Christian Lotz

Money does not play a central role in the major writings of Frankfurt School thinkers, with the exception of Theodor W. Adorno, and Friedrich Pollock during the 1930s, and then again with Habermas and his theory of communicative action. Though Adorno rarely addresses money in his writings, it becomes clear that he analyzes the synthetic force of money as a constitutive element of capitalist social relations under what is for Adorno a central concept, that is, the “exchange principle,” which he developed in light of Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s concept of “real abstraction.” By “exchange society” Adorno refers to capitalism as a social form in which human life becomes universally commodified. Whereas Pollock’s take on money seems to be important for the further development of critical theory, Pollock remains focused on Marx. In contradistinction, Habermas moves away from Marx by no longer conceptualizing money as a universally important element for the constitution of society, instead juxtaposing it with the normative reproduction of society that takes place in the lifeworld. More recently, Nancy Fraser, returning to Polanyi, and Werner Bonefeld, returning to Adorno and Marx, have paid renewed attention to the concept of money, partly based on their dissatisfaction with the dismissal of political economy and a theory of capitalism in contemporary critical theory.Generally, all Frankfurt School critical theorists who deal with the issue of money start from the following assumptions: (1) money is not a “thing” on its own—rather, it is a moment of a larger (dialectical) theory of society; and (2) money is not simply a means of payment, given that even in Habermas’ theory of money as a “medium,” money plays a larger social role for societal developments. Critical theorists therefore all agree that money cannot be neutral, and they thereby refuse positivist and economist approaches to money.

This book frames the mission of the Continental Philosophy and History of Thought series at Lexington Books. International leading scholars contribute essays that explore and redefine the relationship between received arguments in contemporary Continental philosophy and various influential figures and arguments in the history of thought. By bringing Continental philosophy and the histories of thought into dialogue, editors Christian Lotz and Antonio Calcagno broaden the standard canon of what is considered Continental philosophy by including important yet understudied figures and arguments in the tradition; the chapters also deepen and contextualize significant movements and debate in the field by showing their rich historical underpinnings, thereby establishing new viewpoints in specific constituent subfields of philosophy. _Reading Continental Philosophy and the History of Thought_ shows the growing richness of Continental philosophy via unexplored rethinking of the history of thought. The contributors expand Continental philosophy with and through the recovery of important historical developments, figures, and lines of thought.

Against a stream of culturally oriented scholars some scholars in aesthetics, such as Arthur Danto and Noel Carroll, have maintained that there is a sense of “seeing” and visual recognition that does not depend upon historical and cultural practices. This essay shows that Danto’s assumption of a difference between a “core” and an “extended” form of perception and visual recognition should be rejected. The underlying argument of my considerations in this essay is the following: the distinction between a “pure” and an “extended” perception or visual perception is untenable, since, as a phenomenological reflection can reveal, our normal mode of perception is always extended. In this vein, it is argued here that there is, after all, only one mode of perception and that Danto’s position is based on abstractions from the real phenomenon. Consequently, whereas Danto maintains that it makes sense to talk about a “natural” form of seeing, this essay argues that “seeing” is itself a culturally defined way of comportment, and that assumptions about naturalistically defined perceptual core processes turn out to be idealized constructions.

Der vorliegende Band versammelt Beiträge von Philosophen und Philosophinnen innerhalb der phänomenologischen Forschung, speziell derjenigen Husserls. Die Beiträge zeichnen sich durch ihre innovative Kraft aus, da sie Neuland betreten und der phänomenologischen Forschung neue Wege eröffnen. Die Beiträge repräsentieren den gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand auf internationalem Niveau. Forscher und Forscherinnen aus Österreich, Deutschland, Dänemark, Japan, Taiwan, Italien und den USA sind versammelt. Dieser Band enthält fünf Beiträge in englischer Sprache.

In this paper, I first argue that Lucien Goldmann’s attempt to confront Heidegger and Lukács, though it deserves to be revitalized, remains ultimately insuficient. Second, I propose that a more fruitful reading of Heidegger and Lukács should be based on three aspects: first, Lukács’ concept of social totality should be related to Heidegger’s concept of world. Second, the more meaningful way to confront Lukács and Heidegger on the level of praxis is not the everyday dealings with ready-to-hand things, but, instead, the second division of Being and Time in which a political concept of subjectivity and action comes to the forefront. Third, a proper approach to Heidegger’s and Lukács’ philosophies should be based on their respective appropriation of the concept of categories.

In his new book, Lambert Zuidervaart argues that the concept of propositional truth remains one-dimensional and needs to be extended by and embedded in several versions of what the author calls “existential truth,” which he discusses in relation to phenomenology and critical theory. Zuidervaart focuses on key figures of twentieth-century German philosophy, such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, and Max Horkheimer. According to the author, his book “does not intend to be a historical narrative” ; nor does it intend to present “a few nuggets of insights from continental writings”. Instead, Zuidervaart tries to reconstruct the primary material and immanently criticizes the...

In this essay, I offer thoughts on the constitution of images in art, especially as they are constituted in painting and in photography. Utilizing ideas from Gadamer, Derrida and Adorno, I shall argue that representation should be conceived as a performative concept and as an act of formation; i.e., as a process rather thanas something "fixed." My reflections will be carried out in connection with a careful analysis of Gerhard Richter's painting Reader (1994), which is a painting of a photograph that depicts a female who is reading. I demonstrate how a close analysis of this fascinating painting leads us deeper into the problem of painted images, insofar as it enacts what it is about, namely, the constitution of itself as an innige by means of a complex and enigmatic relationship between seeing, reading, memory, inner, outer, gaze and blindness.

Scholarship in Heideggerian philosophy can be broadly differentiated into three groups, which evolved in the European and Anglo-American discourses after WWII, namely, first a transcendental (idealist Kantian) approach; second, an Aristotelian approach; and third, a Christian approach to Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein and his fundamental ontology. All of these basic positions are a result of Heidegger’s philosophy on his way to Being and Time (1927) which he developed both in his broad ranging and fascinating lecture courses in Freiburg, where he taught as Husserl’s assistant between 1917 and 1923, and in Marburg, where he taught between 1923 and 1927 (before he returned to Freiburg in 1928 as Husserl’s successor). Interestingly, the analytic reception of Heidegger focuses on Heidegger’s main work Being and Time, whereas the European and “Continental” discourse is oriented towards larger issues, which include philosophical anthropology, theology, hermeneutics, and the history of philosophy. McGrath’s study belongs to the theologically motivated studies on Heidegger’s phenomenology and ontology and thereby contributes to the recent renewed interest in Heidegger’s early philosophy, which arose after his early lecture courses were published in his Collected Works and after it became clear that Heidegger’s way to Being and Time (and his later thinking) not only was heavily influenced by Scholasticism, especially by Duns Scotus, but also by Augustine, Eckhart, and Luther, all of which took effect before Heidegger encountered Husserl’s phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism or Aristotle’s philosophy. The greatness of Being and Time is indeed a result of the ingenious transformation of all these sources into something new.

Christian Lotz shows in this book that Husserl's Phenomenology and its key concept--subjectivity--is based on a concrete anthropological structure, such as self-affection and the bodily experience of the other. The analysis of the sensual sphere and the lived Body forces Husserl to an ongoing correction of his strong methodological assumptions. Subjectivity turns out to be an ambivalent phenomenon, as the subject is unable to fully present itself to itself, and therefore is forced to allow for a fundamental non-transparency in itself