•  50
    Valuing Knowledge: A Deontological Approach
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4): 413-428. 2009.
    The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest in tr…Read more
  •  78
    Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59 155-182. 2006.
    In the first section of this paper I draw, on a purely conceptual level, a distinction between two kinds of reasons: content-related and attitude-related reasons. The established view is that, in the case of the attitude of believing something, there are no attitude-related reasons. I look at some arguments intended to establish this claim in the second section with an eye to whether these argument could be generalized to cover the case of preferences as well. In the third section I argue agains…Read more
  •  26
    Beware of Safety
    Analytic Philosophy 01-29. 2019.
    Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The…Read more
  •  26
    Norm-reasons and evidentialism
    with Frank Hofmann
    Analysis 79 (2): 202-206. 2019.
    It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evident…Read more
  •  24
    Treating Broome Fairly
    Utilitas 29 (2): 214-238. 2017.
  •  7
    Normative Practical Reasoning: Christian Pillar
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1): 195-216. 2001.
  • Defending Humeanism
    Dissertation, Princeton University. 1997.
    So-called Humean theories of practical rationality elaborate on David Hume's famous dictum that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions". According to Humeanism, beliefs alone cannot determine what one rationally should do. Desires are always involved in practical reasons. A version of Humeanism is developed and defended in this dissertation. ;Its basic principle is the following: If a person believes that some event x increases the likelihood of the occurrence of some other e…Read more
  •  3
    Preface
    with Johannes Brandl and Wolfgang Gombocz
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 1-2. 1991.
  •  57
    Two accounts of objective reasons (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.
    GE Moore vehemently defended the view that what actually happens and not what we, even reasonably, expect to happen, determines what we ought to do. ‘The only possible reason that can justify any action’, Moore writes, ‘is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized’. Moore is an objectivist about reasons and duties: The world and not our view of it gives us reasons to act; the way the world is, and not the way we think it is, determines what we ought to…Read more
  •  26
    On Keith lehrer’s belief in acceptance
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 37-61. 1991.
    Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, it is impossible to pursue the aim of truth…Read more
  •  13
    Es wird versucht, die Stellung des Vindizierungsarguments im Gesamtzusammenhang des Induktionsproblems genauer festzulegen, und eine neue Sichtweise dieses Arguments als entscheidungstheoretisches Dominanzargument wird vorgeschlagen. Diese neue Interpretation bewährt sich in der Konfrontation mit alten Einwänden, doch zeigt sich schließlich, daß sich auch gegen diese Form des Vindizierungsarguments ein erfolgreicher Widerlegungsversuch führen läßt. Eine allgemeine Formulierung des vorgebrachten …Read more
  •  11
    Book reviews (review)
    Erkenntnis 41 (1): 127-133. 1994.
  •  8
    Ways of being good
    Acta Analytica 27 153-168. 2001.
  •  32
    Evidentialism, Transparency, and Commitments
    Philosophical Issues 26 (1): 332-350. 2016.
  •  24
    Comment on Keith Lehrer and Vann McGee's Solution of Newcomb's Problem
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 221-228. 1991.
    Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, it is impossible to pursue the aim of truth…Read more
  •  5
    Two Accounts of Objective Reasons
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 444-451. 2003.
    GE Moore vehemently defended the view that what actually happens and not what we, even reasonably, expect to happen, determines what we ought to do. ‘The only possible reason that can justify any action’, Moore writes, ‘is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized’. Moore is an objectivist about reasons and duties: The world and not our view of it gives us reasons to act; the way the world is, and not the way we think it is, determines what we ought to…Read more
  •  192
    John Greco claims that knowledge is a kind of achievement. The value achievements have (as such) shows, according to Greco, why knowledge is better than mere true belief. I argue that, for a variety of reasons, it is not always good to know. Furthermore, it is wrong to think that achievements are always good – think of achieving what is bad. Greco is mistaken twice; this leaves the idea that knowledge is a kind of achievement intact.
  •  9
    On Keith lehrer’s belief in acceptance
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 37-61. 1991.
    Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, it is impossible to pursue the aim of truth…Read more
  •  6
    Es wird versucht, die Stellung des Vindizierungsarguments im Gesamtzusammenhang des Induktionsproblems genauer festzulegen, und eine neue Sichtweise dieses Arguments als entscheidungstheoretisches Dominanzargument wird vorgeschlagen. Diese neue Interpretation bewährt sich in der Konfrontation mit alten Einwänden, doch zeigt sich schließlich, daß sich auch gegen diese Form des Vindizierungsarguments ein erfolgreicher Widerlegungsversuch führen läßt. Eine allgemeine Formulierung des vorgebrachten …Read more
  •  5
    Choices
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 30 197-207. 1987.
  •  37
    Reliabilist responses to the value of knowledge problem
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1): 121-135. 2009.
    After sketching my own solution to the Value of Knowledge Problem, which argues for a deontological understanding of justification and understands the value of knowing interesting propositions by the value we place on believing as we ought to believe, I discuss Alvin Goldman's and Erik Olsson's recent attempts to explain the value of knowledge within the framework of their reliabilist epistemology.
  •  133
    Morality's Place: Kierkegaard and Frankfurt
    Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 64 (2/4). 2008.
    The aim of this paper is to look at Søren Kierkegaard's defence of an ethical way of life in the light of Harry Frankfurt's work. There are salient general similarities connecting Kierkegaard and Frankfurt: Both are sceptical towards the Kantian idea of founding morality in the laws of practical reason. They both deny that the concerns, which shape our lives, could simply be validated by subject-independent values. Furthermore, and most importantly, they both emphasize the importance of reflecti…Read more
  •  9
    Comment on Keith Lehrer and Vann McGee's Solution of Newcomb's Problem
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 221-228. 1991.
    Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, it is impossible to pursue the aim of truth…Read more
  •  6
    Antikritische Bemerkungen
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1): 197-204. 1988.
  •  299
    The Bootstrapping Objection
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4): 612-631. 2013.
    If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.