• Punishment
    In John Tasioulas (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Law, Cambridge University Press. 2020.
  •  12
    Desert and Dissociation
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (1): 116-134. 2024.
    I argue against the idea of basic desert. I claim that the supposed normative force of desert considerations is better understood in terms of dissociation. The starting point is to note that an important strategy in spelling out the apparent normative force of desert considerations appeals to the idea of complicity. I argue that the idea of basic desert cannot give a good explanation of this connection. I propose that it is rather dissociation that is explanatorily basic. I further argue that di…Read more
  •  8
    Much has been written about recidivist punishments, particularly within the area of criminology. However there is a notorious lack of penal philosophical reflection on this issue. This book attempts to fill that gap by presenting the philosopher’s view on this matter as a way of furthering the debate on recidivist punishments
  •  220
    What is morality? How do we define what is right and wrong? How does moral theory help us deal with ethical issues in the world around us? This second edition provides an engaging and stimulating introduction to philosophical thinking about morality. Christopher Bennett provides the reader with accessible examples of contemporary and relevant ethical problems, before looking at the main theoretical approaches and key philosophers associated with them. Topics covered include: life and death issue…Read more
  •  18
    What Goes On When We Apologize?
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23 (1). 2022.
    In this paper, I argue that our practice of giving and demanding apologies is rationalized by a belief that apologies make a difference to our normative situation. The characteristic normative effects of an apology are, I claim, that it removes an obligation on others to distance themselves from the wrongdoer, and that it makes the apologizer personally accountable to the addressee for their future compliance with the obligation they violated. However, if we ask what rationalizes that belief, tw…Read more
  •  118
    The Alteration Thesis: Forgiveness as a Normative Power
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (2): 207-233. 2018.
  •  15
    Russell on Naturalism and Practical Reason (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1): 347-356. 2019.
    This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. On the other…Read more
  •  6
    Russell on Naturalism and Practical Reason (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1): 347-356. 2019.
    This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. On the other…Read more
  •  7
    Russell on Naturalism and Practical Reason (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1): 347-356. 2019.
    This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. On the other…Read more
  •  211
    Penal Disenfranchisement
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (3): 411-425. 2016.
    This paper considers the justifiability of removing the right to vote from those convicted of crimes. Firstly, I consider the claim that the removal of the right to vote from prisoners is necessary as a practical matter to protect the democratic process from those who have shown themselves to be untrustworthy. Secondly, I look at the claim that offenders have broken the social contract and forfeited rights to participate in making law. And thirdly, I look at the claim that the voting ban is esse…Read more
  •  15
    In this paper I give an interpretation of the Wim Wenders film, Paris, Texas, that brings to bear Talbot Brewer’s notion of “dialectical activity.” According to Brewer, dialectical activity is an a...
  •  22
    Is Amnesty an Act of Political Forgiveness?
    Contemporary Political Theory 2 (1): 67-76. 2003.
  •  42
    Excuses, Justifications and the Normativity of Expressive Behaviour
    Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 32 (3): 563-581. 2012.
    In this article, I look at the role of appeals to the emotions in criminal law defences. A position commonly held is that appeals to the emotions can excuse but cannot justify. However, we should be careful that this view does not rest on too simple and non-cognitive a view of the emotions. I contrast a simple picture, according to which action from emotion involves loss of rational control, with the more Aristotelian picture recently offered by RA Duff. I then look at John Gardner’s theory of e…Read more
  •  20
    Expression, Freedom of Speech and the State
    Jurisprudence 8 (2): 360-369. 2017.
  •  90
    Considering Capital Punishment as a Human Interaction
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2): 367-382. 2013.
    This paper contributes to the normative debate over capital punishment by looking at whether the role of executioner is one in which it is possible and proper to take pride. The answer to the latter question turns on the kind of justification the agent can give for what she does in carrying out the role. So our inquiry concerns whether the justifications available to an executioner could provide him with the kind of justification necessary for him to take pride in what he does. If they cannot, I…Read more
  •  15
    Considering Murphy on Human Executioners
    Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (1): 111-116. 2017.
    I am very grateful to Jeffrie Murphy for his response to my article1 and to Jonathan Jacobs for the chance to respond in turn to Murphy’s criticisms. It is a particular honor for me to respond to J...
  •  43
    A Review of David Owens' Shaping the Normative Landscape (review)
    Jurisprudence 6 (2): 364-370. 2015.
  •  25
    Actions, Institutions, and the Common Good
    Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (2): 205-212. 2011.
    Seumas Miller, The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, 371 pp. ISBN: 978-0-521-76794-1 hardback; 978-0-521-74439-3 paperback. If one were loo...
  •  91
    How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018 Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms, such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues that the proper aim of social punishment is to put …Read more
  •  17
    ABSTRACTAn influential view in recent philosophy of punishment is that the apparatus of criminal justice should be geared at least in part to state censure of wrongdoing. I argue that if it were to be so geared, such an apparatus would make ambitious claims to authority, and that the legitimacy of the relevant state would then depend on whether those claims can be vindicated. This paper looks first at what kind of authority is being claimed by this apparatus. The criminal law, I argue, cannot me…Read more
  •  21
    Shoemaker on Sentiments and Quality of Will
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4): 573-584. 2019.
    In this comment, I raise a number of concerns about David Shoemaker’s adoption of the quality of will approach in his recent book, Responsibility from the Margins. I am not sure that the quality of will approach is given an adequate grounding that defends it against alternative models of moral responsibility; and it is unclear what the argument is for Shoemaker’s tripartite version of the quality of will approach. One possibility that might fit with Shoemaker’s text is that the tripartite model …Read more
  •  4
    Personal and Redemptive Forgiveness
    European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 127-144. 2003.
  •  15
    Review Article: Forgiveness and the Claims of Retribution
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1): 89-101. 2004.
  •  106
    Is Amnesty a Collective Act of Forgiveness?
    Contemporary Political Theory 2 (1): 67-76. 2003.
    Amnesty in the context of national reconciliation involves waiving or cancelling the punishment of convicted or suspected criminals in the name of peace. We can distinguish three positions: amnesty is wrong because it is unjust; amnesty is unjust, but necessary; and amnesty is just because it expresses forgiveness. The third position sounds promising. However, it assumes that when we forgive, we can justifiably waive or cancel the need for punishment. I argue that only punishment that expresses …Read more