Christian Martin

Die Untersuchung zielt auf eine systematische Begründung der von Frege und Wittgenstein initiierten sprachphilosophischen Wende. Ihr zentrales Thema ist das Verhältnis zwischen Gedanken und ihrem Ausdruck. Entwickelt wird eine neuartige Begründung dafür, dass wir im Denken nicht zufällig auf den Gebrauch von Ausdrücken angewiesen sind. Vielmehr sind Gedanken notwendig an Ausdruck gekoppelt, ohne sich mit diesem gleichsetzen zu lassen. Dabei wird die logisch-philosophische Wende zur Sprache zu einer Wende zum Ausdruck verallgemeinert: Dem sprachlich artikulierten Denken muss ein vorsprachliches Denken vorangehen, dessen Ausdruck etwa gestisch-mimischer Art sein kann. Allerdings weist das vorsprachliche Denken aufgrund seiner eigenen Beschränktheit über sich hinaus. Die Untersuchung erweist die Sprache so als Leistung der Vernunft statt als bloss naturhafte Voraussetzung von deren Ausübung.

We introduce and study a natural extension of Marcus external contextual grammars. This mathematically simple mechanism which generates a proper subclass of simple matrix languages, known to be mildly context-sensitive ones, is still mildly context-sensitive. Furthermore, we get an infinite hierarchy of mildly context-sensitive families of languages. Then we attempt to fill a gap regarding the linguistic relevance of these mechanisms which consists in defining a tree structure on the strings generated by many-dimensional external contextual grammars, and investigate some related issues. Several open problems are finally discussed

This paper engages with Kant‘s account of space as a continuum. The stage is set by looking at how the question of spatial continuity comes up in a debate from the 1920s between Ernst Cassirer and logical empiricist thinkers about Kant‘s conception of spatial representation as a pure intuition. While granting that concrete features of space can only be known empirically, Cassirer attempted to save Kant‘s conception by restricting it to the core commitment of space as a continuous coexistent manifold. Cassirer did not however come up with a transcendental argument for spatial continuity. The paper presents such an argument by providing a reading of Kant‘s from which it transpires that Kant does not simply rely on supposed into the continuity of space. It is by way ofinstead that we can know space to be continuous and Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts does hinge on such knowledge.

Nowadays, the high-temperature plasticity of yttria-stabilized tetragonal zirconia polycrystals is successfully explained in terms of a threshold stress. Despite the fact that its existence is very well proved experimentally, the origin and nature of the threshold stress are still unexplained. This work develops a possible explanation for the threshold stress in YTZPs. The model developed in this paper is able to explain quantitatively the dependence of this threshold stress with temperature and grain size. The model is able to predict the influence of a glassy phase present at grain boundaries and the values of the threshold stress in YTZP nanocrystals. The theoretical results are discussed and compared with the available data in the literature

'Why did the window break when it was hit by the stone? Because the window is brittle and the stone is hard; hardness and brittleness are powers, dispositional properties or dispositions.' Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. This book is a record of the debate on the nature of dispositions between three distinguished philosophers - D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place - who have been thinking about dispositions all their working lives. Their distinctive accounts cover many of the issues surrounding dispositions such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation. Dispositions illuminates this central topic in analytic philosophy and at the same time highlights deeper concerns of metaphysics.

Die Auswuchse der technisch-okonomischen Nutzung der irdischen Natur und die mit ihrer wissenschaftlichen Vergegenstandlichung einhergehenden Verkurzungen lassen sich nicht ohne Kultivierung eines asthetischen Naturverhaltnisses einhegen. Unter diesem ist heute weniger denn je die selbstvergessene Kontemplation unberuhrter Natur zu verstehen. Vielmehr geht es um ein schopferisches, potenziell lustvolles Erkunden der Moglichkeiten, kooperativen' Zusammenspiels zwischen naturlich-irdischen Vorgaben und menschlichem Gestalten. Der vorliegende Band will zur Reflexion solcher Moglichkeiten beitragen.

