Christian Damböck

Carnap ist heute der frische Wind, der uns die von Wittgenstein und Heidegger bis zur Frankfurter Schule und Postmoderne geschaffene Distanz zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft überwinden lässt. Diese Entwicklung bot für uns den Anlass, in dem vorliegenden Handbuchformat einen umfassenden Überblick über den Stand der Forschung zu bieten, aber auch bislang wenig oder nicht begangene Pfade der Carnap-Forschung zu erschließen. Dafür war es uns wichtig, eine diverse Gruppe von Carnap-Expert*innen zu gewinnen, die alle Gesichtspunkte von Leben, Werk und Wirkung aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln betrachten. Das Handbuch gliedert sich, gemäß den drei großen Bereichen wo Carnap aktuell die philosophische Forschung inspiriert, in drei Teile: (1) zu Carnaps Leben und intellektueller Biografie, (2) zu allen Gesichtspunkten von Carnaps Werk und dem darauf aufbauenden weit verzweigten Carnap Scholarship, (3) zu den zahlreichen Gesichtspunkten aktueller Carnap-Bezüge, die sich in der heutigen meist durchaus nicht historisch orientierten analytischen Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie finden.

Logical empiricism can be characterized by a double message. All contexts in science and life have a noncognitive side, which is not a matter of right or wrong, but of attitude and value-driven decision making. And the task of science and philosophy is to provide strategies for minimizing the noncognitive input and maximizing the aspects based on rationality, facts, and logic. This logical empiricist stance, in turn, is not only based on a life-reformist attitude and a “scientific humanism”. It has very timely implications for a worldview that wants to be based on both democracy and science. This very broad picture of logical empiricism and its political agenda is drawn here against the background of an overview of its historical development.

This volume offers 11 papers that cover the wide spectrum of influences on Rudolf Carnap’s seminal work, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Along the way, it covers a host of topics related to this important philosophical work, including logic, theories of order, science, hermeneutics, and mathematics in the Aufbau, as the work is commonly termed. The book uncovers the influences of such neglected figures as Gerhards, Driesch, Ziehen, and Ostwald. It also presents new evidence on influences of well-known figures in philosophy, including Husserl, Rickert, Schlick, and Neurath. In addition, the book offers comparisons of the Aufbau with the work of contemporary scientists such as Weyl and Wiener as well as features new archival findings on the early Carnap.This book will appeal to researchers and students with an interest in the history and philosophy of science, history of analytic philosophy, the philosophy of the Vienna Circle, and the philosophy in interwar Germany and Austria.

Wie ist das Verhältnis von Kritischer Theorie, Philosophischer Anthropologie und Logischem Empirismus zu bestimmen? Diese bislang wenig untersuchte Frage steht im Mittelpunkt des Bandes, der entgegen der gängigen Betonung von Gegensätzen historische Berührungspunkte und gemeinsame Ansätze ins Zentrum rückt. Die 18 Beiträge analysieren in vier Sektionen die interdisziplinären Verflechtungen sowie die philosophischen Gemeinsamkeiten und Differenzen : I. Gemeinsame Ursprünge und geteilte Wege, II. Kooperation und Konfrontation von Kritischer Theorie und Logischem ­ Empirismus, III. Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede von Kritischer Theorie und Philosophischer Anthropologie, IV. Annäherungen von Logischem Empirismus und Philosophischer Anthropologie.

Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger shared with Max Weber the decisionist understanding of values as something that cannot be justified by scientists or philosophers. Although both accepted the challenge of modernity in this respect, they reacted in opposite ways. Carnap, along with the Vienna Circle, defended a scientific conception of the world in which science and instrumental rationality were to permeate all of life; Heidegger embarked on an understanding of metaphysics in which rationality and science were to be eliminated. Both strategies were deeply political, and both resulted from the split in the German youth and life-reform movement that took place during and immediately after World War I. I discuss this image here in the context of dialectical theology, the Vienna Circle, and the Davos Disputation, with a sideways glance at Ernst Cassirer, and with a view to earlier interpretations by Michael Friedman and Gottfried Gabriel.

Based on a survey of original sources representing the respective views of logical empiricists and their allies at different stages of the movement’s development, this paper argues that logical empiricism, seen in a broader context that includes the democratic views of Max Weber and Hans Kelsen as well as Austrian social democracy, reveals a powerful, if hitherto underappreciated, side of twentieth-century democratic thought. This conception, which I call “noncognitive deliberation,” is set in the context of debates about deliberative democracy that typically make no reference to logical empiricism. I argue that noncognitive deliberation, along with American pragmatism and current views of deliberative democracy, replaces the earlier Habermasian notion of universal consensus, which condemns those who do not share it as irrational, with the notion of compromise, which leaves room for unresolved conflict.

Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger shared with Max Weber the decisionist understanding of values as something that cannot be justified by scientists or philosophers. Although both accepted the challenge of modernity in this respect, they reacted in opposite ways. Carnap, along with the Vienna Circle, defended a scientific conception of the world in which science and instrumental rationality were to permeate all of life; Heidegger embarked on an understanding of metaphysics in which rationality and science were to be eliminated. Both strategies were deeply political, and both resulted from the split in the German youth and life reform movement that took place during and immediately after World War I. I discuss this image here in the context of dialectical theology, the Vienna Circle, and the Davos Disputation, with a sideways glance at Ernst Cassirer, and with a view to earlier interpretations by Michael Friedman and Gottfried Gabriel.

. Based on a reconstruction of the development of Rudolf Carnap’s views from the Aufbau until the 1960s, this paper provides an account of the philosopher’s understanding of non-cognitivism, which is here seen as in line with the so-called scientific world-conception of left-wing logical empiricism. The starting point of Carnap’s conception is the claim that every human decision depends on certain attitudes that cannot be justified at a cognitive level, that are neither based on empirical facts nor logical reasoning. The key features of Carnap’s non-cognitivism, however, go beyond this general basis and involve several fundamentally moral commitments, such as a commitment toward science, and the embracing of moral attitudes as the result of a long-term process of rational discourse. I argue that these commitments contained in Carnap’s non-cognitivism/scientific world-conception establish a genuinely political worldview that is characteristic of left-wing logical empiricism and converges with socialism and democracy.

Der logische Aufbau der Welt wurde 1928 publiziert, zwei Jahre nachdem Carnap sich in Wien mit dem Manuskript des Buches habilitiert hatte. Entstanden ist Carnaps Buch jedoch in einer Zeit, in der dieser noch nicht in Wien tätig war. Die Niederschrift erfolgte im Jahr 1925 in Buchenbach bei Freiburg; die Vorgeschichte reicht zurück bis ins Jahr 1920. Wie viel Wien oder Wiener Kreis steckt also eigentlich im Aufbau? Wie sehr spiegelt der Aufbau umgekehrt die philosophische Situation in Carnaps frühem Umfeld in Jena und Freiburg wieder? Ist der Aufbau ein Stück österreichische oder ein Stück deutsche Philosophie oder beides? Um diese Fragen auf einer soliden empirischen Grundlage beantworten zu können, wird hier das vorhandene Material ausgewertet, das die Entstehung von Carnaps Buch dokumentiert. Dabei handelt es sich, neben den publizierten Texten Carnaps aus dieser Zeit, um folgende Quellen: Carnaps Tagebücher und Leselisten, verschiedene Briefwechsel, Manuskripte und Fragmente aus den Nachlässen von Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, Franz Roh und anderen.

This Open Access volume is based on the 'Early Carnap in Context’ workshop that took place in Konstanz in 2017 and looks at Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy, documented in his recently released diaries, from a combination of historical, cultural and philosophical perspectives. It enables further evaluation of the diaries and traces newly found interrelationships and their systematic definition. From a cultural and historical point of view, Logical Empiricism and Carnap’s pivotal opus, The Logical Structure of the World, did not evolve in a vacuum. This applies equally in a history of philosophy context as well as under consideration of contemporary historical and cultural influences such as the socio-cultural setting in Vienna and Prague, the correlation between Logical Empiricism and Bauhaus modernism, the connection to the Life Reform Movement or the Youth Movement with its own life philosophy. Pursuing Carnap’s progression on a micro level of history and referring the results back to Carnap’s philosophy is now facilitated by recent access to his Diaries from 1908–1935. These shorthand records, reading lists, travel reports and notes constitute a valuable source for the research of networks and social movements which left their mark on him.

This book studies how the relationship between philosophy, morality, politics, and science was conceived in the Vienna Circle and how this group of philosophers tried to position science as an antidote to totalitarianism and irrationalism. This leads to investigation of the still understudied views of the Vienna Circle on moral philosophy, meta-ethics, and the relationship between philosophy of science and politics. Including papers from an international group of scholars, The Socio-ethical Dimension of Knowledge: The Mission of Logical Empiricism addresses these topics and makes them available to scholars in the field of history of philosophy of science.

