Christian Illies

This chapter suggests a new transcendental argument of the retorsive type and shows how it can overcome the criticised insufficiencies of the traditional transcendental approaches. It seems that there are two moral judgements to which everyone (including the sceptic) is committed; namely, a judgement concerning the universal freedom to act and another concerned with the universal making of true judgements. However, the universal ‘must’ used in making these judgements is generated not by a threat of performative inconsistency, but by the threat of what will be termed a ‘normative inconsistency’. To deny the truth of these moral judgements would be a performative contradiction to certain demands which every rational free agent must necessarily impose upon himself implicitly by acting or arguing. The argument from normative consistency is discussed, along with truth and freedom as moral values.

This chapter puts aside the epistemological level of discourse and outlines the reach of the argument from normative consistency. It shows how the argument from normative consistency can provide an apt and useful basis for the main tenets of moral realism. That ethical foundationalism is dangerous is an objection more prominent in philosophical than in ordinary discourse. However, the view that ethical foundationalism is utterly doomed to fail is the common view of many philosophers and non-philosophers alike. These two criticisms are examined, first in general terms and second in the version of Alasdair MacIntyre. The truth thesis of moral realism is discussed, along with truth and intersubjectivity, truth and tyranny, how moral beliefs can motivate, a typology of true (or right) moral judgements, and the teleological structure of rational agency.

Two highly developed transcendental arguments exist in the current ethical and meta-ethical debates about moral realism and moral judgements. Karl-Otto Apel has developed what is known as an ‘argument from discourse’, while Alan Gewirth has suggested an ‘argument from agency’. This chapter analyses Apel's account and a similar account by Wolfgang Kuhlmann to justify ethics. Both understand truth as a consensus and, consequently, reason as a form of discourse. Their central argument is that to reason at all everyone (including the sceptic) must accept the rules and principles which are required for any discourse to be rational. Both Apel and Kuhlmann demonstrate very clearly the manner in which their argument is supposed to escape the naturalistic fallacy. However, Apel and Kuhlmann cannot show that every reasoner necessarily anticipates a universal discourse community in his reasoning. This chapter discusses moral realism and the argument from discourse, how the argument from discourse answers the naturalistic-fallacy objection, restricted and unrestricted normative judgements, and what moral realism must achieve.

This chapter examines a transcendental argument developed by Alan Gewirth. Gewirth's ‘Dialectically Necessary Method’ is designed to provide a justification for fundamental moral principles on the basis of the implications of human agency. According to Gewirth, all agents are committed to making some moral judgements on the basis of what is necessarily involved in their actions. Gewirth's aim is not to detect factual judgements about the structure of agency, but right from the beginning to detect judgements about the way agents must place positive value in the world. His attempt to found ethics on the implications of agency is the focus of this chapter. To determine whether Gewirth provides a basis for the foundation of moral realism, this chapter first gives a brief account of his reasoning. Moral realism and the argument from agency are discussed and a critique of the argument from agency is presented. Gewirth's objectivation principle is also explored.

This chapter examines whether transcendental arguments might suffice for a justification of a source of normativity, and hence for the project of moral realism. There are two groups or types of transcendental arguments on the basis of two tasks for which they are employed. On the one hand, transcendental arguments are engaged in furthering the explanation of some known fact or judgement in order to expand knowledge. On the other hand, they are employed in a straightforward anti-sceptical fashion. The first type of transcendental argument is known as the explorational type, which proceeds from a non-ambitious starting point by plausible steps to a highly ambitious conclusion, namely, to some a priori knowledge. The second type of transcendental argument is called the retorsive type, which is designed mainly to secure a judgement about something being the case. The pros and cons of the explorational and retorsive arguments are discussed.

