Christophe Facal

Le deuil est un processus d’adaptation à une perte significative qui implique de réorganiser sa vie en y intégrant cette perte. Reconnu comme l’une des expériences les plus éprouvantes et stressantes de la vie, ce processus pourrait être profondément transformé par les avatars numériques post mortem basés sur l’intelligence artificielle (griefbots). Ces systèmes d’IA prétendent conserver l’identité d’une personne et permettre ainsi de maintenir une relation avec elle après sa mort. Or, ces programmes d’IA ont des limites importantes, et leur utilisation risque de mener à des abus et des préjudices s’ils ne sont pas réglementés.

I argue that the Problem of Evil diminishes the likelihood of the simulation hypothesis being true. In section 1, I present the simulation hypothesis. In section 2, I present the Problem of Evil and how it can be addressed to the simulation hypothesis. In section 3, I strengthen my claim by defending the idea that, on the grounds of the expansion of the moral circle, we can infer that potential simulators would most probably view simulated beings as moral subjects. Section 4 is dedicated to counterarguments and their responses, and section 5 contains a conclusion where I clarify the probabilistic nature of my argument.

This paper challenges the prevailing notion in vulnerability theory that only relational vulnerability holds moral significance for aiding the vulnerable. Contrary to this stance, I contend that ontological vulnerability carries moral relevance, and thus grounds a consequentialist duty to mitigate potential harm. This duty constitutes the core ethical principle of transhumanism. My aim will therefore be to defend transhumanism’s central moral tenet from within the framework of vulnerability theory, by showing that ontological vulnerability has moral significance. Section 1 will introduce transhumanism’s moral objective, emphasizing the role of ontological vulnerability. Section 2 will analyze the relational and dispositional accounts of vulnerability, emphasizing the reasons why such kinds of vulnerabilities ground duties to help the vulnerable. Section 3 argues that these same reasons also ground moral obligations to remedy ontological vulnerability, therefore committing us to endorse transhumanism’s moral endeavor highlighted in section 1.