•  48
    This volume celebrates the work of Hans-Johann Glock, a philosopher renowned for both his exegesis of Wittgenstein and his many contributions to debates in contemporary philosophy. It brings together 16 new essays by up-and-coming and distinguished philosophers engaging with Glock’s work, and it concludes with a "Reflections and Replies" chapter in which Glock responds to his interlocutors. Glock’s distinctive philosophical voice features a rare combination of a Wittgenstein-inspired approach wi…Read more
  •  17
    Introduction - Wittgenstein and Beyond
    In Christoph C. Pfisterer & Nicole Rathgeb (eds.), Wittgenstein and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Hans-Johann Glock, Routledge. pp. 1-12. 2022.
    The introduction charts Hans-Johann Glock’s academic career, introduces some of his core philosophical views, and provides an overview of the chapters included in the festschrift.
  •  8
    Wittgenstein and Frege on Assertion
    In Gabriele Mras (ed.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics : Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, . pp. 169-182. 2019.
    In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously criticizes Frege's conception of assertion. "Frege's opinion that every assertion contains an assumption", says Wittgenstein, rests on the possibility of parsing every assertoric sentence into two components: one expressing the assumption that is put forward for assertion, the other expressing that it is asserted. But this possibility does not entail that the "assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting" – any more than th…Read more
  •  2
    Prädikation und behauptende Kraft
    In Sarah-Jane Conrad & Silvan Imhof (eds.), P. F. Strawson - Ding und Begriff / Object and Concept, De Gruyter. pp. 51-74. 2010.
  •  16
    Does Doubt Require Reasons?
    Wittgenstein-Studien 13 (1): 31-43. 2022.
    In On Certainty, Wittgenstein conceives a novel way of dispelling skeptical doubts about our knowledge of the external world. He acknowledges that in his attempt to refute the skeptic, Moore uncovered epistemologically relevant propositions such as ‘I know that this is a hand’. But he denies that appealing to such truisms is likely to succeed in refuting skepticism–not because they cannot be doubted, but because they are not objects of knowledge in the first place. Rather than refuting skepticis…Read more
  •  27
    In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously criticizes Frege’s conception of assertion. “Frege’s opinion that every assertion contains an assumption”, says Wittgenstein, rests on the possibility of parsing every assertoric sentence into two components: one expressing the assumption that is put forward for assertion, the other expressing that it is asserted. But this possibility does not entail that the “assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting” - any more than th…Read more
  •  26
    Ryle on Perception
    In David Dolby (ed.), Ryle on Mind and Language, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 146-164. 2015.
    The philosophy of perception is certainly not Ryle’s main preoccupation, though he turns his attention to it on several occasions. His most extensive treatment of perception can be found in "The Concept of Mind", where he dedicates a whole chapter to the topic. Some of the ideas are fleshed out and elaborated later in "Dilemmas" and in the article ‘Sensation’. Among the recurring subjects is the difference between perception and sensation, the critique of sense-data and the grammar of perception…Read more
  •  139
    The Real Nature of Kripke's Paradox
    Wiener Linguistische Gazette 64 83-98. 2000.
    Reading Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language", at first one can easily get confused about his claim that the problem discovered was a sort of ontological skepticism. Contrary to the opinion of a great number of contemporary philosophers who hold that rule-following brings up merely epistemological problems I will argue that the scepticism presented by Kripke really is ontological because it is concerned with the exclusion of certain facts. The first section in this paper is dedic…Read more
  •  25
    Gedanken beleuchten. Frege und Davidson zum Problem der Prädikation
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (4): 583-595. 2009.
    The paper examines Davidson′s discussion of Frege on the problem of predication. Simple declarative sentences are unities that are true or false; how do predicates contribute to this kind of semantic unity? According to Davidson, the problem cannot be solved by assigning referents to predicates, since this leads to an infinite regress. Frege famously contributes the idea that predicates are “incomplete” or “unsaturated” functional expressions, mapping objects to truth-values. However, he takes p…Read more
  •  19
    Kitcher and Frege on A Priori Knowledge
    Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 38 (94): 29-44. 2009.
    In his book The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge and in a series of articles, Philip Kitcher attacks the traditional conception of a priori mathematical knowledge. The reliabilism he develops as an alternative situates all our knowledge within a psychological framework. However, in Frege‘s Epistemology he claims that Frege‘s conception of a priori knowledge is compatible with a psychological account. Kitcher attributes to Frege a traditional concept of proof, according to which mathematical and …Read more
  •  12
    Kitcher and Frege on A Priori Knowledge
    Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 94 29-43. 2010.
    In his book "The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge" and in a series of articles, Philip Kitcher attacks the traditional conception of a priori mathematical knowledge. The reliabilism he develops as an alternative situates all our knowledge within a psychological framework. However, in "Frege's Epistemology" he claims that Frege's conception of a priori knowledge is compatible with a psychological account. Kitcher attributes to Frege a traditional concept of proof, according to which mathematical …Read more
  •  18
    Moores Paradox, Behaupten, Urteilen
    Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 37 (91): 41-62. 2008.
    Moore was first to notice that it is absurd to assert sentences of the form “p, but I don’t believe it.” As it looks even more absurd to believe what such a sentence states, explanations of Moore’s paradox have primarily focused on the beliefs thus asserted. Shoemaker, for example, analyzes these beliefs in terms of conflicting higher order beliefs. Kriegel, in return, provides an explanation in terms of logical contradictions. I shall argue that both accounts rest on the mistaken assumption tha…Read more