both fairly neutral. In the relevant further cases, at least one option that combines a positive feature and a negative feature is not positive, negative, neutral, or even fairly neutral. To the extent that comparability is revealed as applicable in such cases, skepticism about incomparability can persist, but its significance is reduced by the revelation of how little comparability requires.

Drawing and building on the existing literature, this Element explores the interesting and challenging philosophical terrain where issues regarding cooperation, commitment, and control intersect. Section 1 discusses interpersonal and intrapersonal Prisoner's Dilemma situations, and the possibility of a set of unrestrained choices adding up in a way that is problematic relative to the concerns of the choosers involved. Section 2 focuses on the role of precommitment devices in rational choice. Section 3 considers the role of resoluteness in rational choice and action. And Section 4 delves into some related complications concerning the nature of actions and the nature of intentions.

ABSTRACT One of Bratman’s aims in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance is to develop his insights regarding planning to shed light on temptation. I focus on the main case of temptation Bratman appeals to in supporting his conclusion that it can be rational for an agent facing temptation to stick to her prior plan even if she finds herself with an evaluative judgment that favors deviating. Bratman’s reasoning is meant to be consistent with the priority of present evaluation, and to be sensitive to Smart’s insight that, as Bratman puts it, ‘inference from the advantages of the general habit [of non-reconsideration] directly to a specific conclusion about what to do on the present occasion, once the question of what to do on the present occasion is raised, is fraught.’ My reasoning suggests that, interpreted in one way, the case Bratman uses to make his argument is not clearly a case of giving in to temptation (or else not a case that requires the sort of novel contribution Bratman thinks is needed); and interpreted otherwise, the case does not raise exactly the challenges Bratman suggests it does, and the challenges it does raise are not directly addressed by the solution Bratman provides.

It is commonly held that, given multiple medically permissible ways of proceeding, each with a different impact on the patient’s future, it is extremely important, and part of respecting patient autonomy, that patients not be under substantial pressure to defer to their physicians’ presumed authority. Some, however, worry that the focus on patient autonomy can be detrimental and that, at least in cases where it is hard to grasp what it is really like to live with certain outcomes without any first‐hand or second‐hand experience, it is best if patient choice is firmly directed, or at least effectively nudged, by the recommendation of an experienced medical professional. The idea seems to be that, since physicians cannot get their patients to promptly assimilate a large amount of information and experience, physicians must, if they are to really help their patients make good decisions in hard cases, exert non‐argumentative influence on them. But this neglects an interesting possibility, namely the possibility of influencing patients by providing them with evidence regarding what decisions have proved most satisfactory for patients with their profile. Approximations of patient profile tests are already employed in medical practice. But the potential of the profile‐test approach in medical practice (and research) has been obscured by ongoing debate that neglects the significance of the approach with respect to the apparent dilemma faced by patients who need to make informed, autonomous decisions but cannot be expected to fully assimilate, in short order, the knowledge and experience of their physicians.

This paper concerns regret, where regretting is to be understood, roughly, as mourning the loss of a forgone good. My ultimate aim is to add a new dimension to existing debate concerning the internal logic of regret by revealing the significance of certain sorts of cases—including, most interestingly, certain down-to-earth cases involving vague goals—in relation to the possibility of regret in continued endorsement cases. Intuitively, it might seem like, in continued endorsement cases, an agent’s regret must be tied to the idea that the forgone good is no better than the achieved good but is also not fully made up for by the achieved good because the goods are different in kind. But this view is controversial. After describing a challenge to the view, as well as the main features of the debate regarding regret in which it figures, I appeal first to a fanciful case involving a set of ever-better options, and then to a more down-to-earth case involving a vague goal, to develop a defense of the opposing view that, even in continued endorsement cases, mourning the loss of a forgone good need not be tied to the idea that the loss of the good is not fully made up for by the gain of a preferred or incomparable good of a different kind.

According to Marx, "at any given epoch of a given society, [there is] a quantity of necessaries [recognized as] the necessaries of life habitually required by the average worker." The variations in the type and amount of goods recognized as necessary for life between different epochs and different societies is due to the different 'physical conditions' and to the different 'degrees of civilization' and 'comfort' prevalent. In advanced capitalist societies, the necessities of life include a heated dwelling, food, clothing, and access to some means of transportation, be it public or private. However, the average laborer in advanced capitalist societies has access not only to the necessaries of life but to a variety of luxury items as well. For example, the average worker has access to fine food and drink, an automobile, a television, and a stereo system. In my paper, I explain Marx's theory of the nature of capitalist exploitation. I then indicate how the phenomenon described above may be interpreted as evidence against Marx's theory, and then sketch an interpretation of this phenomenon that reconciles it with Marx's theory. My interpretation will suggest that the average worker's access to luxury items can be explained by the necessity in capitalism of reproducing the working class.

One of Bratman’s aims in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance is to develop his insights regarding planning to shed light on temptation. I focus on the main case of temptation Bratman appeals to in supporting his conclusion that it can be rational for an agent facing temptation to stick to her prior plan even if she finds herself with an evaluative judgment that favors deviating. Bratman’s reasoning is meant to be consistent with the priority of present evaluation, and to be sensitive to Smart’s insight that, as Bratman puts it, ‘inference from the advantages of the general habit [of non-reconsideration] directly to a specific conclusion about what to do on the present occasion, once the question of what to do on the present occasion is raised, is fraught.’ My reasoning suggests that, interpreted in one way, the case Bratman uses to make his argument is not clearly a case of giving in to temptation (or else not a case that requires the sort of novel contribution Bratman thinks is needed); and interpreted otherwise, the case does not raise exactly the challenges Bratman suggests it does, and the challenges it does raise are not directly addressed by the solution Bratman provides.