Emu aux larmes à l'écoute d'une musique, en arrêt devant ce tableau, vous ressentez un plaisir indéfinissable que n'a su provoquer aucune autre oeuvre. Celle-ci excite vos émotions, captive votre corps, court-circuite votre réflexion. "Que c'est beau!". Perdu en elle, vous fusionnez avec le mystère de sa présence en un acte de communion proche de l'amour romantique ou de l'extase mystique. Vous l'aimez, tout simplement! Entremêlant objet, culture et sujet, la relation artistique superpose aux significations de tous, un plaisir, des questionnements et des interprétations qui ne dépendent que de vous. Comment la relation esthétique s'y prend-elle pour éveiller tant d'émotions et comment l'art s'y prend-il pour transmettre du sens? Quel pourrait être l'apport des sciences cognitives à la compréhension de ces problèmes? Finalement, se pourrait-il que les relations complexes qu'entretiennent l'esthétique, l'artistique et son institutionnalisation, révèlent la nature émergente et systémique de l'Art?

In his introductions to the encyclopaedic Philosophy of Nature and to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel distinguishes between three ‘attitudes’ (Verhaltensweisen, Einstellungen) towards nature—the theoretical, the practical and the philosophical attitude. According to him there is a certain ‘contradiction’ or tension between our theoretical attitude towards nature, which makes it an object of scientific inquiry, and the practical attitude that we assume as living rational beings who intervene in nature and shape it according to our purposes. This article focuses on how exactly to pinpoint that tension and on how it is resolved in what Hegel calls the ‘philosophical’ or ‘comprehending’ attitude towards nature.

Das Kompositum Anthropotechnik bringt die Vorstellungen von Mensch und Technik in einem Begriff zusammen und setzt sie in eine wechselseitige Beziehung, die vom Inhalt der jeweiligen Vorstellungen abhängt. Anthropotechnik wird daher zu einem umstrittenen Begriff, weil die Zielsetzung und Machbarkeit der Technik von der jeweiligen Deutung des Menschenbegriffs abhängt, aber auch von der Technik auf jenen zurück wirkt. Der Autor Kevin Liggieri zeichnet in seiner begriffsgeschichtlichen Untersuchung zum Begriff der Anthropotechnik nach, wie Mensch und Technik im Laufe dieser Entwicklung immer wieder neu aufeinander verwiesen sind.

Frege distinguished the thought qua logical content from the assertoric force attached to it when judged to be true. The gist of this distinction is captured by the so-called Frege-Geach point. Recently, several authors have drawn inspiration from Wittgenstein to reject this point and the distinction it is based on. This article proceeds from the observation that Wittgenstein himself did not reject the force-content distinction but urged us to reformulate it in a non-dualistic way. While drawing on Wittgensteinian lessons about thought and its expression, the overall purpose of this paper is systematic, not exegetic: it seeks to contribute to the contemporary debate aboute force and content by arguing that this distinction should be redrawn in such a way as to exhibit force as internal to thought, namely, as that which provides for the unity of thought. To this end, it is investigated what it is for a thought to occur as a forceless part of a propositionally complex assertion (e. g. for p to occur as a part of the assertion that not p).

The notion of absolute spirit, while undeniably central to Hegel’s philosophy, has been somewhat neglected in the literature. Two main lines of interpretation can be identified: a traditional metaphysical reading, according to which “absolute spirit” refers to an infinite spiritual substance, and a non-metaphysical reading, according to which it refers to activities in which human beings articulate their understanding of the principles that guide their communal life. Both types of reading are problematic exegetically as well as philosophically. This article develops an epistemological reading instead. Accordingly, “absolute spirit” refers to a kind of knowledge, which is distinct from empirical and practical knowledge. Hegel conceives of art, religion, and philosophy as species of such knowledge. While this view might seem astonishing, it can be justified by showing that it is by recourse to paradigmatic instances of artistic, religious, and philosophical activity that the otherwise indefinable notion of truth is fixed.

This volume deals with the connection between thinking-and-speaking and our form of life. All contributions engage with Wittgenstein’s approach to this topic. As a whole, the volume takes a stance against both biological and ethnological interpretations of the notion "form of life" and seeks to promote a broadly logico-linguistic understanding instead. The structure of this book is threefold. Part one focuses on lines of thinking that lead from Wittgenstein’s earlier thought to the concept of form of life in his later work. Contributions to part two examine the concrete philosophical function of this notion as well as the ways in which it differs from cognate concepts. Contributions to part three put Wittgenstein’s notion of form of life in perspective by relating it to phenomenology, ordinary language philosophy and problems in contemporary analytic philosophy.