In this paper, I re-examine Barry Smith’s list of features of Austrian Philosophy in his Austrian philosophy. The legacy of Franz Brentano. Open Court, Chicago, 1994). I claim that the list properly applies only in a somewhat abbreviated form to all significant representatives of Austrian Philosophy. Moreover, Smith’s crucial thesis that the features of Austrian Philosophy are not shared by any German philosopher only holds if we compare Austrian Philosophy to a canonical list of German Philosophy II. This list, however, was established in twentieth century as a result of historical misrepresentations. If we correct these misrepresentations, we obtain another list of hidden representatives called German Philosophy I. German Philosophy I is fundamentally identical to Austrian Philosophy, whereas German Philosophy II is entirely different from both Austrian Philosophy and German Philosophy I. Therefore, a slightly modified version of Smith’s Austrian Philosophy account still makes sense as a tool to position the proscientific and rational currents of Austrian Philosophy and German Philosophy I against the tendentially anti-scientific and irrational current of German Philosophy II.

This article reevaluates Hermann Ebbinghaus’s famous criticisms of Wilhelm Dilthey’s 1894 essay “Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology,” to determine how Dilthey’s diverse approaches toward philosophy and the human sciences are related to experimental psychology and to hypothetico-deductive science. It turns out that Ebbinghaus falsely accuses Dilthey of rejecting experimental psychology overall, while, in fact, Dilthey rejects only a specific misuse of experimental psychology: as a way to provide a foundation for the humanities. At the same time, Dilthey recognizes several ways in which philosophy and the human sciences might benefit from experimental psychology. Although it clearly rules out experimental psychology, Dilthey’s descriptive psychology involves a hypothetico-deductive standpoint that intermediates, with some success, between modern social science and nineteenth-century hermeneutics.

Der Band versammelt einen Großteil der Beiträge, die internationale Experten anlässlich der Tagung „Philosophie und Wissenschaft bei Hermann Cohen“ im November 2014 am Institut Wiener Kreis der Universität Wien präsentiert haben. Mit der Tagung zu Hermann Cohen, der zusammen mit Paul Natorp die Marburger Schule begründete, wurden zwei Ziele verfolgt: erstens die Aspekte in der Philosophie des Kantianers Cohen herauszuarbeiten, die an die Idee einer Einheitswissenschaft anknüpfen und zweitens Divergenzen und Übereinstimmungen Cohens mit der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, der Programmatik des Wiener Kreises um Rudolf Carnap und Moritz Schlick zu identifizieren. Der Tagungsband ist in drei Teile gegliedert. Die Aufsätze im ersten Teil beschäftigen sich mit der Bedeutung von Erfahrung und Empirismus für das Philosophieverständnis Hermann Cohens. Im zweiten Teil gehen die Autoren der Frage nach, welche Rolle Theorien aus den Bereichen Mathematik, Naturwissenscha ften und Psychologie für Cohens Denken gespielt haben – unter anderem Hermann von Helmholtz‘ Theorie des Messens und die Bedeutung der Infinitesimalrechnung für die Philosophie der Marburger Schule. Die Beiträge im dritten Teil des Bandes stellen die Philosophie Cohens und der Marburger Schule den Vertretern des Wiener Kreises und der Berliner Gruppe um Hans Reichenbach gegenüber. Dabei wird Reichenbachs Rezeption der Relativitätstheorie in den Kontext einer Relativierung Kants bei Cohen und Ernst Cassirer gestellt und „versteckte Verwandtschaften“ zwischen Cohen und dem Logischen Empirismus aufgedeckt. Der Band richtet sich an Wissenschaftler auf dem Gebiet der Geschichte der Philosophie.

This article is concerned with the development of philosophy of science in the 1970s. The explanatory framework is the picture of two fundamental split-offs: the controversial establishment of history and sociology of science and of formal philosophy of science as independent disciplines, against the background of more traditional “conceptual” varieties of philosophy of science. I illustrate these developments, which finally led to somewhat “purified” versions of the respective accounts, by examining a case study, namely, that of the structuralist school, which emerged in the 1970s as an attempt to reconcile historical and formal approaches in philosophy of science. I try to explain the failure of this initial program of “Kuhn Sneedified” and its transition to a more purified formalist version, on the basis of the fact that the former attempt was caught somewhere amid the purism of conceptual, historical, and formal accounts of philosophy of science.