Christiana Werner

According to an epistemically optimistic view of empathy – understood as the simulation of another person’s state – agents learn (1) in which state the target is and (2) what it is like for her to be in this state. Assuming the necessity of justification for knowledge, this view faces the challenge of how imagination can justify beliefs. Constraining simulation to match the target’s state seems to be a solution. Because of the abundance of plausible psychological reactions towards a specific situation, however, we need to know how the target reacts in order to simulate the correct mental state. According to narrativists, we gain this knowledge by means of testimony, which makes simulation superfluous. For those who accept that (2) has epistemic value, the paper presents a solution to the problem of justification that assigns a central role to both testimony and imagination.

This introduction presents an overview of the key issues discussed in the chapters of the book. This volume brings together two philosophical research areas that have been subject to increased attention: work regarding the unique character of having an experience and studies on the nature and powers of imagination. While in recent decades, there has been an increasing interest in examining the epistemic value of experience and the nature of phenomenal knowledge, the philosophy of imagination has emerged simultaneously as a new field of research. New arguments in various philosophical debates suggest that there is a need to examine how both areas of research interrelate and can enrich one another. Our book seeks to bring together these two fields of research and, in so doing, fill a lacuna in the existing literature. The chapters of the book examine topics related to the overlap and intersection of both areas. In particular, the book explores epistemological, ontological, normative, phenomenological, and intersubjective issues common to both areas of research as well as different ways in which philosophical analyses of experience can enhance our understanding of imagination and vice versa.

This article focuses on unjust credibility deficits in cases of testimony about emotional reactions towards acts of oppression. It argues that the injustice in these cases is not rooted in the hearer’s identity prejudices against the speaker, but the hearer's problematic way of dealing with his simulation of being in the speaker's situation. The simulation is in itself not morally problematic. However, I focus on a case where the hearer either recklessly or negligently fails to consider knowledge about the differences in people’s emotional reactions and comes to believe that his simulated reaction is the only possible reaction, thus believing that the speaker does not report her emotions truthfully.In this case, the ‘epistemic poison’ results from the recklessness or negligence not necessarily from identity prejudice against the speaker. This credibility deficit is unjust, yet its persistent and systematic nature stems from the fact that a hearer who is not from the same marginalized or oppressed group as the speaker will simulate different emotional reactions to those reported by the speaker. Hence, the unjust credibility deficit can be connected to other forms of social injustices suffered by the speaker.

According to an optimistic view, affective empathy is a route to knowledge of what it is like to be in the target person’s state (“phenomenal knowledge”). Roughly, the idea is that the empathizer gains this knowledge by means of empathically experiencing the target’s emotional state. The literature on affective empathy, however, often draws a simplified picture according to which the target feels only a single emotion at a time. Co-occurring emotions (“concurrent emotions”) are rarely considered. This is problematic, because concurring emotions seem to support a sceptical view according to which we cannot gain phenomenal knowledge of the target person’s state by means of affective empathy. The sceptic concludes that attaining the epistemic goal of affective empathy is difficult, in practice often impossible. I accept the sceptic’s premises, but reject the conclusion, because of the argument’s unjustified, hidden premise: that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal understanding, not knowledge. Attention to the under-explored phenomenon of concurring emotions clarifies why this is important. I argue that this is the decisive epistemic progress in everyday cases of phenomenal understanding of another person.