Christian O. Scholz

Aphantasia, a cognitive norm variant characterized by the reduced or absent ability to form visual mental imagery, has been a recent topic of interest in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. A thus far little-discussed finding is that the affected often report having been unaware of their imagery inability for decades of their life. This phenomenon is here referred to as aphantasia nescience (the lack of knowledge of one’s aphantasia). This article presents a possible solution for the puzzle of how aphantasics (people with aphantasia) can remain in a state of aphantasia nescience. It is argued that aphantasic children learn how to play the language-game of visualization, that is, to use the term visualization (and related terms) in socially desirable ways, leading both them and their visualizing peers to remain unaware of the aphantasics’ deviant phenomenology. It is suggested that the presented analysis can function as a template for exploring other cases (e.g., anendophasia) where deviant phenomenology remains undiscovered due to the behavioral abilities of the affected.

In his recent book Mental imagery: Philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, Nanay presents a far-reaching empirically grounded account of mental imagery. This commentary focuses on Nanay's proposal that individuals with aphantasia, a cognitive norm variant characterized by an absence of imagery experience, have unconscious mental imagery. Recent empirical findings on aphantasia are reviewed, and evidence both for and against voluntary and involuntary unconscious mental imagery in aphantasia is discussed in the context of Nanay's general account of mental imagery and its taxonomy. It is argued that people with aphantasia, contrary to Nanay's proposal, do not possess unconscious mental imagery.