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Christian Mott

Columbia University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    7
    • Most Recent
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    2

 More details
  • Columbia University
    Doctoral student
Homepage
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Experimental Philosophy
Experimental Philosophy of Mind
Experimental Philosophy: Ethics
Punishment in Criminal Law
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Law
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  • All publications (7)
  •  18
    Statutes of Limitations and Personal Identity
    In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2, Oxford University Press. pp. 243-269. 2018.
    Legal theorists have proposed several theories to justify statutes of limitations in the criminal law, but none of these normative theories is generally accepted. This chapter investigates the related descriptive question as to whether ordinary people have the intuition that legal punishment becomes less appropriate as time passes from the date of the offense and, if they do, what factors play a role in these intuitions. Five studies demonstrate that there is an intuitive statute of limitations …Read more
    Legal theorists have proposed several theories to justify statutes of limitations in the criminal law, but none of these normative theories is generally accepted. This chapter investigates the related descriptive question as to whether ordinary people have the intuition that legal punishment becomes less appropriate as time passes from the date of the offense and, if they do, what factors play a role in these intuitions. Five studies demonstrate that there is an intuitive statute of limitations on both legal punishment and moral criticism, and that these intuitions arise, in part, from judgments about changes in psychological connectedness over time.
  •  10
    Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Xiang Zhou, Daniel Wilkenfeld, Hugo Viciana, Kevin Tobia, Emile Thalabard, Jan Sprenger, Paulo Sousa, Felipe Romero, Kevin Reuter, Navin Rambharose, Jonathan Phillips, Mark Phelan, Tania Moerenhout, Edouard Machery, Shen-yi Liao, Anthony Lantian, Miklos Kurthy, Joshua Knobe, Markus Kneer, Hanna Kim, Kareem Khalifa, François Jaquet, Wenjia Hu, José V. Hernández-Conde, Ivar Hannikainen, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Brian D. Earp, Vilius Dranseika, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Rodrigo Diaz, Fiery Cushman, Matteo Colombo, Jordane Boudesseul, Renatas Berniūnas, James Beebe, Mario Attie, James Andow, Aurélien Allard, Angela Abatista, Brent Strickland, and Florian Cova
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4): 999-1003. 2021.
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  26
    The Experimental Jurisprudence of Persistence through Time
    In Kevin Tobia (ed.), The Cambridge handbook of experimental jurisprudence, Cambridge University Press. pp. 293-305. 2025.
    Experimental Philosophy: Persons
  •  3396
    True happiness: The role of morality in the folk concept of happiness
    with Jonathan Phillips, Julian De Freitas, June Gruber, and Joshua Knobe
    Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 146 (2): 165-181. 2017.
    Recent scientific research has settled on a purely descriptive definition of happiness that is focused solely on agents’ psychological states (high positive affect, low negative affect, high life satisfaction). In contrast to this understanding, recent research has suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness is also sensitive to the moral value of agents’ lives. Five studies systematically investigate and explain the impact of morality on ordinary assessments of happiness. Study 1 demonstra…Read more
    Recent scientific research has settled on a purely descriptive definition of happiness that is focused solely on agents’ psychological states (high positive affect, low negative affect, high life satisfaction). In contrast to this understanding, recent research has suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness is also sensitive to the moral value of agents’ lives. Five studies systematically investigate and explain the impact of morality on ordinary assessments of happiness. Study 1 demonstrates that moral judgments influence assessments of happiness not only for untrained participants, but also for academic researchers and even in those who study happiness specifically. Studies 2 and 3 then respectively ask whether this effect may be explained by general motivational biases or beliefs in a just world. In both cases, we find evidence against these explanations. Study 4 shows that the impact of moral judgments cannot be explained by changes in the perception of descriptive psychological states. Finally, Study 5 compares the impact of moral and non-moral value, and provides evidence that unlike non-moral value, moral value is part of the criteria that govern the ordinary concept of happiness. Taken together, these studies provide a specific explanation of how and why the ordinary concept of happiness deviates from the definition used by researchers studying happiness.
    Experimental Philosophy: Ethics, MiscHappinessExperimental Philosophy of Mind, Misc
  •  486
    Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Florian Cova, Brent Strickland, Angela Abatista, Aurélien Allard, James Andow, Mario Attie, James Beebe, Renatas Berniūnas, Jordane Boudesseul, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman, Rodrigo Diaz, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Vilius Dranseika, Brian D. Earp, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Ivar Hannikainen, José V. Hernández-Conde, Wenjia Hu, François Jaquet, Kareem Khalifa, Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer, Joshua Knobe, Miklos Kurthy, Anthony Lantian, Shen-yi Liao, Edouard Machery, Tania Moerenhout, Mark Phelan, Jonathan Phillips, Navin Rambharose, Kevin Reuter, Felipe Romero, Paulo Sousa, Jan Sprenger, Emile Thalabard, Kevin Tobia, Hugo Viciana, Daniel Wilkenfeld, and Xiang Zhou
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 1-36. 2018.
    Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi stud…Read more
    Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward.
    Philosophy of MindFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyEx…Read more
    Philosophy of MindFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyExperimental Aesthetics
  •  351
    Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Florian Cova, Brent Strickland, Angela Abatista, Aurélien Allard, James Andow, Mario Attie, James Beebe, Renatas Berniūnas, Jordane Boudesseul, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman, Rodrigo Diaz, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Vilius Dranseika, Brian D. Earp, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Ivar Hannikainen, José V. Hernández-Conde, Wenjia Hu, François Jaquet, Kareem Khalifa, Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer, Joshua Knobe, Miklos Kurthy, Anthony Lantian, Shen-yi Liao, Edouard Machery, Tania Moerenhout, Mark Phelan, Jonathan Phillips, Navin Rambharose, Kevin Reuter, Felipe Romero, Paulo Sousa, Jan Sprenger, Emile Thalabard, Kevin Tobia, Hugo Viciana, Daniel Wilkenfeld, and Xiang Zhou
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (1): 45-48. 2018.
    Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.
    Philosophy of MindCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscEx…Read more
    Philosophy of MindCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscExperimental Philosophy, Misc
  •  1333
    Statutes of Limitations and Personal Identity
    In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume Two, Oxford University Press. pp. 243-269. 2018.
    Legal theorists have proposed several theories to justify statutes of limitations in the criminal law, but none of these normative theories is generally accepted. This chapter investigates the related descriptive question as to whether ordinary people have the intuition that legal punishment becomes less appropriate as time passes from the date of the offense and, if they do, what factors play a role in these intuitions. Five studies demonstrate that there is an intuitive statute of limitations …Read more
    Legal theorists have proposed several theories to justify statutes of limitations in the criminal law, but none of these normative theories is generally accepted. This chapter investigates the related descriptive question as to whether ordinary people have the intuition that legal punishment becomes less appropriate as time passes from the date of the offense and, if they do, what factors play a role in these intuitions. Five studies demonstrate that there is an intuitive statute of limitations on both legal punishment and moral criticism, and that these intuitions arise, in part, from judgments about changes in psychological connectedness over time.
    Experimental Philosophy: Folk MoralityExperimental Philosophy: Persons
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