Christian Frigerio

This paper explores power ontology as an alternative to the traditional passivist view that has justified some human attitudes toward the environment. Once we see powers as a part of nature and every being as endowed with peculiar powers, it becomes possible to see them as normative indications prescribing how to regulate our relationship with the rest of the world. The more consistent instance of power metaphysics is probably offered by Whitehead; however, the legacy of his philosophy of the organism is more often associated with the rebirth of panpsychism. Even if as an ecological strategy panpsychism has the merit to encourage a more charitable attitude toward non-humans, it presents some flaws that make the pluralism of power ontology more desirable, as it considers not only thought but every kind of power as a claimant to value. Finally, a particular kind of power ontology named “materialicism” will be sketched: a study of the powers immanent to materials. Materialicism help us to understand how human projects depend abundantly on the so far neglected powers of matter and how such powers ask for a consideration that can no longer be negated them after the ongoing ecological crisis. The powers of materials express themselves as nomoi, which consist in what a legislator aware of the active nature of the world should take into consideration for a policy- making suitable to the future of the planet.

The ontological turn is one of the most debated issues in contemporary anthropology, but what it means for anthropology to become ontological is rarely made clear. Bruno Latour’s suggestion that anthropology should revolve around “modes of existence” is arguably the most robust proposal to date, but the connection between modes of existence and properly anthropological concerns remains obscure. This paper argues that William James is a key figure for getting a better understanding of what ontology and modes of existence mean, and that in particular “The Perception of Reality” – chapter XXI of the second volume of the Principles of Psychology – offers many possibilities for linking a framework centered on human being-in-the-world, such as anthropology, with properly metaphysical concerns. In this paper, the content of “The Perception of Reality” is summarized, and James’s proposal to ground modes of existence on belief is discussed, to show how, once we are clear about what we mean by “ontology,” anthropology can (and should) engage in metaphysical debates in order to make its stakes explicit. The conclusion suggests that James’s grounding of modes of existence on individual belief can compensate for ontological anthropology’s tendency to erase the internal differences of a collective in order to speak of a supposedly unified and homogeneous “cosmology.”

At the point of convergence between speculative realism, nihilism, and a certain taste for horror culture, “dark philosophies” have emerged as some of the most original theoretical proposals of our times. All these philosophies see virality as the paradigmatic event that disturbs the global axiomatics of capitalism. Today, this globality is precisely what gives virality its enormous strength. What dark philosophies can teach us, through a crossed reflection on current socialpolitical conditions and on the concept of life, is how to draw from virality a possibility for thought: virality is a pharmacological concept, and its meaning will be in a great part dependent on what we will be able to make of it. A thorough reflection on virality could bring us to see in the present situation not only a possibility for new kinds of individuation, but also a catalyst for a type of politics that is perhaps the only possibility to cope with imperial axiomatics.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the debate between supporters of internal and external relations showed how our assumptions on the nature of relations result in ontological, epistemic, and ethical commitments. In this debate, Alfred North Whitehead provided the most articulated and satisfying account through his “philosophy of the organism,” which holds relations to be internal yet vectorial, without excluding completely external relations. Today, the debate has become once again topical and constitutes a core issue for speculative realism. This paper aims to show how the theory of external relations endorsed by some leading figures of speculative realism does not suffice to preserve the desiderata it was designed for, and how a more serious consideration of Whitehead’s theory would have beneficial effects on the ontological and ethical issues of this rejuvenated metaphysical discourse.

This paper aims at exploring a particular dimension of the affinity between Gilles Deleuze and pragmatism: his ontology of the virtual, which results in a metaphysics of power. In Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, the essence of an entity is identical to its power: what can it do? substitutes the Socratic ti esti? as the leading philosophical question. This shift, operated by Spinoza and given a new and adequate ontology by Deleuze, is very close to Peirce’s pragmatic revolution: if Deleuze’s virtual ideas are identical to the range of variations in power and affects that a body may go through, Peirce defines meaning in terms of the whole range of possible effects that an idea would produce if taken to be true. Contradictory as it may sound, the concept of the virtual entails something like a pragmaticism of the singular, which informs every aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy: his doctrine of faculties and his theory of praxis will be used as instances of this pervasiveness. This pragmatist reading of Deleuze could possibly shape an alternative path for contemporary pragmatism: instead of valorising its “edifying” (linguistic, historicistic, humanistic) tendency, Deleuze allows to highlight the vitality of the second vein of pragmatism, the “constructive,” empiricist, speculative, even metaphysical one.

This paper explores Whitehead’s concept of law as an immanent order, arguing that it can be successfully used to cover the whole semantic field denoted as ‘law’, and especially law in its juridical sense. After showing the features that make it more plausible and more desirable than the opposing view of law as a transcendent imposition, law will be defined as the expression of the modes of existence of individuals within their environment. It will then be tested as a key for understanding the link between life and law and showing the inadequacy of Foucault and Agamben’s biopolitical reflections: if law is an immanent order, then life is identical with its own inherent normativity. Finally, drawing on Deleuze’s philosophy of right, the fundamental features of an immanent practice of law, a “speculative jurisprudence” which confirms the binding between law, life, and immanence, will be sketched as a proposal for a practical philosophy consistent with Whitehead’s process cosmology.

Questo articolo si propone come contributo alla teoria della rêverie degli elementi naturali sviluppata da Gaston Bachelard. Si argomenterà che la contemplazione del mare sollecita una visione particolare del mondo che può affettare le nostre idee del tempo e della memoria. Sulla scia del famoso detto di Eraclito, quella del fiume è sempre stata l’immagine principale per descrivere la natura inafferrabile del tempo; ma il mare, il luogo dove finiscono tutti i fiumi, fornisce una perfetta analogia naturale per la conservazione del «passato in sé» attorno cui Henri Bergson ha costruito la sua teoria della durata e della memoria: niente scompare davvero, e così il passato viene dotato della consistenza e della vivida eternità che la filosofia tradizionale attribuiva all’essere. Intercessori dal panorama letterario, uniti alla considerazione filosofica di alcune immagini ricorrenti – specialmente quelle del relitto e della città sommersa – aiuteranno ad approssimare la rêverie marina al pensiero di Bergson, approssimazione che si compirà nella conclusione.