Christian Martin

We introduce and study a natural extension of Marcus external contextual grammars. This mathematically simple mechanism which generates a proper subclass of simple matrix languages, known to be mildly context-sensitive ones, is still mildly context-sensitive. Furthermore, we get an infinite hierarchy of mildly context-sensitive families of languages. Then we attempt to fill a gap regarding the linguistic relevance of these mechanisms which consists in defining a tree structure on the strings generated by many-dimensional external contextual grammars, and investigate some related issues. Several open problems are finally discussed

Das Kompositum Anthropotechnik bringt die Vorstellungen von Mensch und Technik in einem Begriff zusammen und setzt sie in eine wechselseitige Beziehung, die vom Inhalt der jeweiligen Vorstellungen abhängt. Anthropotechnik wird daher zu einem umstrittenen Begriff, weil die Zielsetzung und Machbarkeit der Technik von der jeweiligen Deutung des Menschenbegriffs abhängt, aber auch von der Technik auf jenen zurück wirkt. Der Autor Kevin Liggieri zeichnet in seiner begriffsgeschichtlichen Untersuchung zum Begriff der Anthropotechnik nach, wie Mensch und Technik im Laufe dieser Entwicklung immer wieder neu aufeinander verwiesen sind.

Nowadays, the high-temperature plasticity of yttria-stabilized tetragonal zirconia polycrystals is successfully explained in terms of a threshold stress. Despite the fact that its existence is very well proved experimentally, the origin and nature of the threshold stress are still unexplained. This work develops a possible explanation for the threshold stress in YTZPs. The model developed in this paper is able to explain quantitatively the dependence of this threshold stress with temperature and grain size. The model is able to predict the influence of a glassy phase present at grain boundaries and the values of the threshold stress in YTZP nanocrystals. The theoretical results are discussed and compared with the available data in the literature

Die Auswuchse der technisch-okonomischen Nutzung der irdischen Natur und die mit ihrer wissenschaftlichen Vergegenstandlichung einhergehenden Verkurzungen lassen sich nicht ohne Kultivierung eines asthetischen Naturverhaltnisses einhegen. Unter diesem ist heute weniger denn je die selbstvergessene Kontemplation unberuhrter Natur zu verstehen. Vielmehr geht es um ein schopferisches, potenziell lustvolles Erkunden der Moglichkeiten, kooperativen' Zusammenspiels zwischen naturlich-irdischen Vorgaben und menschlichem Gestalten. Der vorliegende Band will zur Reflexion solcher Moglichkeiten beitragen.

In his introductions to the encyclopaedic Philosophy of Nature and to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel distinguishes between three ‘attitudes’ (Verhaltensweisen, Einstellungen) towards nature—the theoretical, the practical and the philosophical attitude. According to him there is a certain ‘contradiction’ or tension between our theoretical attitude towards nature, which makes it an object of scientific inquiry, and the practical attitude that we assume as living rational beings who intervene in nature and shape it according to our purposes. This article focuses on how exactly to pinpoint that tension and on how it is resolved in what Hegel calls the ‘philosophical’ or ‘comprehending’ attitude towards nature.

This paper engages with Kant‘s account of space as a continuum. The stage is set by looking at how the question of spatial continuity comes up in a debate from the 1920s between Ernst Cassirer and logical empiricist thinkers about Kant‘s conception of spatial representation as a pure intuition. While granting that concrete features of space can only be known empirically, Cassirer attempted to save Kant‘s conception by restricting it to the core commitment of space as a continuous coexistent manifold. Cassirer did not however come up with a transcendental argument for spatial continuity. The paper presents such an argument by providing a reading of Kant‘s from which it transpires that Kant does not simply rely on supposed into the continuity of space. It is by way ofinstead that we can know space to be continuous and Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts does hinge on such knowledge.

The notion of absolute spirit, while undeniably central to Hegel’s philosophy, has been somewhat neglected in the literature. Two main lines of interpretation can be identified: a traditional metaphysical reading, according to which “absolute spirit” refers to an infinite spiritual substance, and a non-metaphysical reading, according to which it refers to activities in which human beings articulate their understanding of the principles that guide their communal life. Both types of reading are problematic exegetically as well as philosophically. This article develops an epistemological reading instead. Accordingly, “absolute spirit” refers to a kind of knowledge, which is distinct from empirical and practical knowledge. Hegel conceives of art, religion, and philosophy as species of such knowledge. While this view might seem astonishing, it can be justified by showing that it is by recourse to paradigmatic instances of artistic, religious, and philosophical activity that the otherwise indefinable notion of truth is fixed.

This article presents a line of thought leading from considerations on how the difference between logical affirmation and negation is linguistically manifest via a critique of the ‘force-content-distinction’ drawn by Frege and reflection on how that distinction is involved in confusions about rule following to a conception of ‘thinking-and-speaking’ as, essentially, an activity of living beings. It thus seeks to motivate a logico-linguistic understanding of ‘form of life’, exhibiting it as already involved in making distinctions as ‘simple’ as that between ‘p’ and ‘not p’.

Introduction: Endotracheal intubation in the prehospital setting poses unique challengeswhere multiple ETI attempts are associated with adverse patient outcomes. Early identificationof difficult ETI cases will allow providers to tailor airway-man agement efforts to minimizecomplications associated with ETI. We sought to derive and validate a prehospital difficult airwayidentification tool based on predictors of difficult ETI in other settings. Methods: We prospectively collected patient and airway data on all airway attempts from 16Advanced Life Support ground emergency medical services agencies from January2011 to October 2014. Cases that required more than two ETI attempts and cases where analternative airway strategy was employed after one unsuccessful ETIattempt were categorized as “difficult.” We used a random allocation sequence to split the datainto derivation and validation subsets. Using backward elimination, factors with a p 3, limited neckmovement, trismus/jaw clenched, inability to palpate thelandmarks of the neck, and fluid in the airwa y such as blood or emesis. This was the most parsimonious model and exhibited good fit with an AUC of 0.68. When applied to the validatio n set,the model had an AUC of 0.63 with high specificity for identifying di fficult ETI if >2factors were present ). Conclusion: We have developed a simple tool using five factors that may aid p rehospitalproviders in the identification of difficult ETI.

Is poetry a topic for philosophical reflection? This paper seeks to argue that it is by exhibiting poetry as a form of knowledge. What the claim that poetry is a form of knowledge amounts to is that something can be knowledge in virtue of being poetical and poetical in virtue of being the (kind of) knowledge it is. Various kinds of skeptical doubt about this claim are considered. It is argued that such doubts are based on distorting pictures of poetry. Two strategies to justify the claim that poetry is a form of knowledge shall be explored. The first strategy is a broadly Wittgensteinian one, relying on grammatical reminders. The second strategy is a broadly Hegelian one, exhibiting poetry as a form of knowledge by showing that the concepts of two other forms of knowledge – practical and second-person knowledge – due to internal incoherences, point beyond themselves towards the concept of poetry.

According to a widespread view, the essentials of Kant’s critical conception of space and time as set forth in the Transcendental Aesthetic can already be found in his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation. Contrary to this assumption, the present article shows that Kant’s later arguments for the a priori intuitive character of our original representations of space and time differ crucially from those contained in the Dissertation. This article highlights profound differences between Kant’s transcendental and his pre-critical conception of pure sensibility by systematically comparing the topic, method and argumentation of the First Critique with that of the Inaugural Dissertation. It thus contributes to a better understanding of the Transcendental Aesthetics itself, which allows one to distinguish its peculiar transcendental mode of argumentation from considerations made by the pre-critical Kant, with which it can easily be conflated.