Christian Blum

Metaethical value pluralism is the claim that there are many equally fundamental values that matter for normative choice, rather than one fundamental value. Deliberative democracy is an ideal from political theory stating that respectful, reasoned communicative contestations between free and equal citizens about the relative merits of policies is preferable to mere majoritarian voting. At first glance, both claims go together well. However, several theorists argue that they are incompatible: Value pluralists cannot be deliberative democrats, and deliberative democrats cannot be value pluralists. The argument rests on the supposition that plural fundamental values preclude a common standard of comparison that allows for weighing off different values, thereby rendering deliberation about value conflicts pointless. I argue that this supposition is implausible: Plural fundamental values can be rationally compared. The key is to conceive of the relevant standard as less fundamental than the values at stake. I conclude that value pluralists can remain neutral on the issue of deliberative democracy and that deliberative democrats can and should be value pluralists.

In recent years, philosophers, political scientists and sociologists have witnessed a renaissance of the concept of the common good in political discourse: political agents such as parties, civic networks and courts increasingly refer to this concept to justify their actions. This development gives rise to the question whether normative political theory can provide a sensible definition of the common good which is compatible with pluralistic democratic society and which allows the identification of a specific range of well justified policies. The most influential account in this field is the theory of proceduralism which holds that the common good consists, by necessity, in the output of a political system whose procedures grant each citizen an equal say in collective decision-making. This account derives its initial plausibility from acknowledging citizens as agents who autonomously shape the welfare of their community on the basis of their subjective interests. However, it falls short of explaining how democratic decision-making good could possibly authorize actions that are detrimental to the common good. This problem is solved by a modification of the proceduralist paradigm that complements procedural criteria with objective and substantive standards that serve as limiting values for admissible policy outputs.

Power is the essence of politics. Whoever seeks to understand and master it must understand its logic. Drawing on two decades of international experience in political consulting, Dominik Meier and Christian Blum give profound and honest insights into the inner workings of power. Introducing their Power Leadership Approach, the authors provide a conceptual analysis of power and present the tools to successfully exercise it in the political domain. "Power and its Logic" is a guidebook for politicians, business leaders, civil society pioneers, public affairs consultants and for every citizen who wants to understand the unwritten rules of politics.

This essay undertakes a definitional approach to the concept of the polity in order to clarify the social reference point of common good-oriented policies. Following John Dewey, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Georg W. F. Hegel, I argue for a socialholistic understanding of the term: accordingly, the polity is an autonomous moral actor composed of human persons who not only understand but also actively affirm their socio-political cooperative relationships, have a shared worldview (“common sense”) and are concerned with the production and protection of communal goods. A polity understood in this way constitutes, as I suggest, an ideal of political coexistence and collaboration that provides orientation and meaningful projects in the face of current phenomena of polarization and alienation in modern democracies.

Value pluralism is the metaphysical thesis that there is a plurality of values at the fundamental level of the evaluative domain. Value monism, on the other hand, is the claim that there is just one fundamental value. Pluralists, it is commonly argued, have an edge over monists when it comes to accounting for the conspicuous heterogeneity of the evaluative domain and the rationality of regretting well-justified decisions. Monists, in turn, seem to provide a far more plausible account of rational evaluative decision-making. I argue that the impression of a theoretical stalemate, which is suggested by the exchange of those arguments, is premature. An assessment of the sub-positions in both camps, in conjunction with an analysis of value fundamentality based on the notion of grounding, reveals that certain versions of pluralism and monism—which I call moderate positions—can counter the respective objections. Thus, moderate value pluralism and moderate value monism emerge as the strongest positions in both camps. I conclude that the further debate should center around those two positions.