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12Second-Order KnowledgeIn Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. 2010.No abstract available.
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40Agent functionalismIn Mathias Steup (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell. forthcoming.No abstract available.
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13Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for SosaSynthese 197 (12): 1-16. 2017.This paper critically assesses Sosa’s normative framework for performances as well as its application to epistemology. We first develop a problem for one of Sosa’s central theses in the general theory of performance normativity according to which performances attain fully desirable status if and only if they are fully apt. More specifically, we argue that given Sosa’s account of full aptness according to which a performance is fully apt only if safe from failure, this thesis can’t be true. We th…Read more
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15Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.
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12Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion DynamicsErkenntnis (2): 271-283. 2011.This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics suggest that this is a mistake. How scientists ex…Read more
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2In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to CasalegnoDialectica 66 (2): 289-297. 2012.
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18Knowledge and Approximate KnowledgeErkenntnis 79 (S6): 1129-1150. 2014.Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people’s knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alter…Read more
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9How to be a capacitistSynthese 201 (5): 1-16. 2023.Capacitism is the view that capacities come first in epistemological theorising: they are explanatorily basic and key epistemic phenomena are to be analysed in terms of capacities. This paper develops a problem for capacitism and outlines a motivated way of solving it.
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69Trustworthy artificial intelligenceAsian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 1-12. 2020.This paper develops an account of trustworthy AI. Its central idea is that whether AIs are trustworthy is a matter of whether they live up to their function-based obligations. We argue that this account serves to advance the literature in a couple of important ways. First, it serves to provide a rationale for why a range of properties that are widely assumed in the scientific literature, as well as in policy, to be required of trustworthy AI, such as safety, justice, and explainability, are prop…Read more
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28What is trustworthiness?Noûs 57 (3): 667-683. 2023.This paper develops a novel, bifocal account of trustworthiness according to which both trustworthinesssimpliciter(as in ‘Ann is trustworthy’) and trustworthiness tophi(as in ‘Ann is trustworthy when it comes to keeping your secrets’) are analysed in terms of dispositions to fulfil one's obligations. We also offer a systematic account of the relation between the two types of trustworthiness, an account of degrees of trustworthiness and comparative trustworthiness, as well as a view of permissibl…Read more
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Introduction: Virtue theoretic epistemologyIn Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, Cambridge University Press. 2020.
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8Defeat and proficienciesPhilosophical Issues 32 (1): 82-103. 2022.Virtue epistemology is the view that beliefs are attempts at truth (or perhaps knowledge) and, as a result, can be assessed as successful, competent, and apt. Moreover, virtue epistemology identifies central epistemic properties with normative properties of beliefs as attempts. In particular, knowledge is apt belief and justified belief is competent belief. This paper develops a systematic virtue epistemological account of defeat (of justification/competence). I provide reason to think that defe…Read more
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16Inquiry, Knowledge, and UnderstandingOxford University Press. 2021.This study takes inquiry as the starting point for epistemological theorising. It uses this idea to develop new and systematic answers to some of the most fundamental questions in epistemology, including about the nature of core epistemic phenomena as well as their value and the extent to which we possess them.
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18Assertion: A Function First AccountNoûs 52 (2): 411-442. 2018.This paper aims to develop a novel account of the normativity of assertion. Its core thesis is that assertion has an etiological epistemic function, viz. to generate knowledge in hearers. In conjunction with a general account of etiological functions and their normative import, it is argued that an assertion is epistemically good if and only if it has the disposition to generate knowledge in hearers. In addition, reason is provided to believe that it makes sense to regulate the practice of asser…Read more
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18How to be an infallibilistPhilosophical Studies 179 (8): 2675-2682. 2022.While fallibilism has been the dominant view in epistemology in recent times, the field has witnessed the rise of a new form of infallibilism. In a recent book, Jessica Brown has taken on the task of mounting a systematic defence of fallibilism against this new infallibilism. She argues that new infallibilism incurs several problematic commitments that fallibilism can avoid. In addition, the key data points that infallibilists have adduced in support of their view can be accommodated by fallibil…Read more
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7Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of AssertionCambridge University Press. 2021.Assertion is the central vehicle for the sharing of knowledge. Whether knowledge is shared successfully often depends on the quality of assertions: good assertions lead to successful knowledge sharing, while bad ones don't. In Sharing Knowledge, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion investigate the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and develop an account of what it is to assert well. More specifically, they argue that the function of assertion is to share knowledge with others. It is th…Read more
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5Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeatPhilosophical Issues 30 (1): 192-204. 2020.Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 192-204, October 2020.
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7Moral AssertionEthical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4): 639-649. 2020.In this paper, I introduce a puzzle about moral assertion and defend a solution that centrally features the claim that the normativity of moral assertion centrally features moral understanding.
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35Theory of inquiryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2): 359-384. 2020.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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23Inquiry, knowledge and understandingSynthese 198 (Suppl 7): 1583-1593. 2018.This paper connects two important debates in epistemology—to wit, on the goal of inquiry and on the nature of understanding—and offers a unified knowledge-based account of both.
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1Review of Jennifer Lackey's Learning from WordsThe Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237): 748-750. 2009.status: published.
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9Commodious knowledgeSynthese 194 (5): 1487-1502. 2017.This paper offers a novel account of the value of knowledge. The account is novel insofar as it advocates a shift in focus from the value of individual items of knowledge to the value of the commodity of knowledge. It is argued that the commodity of knowledge is valuable in at least two ways: in a wide range of areas, knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact with the world and for us the good life is a life rich enough in knowledge.
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4How to motivate anti-luck virtue epistemologyGrazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1): 211-225. 2013.Duncan Pritchard has recently defended an account of knowledge that combines a safety condition with an ability condition on knowledge. In order to explain this bipartite structure of knowledge he appeals to Edward Craig's work on the concept of knowledge. This paper argues that Pritchard's envisaged explanation fails and offers a better alternative.
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12Proper bootstrappingSynthese 190 (1): 171-185. 2013.According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type of …Read more
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7The C account of assertion: a negative resultSynthese 197 (1): 125-137. 2020.According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature.
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8The knowledge norm of blamingAnalysis 80 (2): 256-261. 2020.This paper argues that the standard evidence for the knowledge norm of assertion can be extended to provide evidence for a corresponding knowledge norm of blame.
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10Assertion: the constitutive norms viewIn Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford University Press. 2018.Two important philosophical questions about assertion concern its nature and normativity. This article defends the optimism about the constitutive norm account of assertion and sets out a constitutivity thesis that is much more modest than that proposed by Timothy Williamson. It starts by looking at the extant objections to Williamson’s Knowledge Account of Assertion and argues that they fail to hit their target in virtue of imposing implausible conditions on engaging in norm-constituted activit…Read more
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34Conceptual Innovation, Function FirstNoûs 54 (4): 985-1002. 2019.Can we engineer conceptual change? While a positive answer to this question would be exciting news for philosophy, there has been a growing number of pessimistic voices in the literature. This paper resists this trend. Its central aim is to argue not only that conceptual engineering is possible but also that it is not even distinctively hard. In order to achieve this, we will develop a novel approach to conceptual engineering that has two key components. First, it proposes a reorientation of the…Read more
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16Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue EpistemologyRoutledge. 2018.Process reliabilism -- Virtue reliabilism: justified belief -- Virtue reliabilism: knowledge -- Knowledge first virtue reliabilism -- The competition -- The safety dilemma -- Lottery cases.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
General Philosophy of Science |
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |