Christine Daigle

L’ouvrage de Lukas Gschwend s’inscrit dans la lignée de la nouvelle littérature sur Nietzsche qui se veut une réhabilitation philosophique de son œuvre. Dans cette étude, Gschwend se propose de reconstruire la philosophie nietzschéenne du droit. C’est une tâche difficile, comme tout exposé systématique de cette pensée qui se présente de façon non systématique, voire «chaotique» ainsi que le dira Gschwend. Notre auteur s’attaque donc au corpus nietzschéen pour en extraire les éléments qui relèvent d’une philosophie du droit. Il fait judicieusement appel tant aux œuvres publiées par Nietzsche lui-même qu’à celles qui parurent après sa mort, le fameux Nachlaß, ne privilégiant aucune période au détriment d’une autre. Une bibliographie systématique et imposante et qui peut être fort utile à quiconque souhaite pousser plus loin son investigation sur la philosophie du droit chez Nietzsche est présentée en début d’ouvrage.

Uncovering the theoretical and creative interconnections between posthumanism and philosophies of immanence, this volume explores the influence of the philosophy of immanence on posthuman theory; the varied reworkings of immanence for the nonhuman turn; and the new pathways for critical thinking created by the combination of these monumental discourses. With the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari serving as a vibrant node of immanence, this volume maps a multiplicity of pathways from Deleuze, Guattari and their theoretical allies - including Spinoza and Nietzsche - to posthuman thought. As positions that insist, respectively, on the equal yet distinct powers of mind and body (immanence) and the urgent need to dismantle human privilege and exceptionality (posthumanism), each chapter reveals concepts for rethinking established notions of being, thought, experience, and life. The authors here take examples from a range of different media, including literature and contemporary cinema, featuring films such as Enthiran/The Robot (India, 2010) and CHAPPiE (USA/Mexico, 2015), and new developments in technology and theory. In doing so, they investigate Deleuzian and Guattarian posthumanism from a variety of political and ethical frameworks and perspectives, from afro-pessimism to feminist thought, disability studies, biopolitics, and social justice. Countering the dualisms of Cartesian philosophy and flattening the hierarchies imposed by Humanism, From Deleuze and Guattari to Posthumanism launches vital interrogations of established knowledge and sparks the critical reflection necessary for life in the posthuman era.

When one undertakes research on Nietzsche, a confrontation with Heidegger’s interpretation of his philosophy is almost unavoidable. Widely known, particular and influent, this interpretation is nevertheless problematic and its analysis, particularly of its occurence in Holzwege, leads to a questionning of the generally admitted notions of ontology, metaphysics, ethics, and nihilism. These notions are an integral part of the philosophical vocabulary and never seem to pose a problem. I am claiming here that, although they might seem quite univoqual and clear, these terms do pose a problem, at least when one wants to analyse Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche. I will divide this paper according to the following plan. I will begin by presenting Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche as it appears in Holzwege. This interpretation will lead us to the first question: how to define “ontology”, “metaphysics”, and “ethics” and how to relate them. From this question, and its tentative answer, I will move to the question of Heidegger’s possible nihilism. This discussion will lead us to another question: what is nihilism exactly? With my answer to this question, the circle will be closed and I will determine whether there is nihilism in Nietzsche, as Heidegger claims.

Simone de Beauvoir’s contribution to ethics and politics is articulated through a methodology that successfully renders philosophy as literary and literature as philosophical. Her existential-phenomenological stance permeates her corpus and dictates a philosophical approach that avoids theoretical treatises in favour of philosophy as a way of life which is com­municated in a variety of modes of expression. The Ethics of Ambiguity furnishes us with an example of said philosophy insofar as it performs the philosophy it offers and thereby appeals to the reader to engage in ethical and political action in her own life.

I present an interpretation of the works of Nietzsche’s middle period as offering a phenomenological inquiry. This constitutes an extension of the famous existentialist interpretation of his philosophy. Nietzsche’s concern with the individual qua individual leads him to consider how the human being experiences 1) himself, 2) the presence of others and 3) how the world and the objects therein appear to him. This concern focuses on the human being as an embodied intentional consciousness. I propose to consider Nietzsche as a phenomenologist avant la lettre, that is, as a philosopher whose inquiry anticipates traditional phenomenology. To flesh this out, I explore Nietzsche’s phenomenological view on embodiment and his notion of the body as „die große Vernunft“ (grand reason). I also explore how this view of the situated body forms the ground for Nietzsche’s ethical elaborations. This leads me to conclude that the embodied Übermensch is the phenomenological ethical ideal of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the only one that may allow the individual to flourish.

We will argue that Sartre’s failure and Beauvoir’s success in formulating a successful existential ethics lie in their distinct understandings of transcendence. Sartre’s struggle between transcendent consciousness and immanent body undermines being-in-the-world and being-with-others (what is, in Sartre’s language, only a being-for-others) as a way to enrich the self. Contra Sartre, Beauvoir’s notion of transcendence is an upsurge of being which originates in and necessitates bodily immanence. For Beauvoir, transcendence is to be gained only by revelling in immanence, a gesture that puts oneself at risk toward the Other. This putting oneself at risk is, however, the only way to generate an authentic and no longer conflictual encounter with the Other.

