Christian Weidemann

Laut theologischem Realismus beanspruchen Christen (Juden, Muslime...) mit Äußerungen wie „Gott hat die Welt erschaffen“ wahre oder falsche Aussagen über eine nicht auf Moral oder Anthropologie reduzierbare, genuin theologische, von menschlichem Denken, Handeln und Sprechen unabhängige Wirklichkeit zu treffen. Der Artikel erläutert diese Bestimmung, führt in die Geschichte der Kritik am Realismus ein, unterscheidet drei Typen von theologischem Antirealismus und grenzt sie vom klassischen Atheismus ab. Da es sich beim Antirealismus um eine vergleichsweise junge, revisionäre Auffassung handelt, liegt die Beweislast bei seinen Vertretern. Sieben Einwände gegen den theologischen Realismus werden vorgestellt, expliziert und als nicht-triftig zurückgewiesen. Dass ein gütiges und mächtiges Wesen unseren Kosmos (buchstäblich!) geschaffen hat und den Schlüssel zu ewigem Leben und universaler Gerechtigkeit in Händen hält, ist eine aufregende Behauptung. Es besteht für die Theologie kein Anlass, statt dieser originalen, gewiss klärungsbedürftigen, womöglich irrigen und skandalösen, aber doch jederzeit interessanten Sache einen blutleeren antirealistischen Wiedergänger als ihren Gegenstand auszugeben.

This paper deals with two problems that arise in the context of Peter van Inwagen’s treatment of responsibility. First, according to van Inwagen, a human person is identical with a human organism. If so, even drastic events, like an irreversible memory loss accompanied by a severe personality change, would not affect the diachronic identity of persons. It seems at least as plausible, however, to treat the amnesiac like a legal successor who inherits certain obligations without being morally accountable for actions of her predecessor. Second, van Inwagen has argued that neither external (skills, number of opportunities etc.) nor internal (desires, values) factors that have statistical effects on human behavior can provide a moral excuse or mitigating circumstance. We present examples that strongly suggest that van Inwagen’s claim is wrong.

After offering a definition of “conspiracy theory” and highlighting some interesting interconnections between conspiracy theories and religious worldviews, we turn to epistemologically relevant analogies. Proponents of conspiracy theories and religions have often been accused of the same biases and epistemic vices, e.g., gullibility, hypersensitive proneness to personal explanations, or overemphasis on holistic thinking. So-called Generalism is best understood as the thesis that conspiracy theories are guilty until proven innocent because they share certain “bunkum-making properties.” However, we argue for the particularist position, i.e. the position that a general epistemic presumption against conspiracy theories is not tenable. Building a negative valence into the very notion of conspiracy theory is not convincing either. Given the analogies, our analysis supports similar verdicts with respect to religious worldviews: Like conspiracy theories, they should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis rather than being dismissed simply for being religious. Finally, we reject Bezazel’s view that both conspiracy theories and religious worldviews constitute a-rational frames or “bliks” that, besides other things, ground what counts as an explanation. Such a proposal squares badly with epistemic misgivings about particularly preposterous examples of conspiracy theories and religious worldviews.

The origin of life on Earth is one of the great unsolved mysteries of science. Although no complete account of life’s beginnings is available and although no life forms that emerged independently on other planets have been discovered, most origin-of-life-researchers and astrobiologists dismiss a chance scenario out of hand. I argue that this is a mistake for at least two reasons. First, given a sufficiently big and adequately variegated cosmos any finite chance of life emerging on Earth-like planets will virtually guarantee the formation of life somewhere. An observational selection effect could then explain why the cosmic neighbourhood we find ourselves in is a very special place (Vast Cosmos Argument). Second, as White (2007) has pointed out, there seems to be no conceivable a priori reason to suppose that processes by which complex molecules arise are more likely to be unintentionally biased towards self-replicating, life-producing molecules than to other types of molecules (Indifferent Nature Argument). Objections to both arguments are discussed and rejected.

Why did God create a vast universe? Various answers are discussed and rejected: a) for its beauty; b) to instill a sense of the sublime in his intelligent creatures; c) to demonstrate his glory, d) to provide a home for extraterrestrial species; e) to guarantee that the natural emergence of (intelligent) life, though extremely rare, happens nonetheless somewhere; f) for no reason at all, because the human notion of efficiency does not apply to God’s actions. Instead, the paper suggests that the universe is intended for Space settlements. Several objections to this proposal are considered and deemed unconvincing.

Richard Swinburne is one of the most influential contemporary proponents of the analytical philosophy of religion. He is, above all, a traditional theist. However, his interests are very wide-ranging. He has written about nearly all central theological and philosophical issues such as epistemology, metaphysics, theory of mind and ethics. During the “Münstersche Vorlesungen 2007” students and faculty members of the Department of Philosophy at Münster University entered into a skilful and interesting discussion concerning most of Swinburne’s positions. This volume presents their contributions as well as Swinburne's replies.