This chapter examines the debate about moral realism which can be found in current analytic philosophy and outlines the position of moral realism and anti-realism and the main arguments raised by proponents of both sides. It seems that a rational solution of the conflict between these very different perspectives is not possible, since realists and anti-realists not only disagree heavily about whether moral facts are ‘real’ in any meaningful sense, but also about the criteria for deciding upon this question. Moral realism has the burden of proof in this debate, and can only make a proper claim to be right if it can provide a rational justification of moral judgements. Traditional methodologies for such a justification of normative notions are considered and rejected as inappropriate to the task, including deduction, induction, and intuition.

In our era of rapid, breathless change, we need concepts of human education that promise sustainability, along with a corresponding architecture of learning. The pursuit of knowledge has always been regarded as a key to a better life – both individually and collectively – and the social value of learning is reflected most vividly in the environments where it takes place. What kind of architecture do we need for a holistic concept of education that anticipates future developments? And how can the built environment support the transformation of accumulated knowledge into lived experience and embodied wisdom? Answers to such questions have often found meaningful expression in the typology of the library – and continue to do so today. This book addresses vital questions of education, human epistemics, knowledge, and their architectural settings from diverse disciplinary perspectives.

Published in English with parallel Chinese translation. The book considers the relationship between Western philosophy and architecture. We discuss philosophy’s contribution to architecture and the way in which we can reflect philosophically about architecture, that is to say principally about individual buildings rather than cities. This double role of philosophy is unusual in what might be seen as a technical field: a philosophical investigation would more often look critically at the process of gaining new knowledge or designing and producing something, or it would try to understand or evaluate types of artefacts (for example computers). In contrast, the practice of architecture is already deeply involved in and shaped by philosophical reflection and ideas. Architecture is guided by architectural theory, an ongoing discourse that bridges between philosophy and the practical discipline. Thus when philosophy looks at architectural artefacts or production, it investigates something that is itself partly philosophical, at least in the widest sense of the word.

EineEthikBegegnungMoralund NaturmitNaturals NormVertretern empirischer[aut]Illies, Christian Wissenschaften endet für Ethiker oft unerfreulich. Funktionale Erklärungen für moralische Phänomene, wie sie etwa die EvolutionsbiologieEvolutionsbiologie, Soziologie oder Psychologie vorlegen, vertreiben oft das Phänomen, zumindest als ein im eigentlichen Sinne moralisches Phänomen – womit der Ethiker den Gegenstand seines Nachdenkens verliert, um den sich dann besser andere Wissenschaften kümmern sollen.

Architektur ist mehr als die technisch-funktionale Lösung eines praktischen Problems. In Bauwerken drückt sich immer auch ein Weltverhältnis aus - und macht zugleich ein bleibendes Sinn-Angebot. Architektur ist deswegen ein Anstoss, manchmal auch ein Apell, über sehr unterschiedliche Fragen nachzudenken, sich zu ihnen zu verhalten und sich dabei geistig zu verorten. In diesem Buch begegnen sich eine Vielfalt der Deutungs- und Annäherungsmöglichkeiten durch Vertreter unterschiedlicher Kultur- und Geisteswissenschaften. Die Eigenart der Wahrnehmungen und unterschiedlichen methodischen Herangehensweisen kommen so in ein Gespräch. Es soll zu einem besseres Verstehen, aber auch Bewerten führen. Denn wenn Bauwerke Sinn-Angebote machen, lassen sich diese auch beurteilen, da sie Ideale und mögliche Lebensweisen ausdrücken machen, die nicht alle gleichwertig sind"--Page 4 of cover.

Was wir inhaltlich unter der Natur des Menschen verstehen sollten, ist ebenso umstritten wie ihr ontologischer Status, also ob es sie überhaupt gibt. Nach einer Klärung des Begriffsfeldes mit Blick auf Aristoteles wird auf die Neudeutung des Begriffs durch die christliche Philosophie eingegangen, aus der sich die zentralen Konfliktlinien der Gegenwart erklären: Eine naturalisierende Deutung unserer Natur steht gegen eine sozial-konstruktivistische, nach der die Natur ein kulturelles Produkt ist. Dazu kommen anti-essenzialistische (nominalistische) Weltbilder, die eine allgemeine „Natur des Menschen“ zurückweisen. Die verschiedenen Positionen und Diskussionen werden skizziert und abschließend argumentiert, dass viel dafür spricht, an einer Natur des Menschen festzuhalten, auch wenn dies metaphysisch einen Preis hat. Aber der Preis dafür, den Mensch in der dünnen Luft der Wesenslosigkeit verwehen zu lassen, wäre höher.