Some have characterized the twentieth century as a Nietzschean century, while others, such as Bernard-Henri Lévy, call this Le siècle de Sartre. Those who are interested in the works of Sartre and Nietzsche wish to know what these two authors, who have left a deep impression on the twentieth century, share in common. Others, myself included, dare to ask: "Was Sartre a Nietzschean?" Studies on this connection are few and, besides Jean-François Louette's book, Sartre contra Nietzsche, no major study exists. What is the particular nature of the relations between their thoughts? Is there an influence of Nietzsche upon Sartre? Is there a philosophical kinship? I will begin by clarifying the question of Sartre's interest in Nietzsche. Then, I will demonstrate that they had the same philosophical starting point: nihilism. Finally, I will show that both give a similar answer to the problem opened by nihilism, the question of meaning.

While many scholars consider Simone de Beauvoir an important philosopher in her own right, thorny issues of mutual influence between her thought and that of Jean-Paul Sartre still have not been settled definitively. Some continue to believe Beauvoir's own claim that Sartre was the philosopher and she was the follower even though their relationship was far more complex than this proposition suggests. Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb, and an international group of scholars explore the philosophical and literary relationship between Beauvoir and Sartre in this penetrating volume. Did each elaborate a philosophy of his or her own? Did they share a single philosophy? Did the ideas of each have an impact on the other? How did influences develop and what was their nature? Who influenced whom most of all? A crisscrossed picture of mutual intricacies and significant differences emerges from the skillful and sophisticated exchange that takes place here.

What are the challenges that Nietzsche's philosophy poses for contemporary phenomenology? Elodie Boublil, Christine Daigle, and an international group of scholars take Nietzsche in new directions and shed light on the sources of phenomenological method in Nietzsche, echoes and influences of Nietzsche within modern phenomenology, and connections between Nietzsche, phenomenology, and ethics. Nietzsche and Phenomenology offers a historical and systematic reconsideration of the scope of Nietzsche’s thought.

Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex presents phenomenolog¬ical analyses that are intertwined and political proposals that posit that the individual ought to acknowledge the ambiguity of her own experience as human as well as the ambiguity of her relations with the Other and enact this ambiguous encounter. This is possible only with the rejection of the patriarchal system of values and meaning which negates ambiguity through its determinations of the feminine and the mascu¬line. A radical transformation of the social imaginaries permeating our lives is needed. The Second Sex functions as a call to its readers to undertake this transformation. My claim is that in addition to putting forward a concept of political subjectivity as fundamentally ambiguous, Beauvoir also addresses us, the readers, as such subjects. I explain that this work is an instance of what Beauvoir defines as metaphysical literature that performs an appeal to ambiguous agents.

This article shows that Sartre's theatrical works offer a reflection on morality, in particular The Flies, The Devil and the Good Lord, and The Sequestered of Altona. The ethical reflections that we find in his plays fill a philosophical gap left after Being and Nothingness. The plays offer an exploration of freedom's rootedness in situation which complements the more theoretical notes of the posthumously published Notebooks for an Ethics. Additionally, I link Sartre's ethics and Nietzsche's ethics showing that both thinkers rest their philosophies on a strict atheism. Further, their elaborations on morality follow a similar path by emphasizing individual freedom and thus subsequently the responsibility of the individual as the creator of values. French Cet article fait la démonstration que les œuvres théâtrales de Sartre, plus particulièrement Les Mouches, Le Diable et le bon dieu et Les Séquestrés d'Altona, tiennent lieu de réflexion morale chez Sartre. La réflexion éthique qu'on y retrouve comble un manque laissé par les écrits philosophiques suivant L'Être et le néant. Les pièces et leur exploration de l'ancrage de la liberté dans la situation offrent un complément aux notes plus théoriques des Cahiers pour une morale, publiés à titre posthume. En plus de faire cette démonstration, cet article explore les liens entre la morale des pièces sartriennes et la morale nietzschéenne. Il ressort de cet examen que ces deux morales s'appuient sur un athéisme pur et dur et s'élaborent de même façon en mettant l'emphase sur la liberté de l'individu et son rôle en tant que créateur de valeurs.

Scholars have often taken Foucault by his words and insisted that his philosophy is completely at odds and opposed to Sartre’s—and Beauvoir’s—existentialism. However, it is my contention that Foucault’s own appreciation and intense critique of existentialist philosophy stems from a series of misunderstandings with regards to the notions of the subject, freedom, and historicity. The purpose of my essay will be to explore affinities between Foucauldian and existentialist philosophy as found in Sartre and Beauvoir’s works, focusing particularly on the ethical notions of authenticity and distantiation from oneself. Indeed, if the existentialist ideal of authenticity as offered by Sartre and Beauvoir aims at a...

Dans son ouvrage, McKinnon a pour but de démontrer que l’éthique de la vertu est une alternative valable et plus prometteuse que ses pendants traditionnels que sont l’éthique du devoir et les différents types d’utilitarismes. Elle reconnaît toutefois que l’éthique de la vertu à cette étape de son développement a besoin d’être peaufinée. Premièrement, il semblerait que la connexion entre ce qui est bon pour les humains et ce que c’est que d’être un bon être humain soit manquante et que donc, au point de vue théorique, le fondement soit manquant. Deuxièmement, il semblerait que les différentes versions proposées de l’éthique de la vertu ne définissent pas assez clairement ce que sont la vertu et le vice et ne posent pas de façon distincte les liens existants entre ceux-ci et le caractère. McKinnon réussira dans son ouvrage à pallier ces deux manques.