Christoph J Merdes

The theory of hermeneutical injustice analyzes the wrongs suffered due to deficiencies in the shared interpretive resources of a society. A hermeneutical injustice is diagnosed when individuals of a social type are persistently and systematically hindered to understand a significant part of their experiences due to such interpretive scarcity. The theory uncovers a number of important phenomena, such as the relationship between symmetry in ignorance and asymmetry in consequence. In this paper, we develop a reconstruction of deficient interpretive resources to capture such phenomena more precisely and investigate novel implications of the existing theoretical account. The formal reconstruction is set in the framework of imprecise probabilities, a generalization of classical probability which represents an additional quality of uncertainty or ignorance. This quality we deploy to reconstruct a kind of interpretive deficiency and analyze it for both normative force and explanatory power. We conclude that (1) symmetrical ignorance is consistent with asymmetric epistemic action even under shared values and (2) insufficiently developed interpretive re-sources, as represented by imprecise probabilities, can induce a dispersion of credal states. The former is a contribution to the established theoretical discourse, whereas the latter is a novel observation; in tandem, these conclusions illustrate the continuity of the reconstruction with existing work as well as its surplus value in aiding discovery.

Since the introduction of the concept of testimonial injustice, it has been a matter of dispute if giving credit to a speaker in excess of their reliability is generally a wrong. This question is closely related to the applicability of theories of distributive justice to credibility: If credibility is scarce, giving one too much is withholding it from another. In this paper, we use a Bayesian reconstruction of testimony to capture these two issues. The formal analysis allows us to differentiate two competing notions of credibility, both of which seem to be at play in the debate. We show that the answer to both the above questions depends on which concept of credibility is accepted in a given dispute, thus clarifying and making more precise what is at stake and in some cases even resolving the issue. To complete the argument on potential applications of distributive justice to credibility, we discuss the question of an obviously ideal allocation of credibility, developing an alternative representation of prejudice within the model in the process. We conclude that distributive justice is, given the formal explication and specified qualifications, applicable to the allocation of credibility.

Redefreiheit ist häufig als negatives Abwehrrecht aufgefasst worden, und wird dies auch heute noch in vielen Kontexten. Ein solches negatives Abwehrrecht ist jedoch ungeeignet, die der Freiheit zugrundeligenden normativen Gründe vollständig zu realisieren. In diesem Aufsatz wird ein Befähigungsansatz in Stellung gebracht, um eine substanziellere Freiheit zur öffentlichen Rede zu formulieren. Ein zentrales Ergebnis ist die Feststellung, dass die Befähigung zum öffentlichen Sprechen eine korrespsoniderende Befähigung zum Hören verlant; Hören bedeutet dabei nicht nur die sensorische und linguistische Fähigkeit, sprachliche Äußerungen zu verstehen, sondern die Vermögen zu verstehen, wohlwollend zu rezipieren und kritisch zu antworten.