One might question whether we need ethics at all in the debate on global povertyPoverty, or whether the demand to help seems self-evident and the choice of particular actions should be left to specialists on developmental aid. In this chapter, it is argued that the answers are yes and no: No, because we can leave particular recommendations to experts once we know precisely what we should promote—but also yes, since we must know the exact end of our (demanded) action. Empirical povertyPoverty-researchResearch without specified ends is blind; it requires the prior identification and rational justification of particular ends. This, however, is the task of ethics because no empirical science can lead to normative insights. Since it is highly controversial whether philosophical reflection can provide such a justification, a transcendental argument is outlined: if there is something good, then it is good that the good is actively supported, and if a capability to do so is a necessary requirement for this support, then it is also good that human beings have this capability. Human freedom is the paramount capability to self-determine one’s life and actions. It is an essential condition for supporting the good. It follows that a certain kind of freedom (namely the one necessary for supporting the good; here called “moral freedom”) must be regarded as a necessary end for any moralityMorality. We are obliged to help others so that they can help. The chapter ends with showing in which way the end “moral freedom” tells us why we should help the poor and can provide practical orientation for doing so.

Transcendental arguments are arguments which aim to provide justification (possibly even ultimate justification) for some ethical and other judgments. In their most complex form they are indirect arguments: they claim to demonstrate that a proposition is true by showing that it cannot be false. This kind of reasoning is not trivial. But what are we doing when we argue transcendentally? We can ask this question from an epistemological perspective but also from the point of view of moral psychology. The thesis of this paper is that understanding and accepting of indirect transcendental arguments require some form of moral commitment on the part of the reasoner, over and above that reasoner’s purely rational capacities. Such a reasoner can be neither a non-human animal (as these lack any rational understanding of morality) nor a god (as gods, being morally perfect, need no moral commitment), but must have exactly those capacities which we, human beings, happen to have. This supports the observations of Aristotle, Confucius, and others: that only the good person can find the truth.

Is it merely a matter of taste or convention to consider something right or wrong? Or can we find good reasons for our values and judgements that are independent of culture and tradition? The problem is as old as philosophy itself; and after more than two millennia of scholarly debate, there seems no end to the controversy. But Christian Illies suggests that powerful new forms of transcendental argument (a philosophical tool known since antiquity) may offer a long-sought cornerstone for morality.

In dem Aufsatz wird die Leistungsfähigkeit des Potentialitätsarguments am Beispiel des therapeutische Klonen untersucht. Die Diskussion bewegt sich auf drei Ebenen. Zunächst geht es auf fundamentaler Ebene darum, eine Begründung des Lebensrechts von Vernunftwesen zu skizzieren. Dann wird auf einer zweiten Ebene argumentiert, daß der Anwendungsbereich dieser Grundnorm auch nicht aktual ihre Vernunft gebrauchende Wesen einschließt. Diese hier "Erweiterungspostulat" genannte Forderung wird weitgehend intuitiv begründet. Daran anschließend wird das Potentialitätsargument als Versuch interpretiert, dieses Postulat bestmöglich zu rationalisieren. Das so gewonnene Konzept einer "aktiven Potentialität" als Grundlage für das Recht auf Leben wird gegen die gängigen Einwände verteidigt. Auf einer dritten Ebene wird das Potentialitätsargument schließlich auf die beim therapeutischen Klonen anfallenden künstlichen Zygoten bzw. Embryonen angewandt und dafür argumentiert, diese beim gegenwärtigen Stand des Wissens nicht für die Forschung freizugeben